Whether it’s cars, high-end electronics, or groceries, nowadays, we want things cheap, and we want them now. It is hard to overstate the impact that the rise of e-commerce has had on consumers’ buying habits, and the fashion industry is no exception. The rise of so-called “fast fashion” brands feels like the natural progression of the digitalization of commerce. Yet, in the drive to reinvent the fashion industry and cut costs, Chinese e-commerce sites like SHEIN and Temu are engaging in unacceptable practices and, in many instances, outright abuses of human rights.

The United States and other Western countries should not sit idly by and allow products produced with forced labor to contaminate our markets. To that end, it is heartening to see a new bipartisan effort to investigate the practices of SHEIN, Temu, and other such companies. However, the Biden administration’s proposal to effectively eliminate the de minimis tariff exemptions for all Chinese products drives in a nail with a sledgehammer. Rather than using such a broad policy to address the human rights violations and improper trade practices of some firms, the Biden administration should use the tailored authority provided to it under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) and address human rights abuses by Chinese firms on a case-by-case basis.

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As the market for fast fashion continues to grow, SHEIN and Temu have become household names in the United States, offering ultra-cheap, trendy apparel that appeals particularly to younger consumers. However, behind these rock-bottom prices and overnight delivery lies a disturbing truth—these companies routinely engage in human rights violations and flout American trade laws.

According to a recent interim report by the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, both brands have been implicated in the exploitation of forced labor in China’s Xinjiang region, where the ethnic Uyghur population endures systemic oppression, forced labor, and detention under the Chinese government. Temu, in particular, has virtually no systems to ensure that its supply chains are free from forced labor and that products comply with human rights and trade laws like the UFLPA. This not only raises serious ethical concerns but also puts U.S. consumers in a position where their purchases may indirectly fund and perpetuate genocide in Xinjiang.

With the evidence against SHEIN and Temu as damning as it is, the obvious question is how have these companies managed to get around the numerous U.S. laws that prevent the import and sale of products manufactured using forced labor? One way these companies get around U.S. trade law is through the de minimis exemption from tariffs and customs enforcement. By shipping products in quantities valued under $800, companies like SHEIN and Temu can avoid import duties and disclosure requirements and skirt U.S. trade laws.

This exemption was never intended to serve as a workaround for large-scale e-commerce operations to flood the market with cheap goods, let alone those produced under forced labor conditions. In fact, according to the White House, “the number of shipments entering the United States claiming the de minimis exemption has increased significantly, from approximately 140 million a year to over one billion a year” over the last decade. The majority of this increase comes from just a handful of Chinese e-commerce companies, including SHEIN and Temu.

The Blunt Instrument of Ending The De Minimis Exemption

In response to the human rights issues connected to SHEIN and Temu’s continued exploitation of the de minimis exemption, the Biden administration recently announced new rules to eliminate the exemption for most Chinese goods. This move presents a strong stand against Chinese exploitation of U.S. trade laws and its own people. However, as with any broad policy, the potential unintended consequences cannot be overlooked.

First, eliminating the de minimis exemption entirely may not effectively stop SHEIN, Temu, and other such companies from importing goods illegally produced with forced labor. As we have seen in the past, companies with the resources and motivation to bypass labor laws often find new ways to evade them. In spite of decades of global efforts to prevent it, imports of coffee from South America, cocoa from West Africa, and precious metals from the Congo are still regularly tainted with slave labor. Without more targeted enforcement, the broad elimination of the de minimis exemption might only incentivize these companies to adopt more sophisticated methods of avoidance while continuing to engage in unethical labor practices.

The ineffectiveness of eliminating the de minimis exemption would likely be exacerbated by the enfeebled state of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). As the “boots on the ground” at U.S. ports and border crossings, CBP is the primary agency charged with enforcing U.S. import and export laws. But, due in no small part to the challenges of patrolling the southern border, CBP resources are spread increasingly thin. By one tally, fully implementing the Biden administration’s proposal would require between $8 billion and $30 billion in additional annual funding for CBP and thousands of new officers for an agency already racked by workforce shortages. Without addressing these inherent problems at CBP, simply repealing the exemption is unlikely to achieve the goal of preventing the import of products manufactured using forced labor.

Second, ending the de minimis exemption for all Chinese imports would likely have a significant negative impact on U.S. consumers and businesses. Many small and medium-sized American companies rely on importing goods from China—legitimate products that have no connection to forced labor or human rights abuses. These businesses would be hit with higher costs and increased administrative burdens, leading to higher consumer prices and disruptions in supply chains, amounting to billions of dollars in welfare losses. Research has shown that changes to de minimis rules will most heavily impact lower-income consumers. At a time when inflation is still a concern and consumers are already grappling with high costs, this broad-stroke policy could backfire economically.

Third, the administration’s argument for removing the de minimis exemption perversely invokes national security concerns to protect domestic apparel and textile manufacturers. The administration’s press release concludes, claiming that removing the exemption is critical to protecting the American apparel and manufacturing sector because of its importance to the defense industrial base. Programs specifically designed to support and protect textile manufacturing for critical government needs already exist, so any attempt to bolster these capabilities should begin with an inventory of existing programs and their funding. Furthermore, since 2016, when new de minimis rules came into effect, American exports of fiber, textile, and apparel by value have largely remained steady and reached their highest levels in 2022 and 2023. Attempting to privilege domestic manufacturers under the guise of national security dilutes the importance of addressing improper trade practices and undermines U.S. action.

Finally, such a sweeping measure risks eroding public support for more tailored and effective solutions. There is broad bipartisan agreement on the need to combat forced labor and human rights abuses in China, particularly regarding the plight of the Uyghur people. However, a blanket policy that increases costs for American businesses and consumers related to goods that pose little to no national security risk could undermine future efforts to deter the CCP’s malign practices related to trade and intellectual property. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have rightly focused on addressing strategic weaknesses and security threats posed by Chinese control over advanced semiconductors, digital platforms, and critical minerals. Such moves were focused on addressing specific threats in a narrowly tailored fashion. The administration should take a similar approach to SHEIN and Temu.

A More Targeted Approach

Rather than deploying a one-size-fits-all solution, the Biden administration should leverage the existing authority granted by the UFLPA to address the specific problem posed by SHEIN, Temu, and other companies that rely on forced labor. The UFLPA already provides a robust legal framework to prevent goods produced with forced labor from entering the U.S. market, presuming that all goods from Xinjiang are tainted unless proven otherwise. However, enforcement of the law has been uneven, allowing companies like SHEIN and Temu to continue their operations with minimal disruption.

The administration should focus on strengthening the enforcement of the UFLPA by increasing inspections and audits of companies with ties to Xinjiang, particularly those in the fast fashion industry. By ramping up targeted enforcement efforts, the U.S. can more effectively block products made with forced labor from entering the market without resorting to broad measures that affect legitimate trade. Perhaps more importantly, since Congress has determined on a bipartisan basis that both SHEIN and Temu have facilitated forced labor in Xinjiang by creating a market for such products and contravening U.S. trade laws such as the UFLPA, the Biden administration should consider using its authority under Section 5 of the UFLPA to sanction SHEIN, Temu, and individuals known to have facilitated their actions.

The United States has a moral and strategic obligation to prevent the importation of goods produced with forced labor, particularly from regions like Xinjiang, where the Chinese government is perpetrating gross human rights abuses. While the Biden administration’s proposed elimination of the de minimis exemption for Chinese goods is well intended, it is a blunt instrument that risks harming U.S. consumers and businesses without addressing the root of the problem.

A more targeted approach, focusing on enforcing the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and closing specific loopholes in the de minimis exemption, would be a more effective way to combat forced labor and hold companies like SHEIN and Temu accountable. By adopting a measured and focused strategy, the U.S. can advocate for human rights without compromising its economic interests.

Joshua Levine is the manager of technology policy at the Foundation for American Innovation.

Luke Hogg is director of policy and outreach at the Foundation for American Innovation.

To read the blog as it was published on The National Interest webpage, click here.

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Xi’s visit also conveyed a broader Chinese goal in the Rare Earths sector that goes beyond mining: maintaining leadership in the downstream industrial supply chains of processing, refining, and magnet production. While the semiconductor war gets more attention, there is another tech battle underway in the rare earths supply chains as China continues to tighten its bodog poker review control over what it calls a “state resource” and its supporting technologies. 

The Western rush to build China-free supply chains with both upstream and downstream industries is masking the bigger technological challenge of establishing a sustainable processing capacity. Given the stakes, a targeted approach is required to solve the processing tech puzzle through investments in R&D, international partnerships, and diffusion of alternate methods. 

Rare Earths, Rarer Tech? 

In 1992, while visiting Baotou, Inner Mongolia, one of China’s biggest rare earth mines, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping famously said, “The Middle East has oil, China has rare earths.” He was referring to the country’s resource endowment of over 30% of the world’s reserves. But unlike the Middle Eastern oil producing countries who primarily drill and export crude, China built an entire ecosystem around the rare earths, from mineral production and processing to manufacturing finished products, and most importantly, rare earth magnets.

China has maintained leadership at every step up the ladder. Though its global production share dipped from a staggering 97% in 2011 to around 70% in 2022, it still controls over 85% of processing capacity. China has an effective monopoly over processing major heavy rare earths – Dysprosium (Dy) and Terbium (Tb), and Light Rare Earths – Neodymium (Nd) and Praseodymium (Pr).

Environmental impact is often cited as one of the main reasons for China’s emergence as a rare earth powerhouse, but the technological aspect is less discussed. From 1950 to October 2018, China filed over 25,000 rare earth patents, surpassing the US’ 10,000. Over decades, Chinese engineers perfected the solvent extraction process to refine REEs which plays a critical role in ensuring China’s primacy. Though the technology originated in the United States, environmental and regulatory concerns made domestic rare earth development unfeasible. 

Rare earths are clumped together in rocks, making their processing a complex undertaking. “All of them behave the same way, with very minor differences in chemistry. That means they bond with the same things under the same conditions, and they’re not going to separate from each other readily,” explained Dr. Isabel Barton from the University of Arizona. 

New Tech for Old Problems? 

Given the challenge of accessing China-controlled solvent extraction tech and its environmental costs, multiple research projects are underway to search for cleaner and more sustainable processing methods. One of them is a DARPA-funded program called EMBER (Environmental Microbes as a BioEngineering Resource) to use microbes to process and refine rare earths. A biologist and the Principal Investigator of the project, Marina Kalyuzhnaya, called it an “intensive program” and argued that a biological approach could play an important role. “The goal is to separate REEs, and biology might be specific enough or selective enough to keep individual minerals out of the complex mixture.” She added that the goal was to create “something completely sustainable” but conceded despite exciting breakthroughs, scalability for the project is at least 4-5 years away.

A Vision for Targeted Diversification 

Apart from investing in new tech, the US and other western governments have taken multiple national and international steps to diversify supply chains. Despite the efforts, Benchmark Minerals, a mining advisory firm, projects by 2028, China’s share in processing of both heavy and light rare earths would only drop marginally.

There are many reasons for the sobering predictions. For one, Western governments are trying to focus on all stages of supply chains simultaneously without prioritizing one over the other, causing inefficiency and resource wastage. Two, current policies divert attention from the bigger technological challenge of establishing sustainable processing and refining capacities outside of China. 

To resolve this, there is an urgent need to increase R&D investments for cleaner processing solutions that match or even surpass China’s cumulative investments. The US also needs to address the processing know-how gap as a strategic technological challenge and not just a pollution problem. While state-led investments to spur private interest is essential, the bid to onshore all components of the REE supply chains would be counterproductive in the long run. The US, along with its allies should create an REE-specific strategy and foster development of regional nodes. It took China nearly three decades to dominate REE supply chains; a well-executed diversification effort may not take as long. 

To read the column as it was published on the New Security Beat webpage, click here.

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Night really does follow day! On Tuesday (20 August) the European Union announced its planned anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, a hefty 36.3%.  

On Wednesday (21 August), China retaliated by opening an investigation into EU subsidies for cheese. Affected parties – the European Union, EU member states, dairy producers exporting to China – have twenty days to respond. 

Clever move? 

This move by China is either very clever or very stupid. Or possibly both. Let’s unpick it.  

The first observation to make is that the EU will not have been taken by surprise by the opening of this cheese subsidy case. China invariably retaliates when its trading partners impose restrictions on its exports. In its announcement of the investigation China in fact refers to consultations having taken place with the Commission two weeks ago.  

It is not impossible that it was even choreographed between China and the Commission, so that the Commission can demonstrate to EU member states that there will be a high price to pay if in November the EU imposes definitive duties on electric vehicles.

EU dairy producers in many member states pay the price for a trade spat in a wholly unrelated sector.  

Why cheese? European wine and charcuterie producers must be heaving a sigh of relief as I write, as they were assuming they would yet again be the target of the obligatory retaliation.  

China chose its target carefully. Cheese is a politically high-profile product in European eyes, it comes from a large range of member states – “there’s a cow in every member state” the saying goes. So, the pain will be distributed across the whole of the EU.  

Yet at the same time exports to China – that famously lactose intolerant nation – are limited. In 2023 the EU sent to China just € 190 million worth of cheese. That figure pales in comparison with China’s € 20 billion of electric vehicle sales in Europe now to be hit with a up to 36.3% extra duty.  

This means that the eventual imposition of anti-subsidy duties on Gouda and Pecorino Romano is unlikely to sway member states when they are called on in November to agree definitive duties on Chinese cars.  

China’s announcement is above all political and symbolic, aimed at creating a bit of leverage over the EU but calibrated so as not to represent the opening salvo in a real trade war. 

‘As close as lips and teeth’ 

So far so good. But from another angle one can argue that this Chinese move is misguided and it may come to regret it.  

The investigation was triggered by a request from the domestic industry. 

Knowing how intertwined government and industry are in China – “as close as lips and teeth” as the Chinese proverb has it – it is hardly fanciful to imagine that China’s government instructed industry to lodge the request.  

It is common knowledge that Beijing has a metaphorical drawer of oven-ready dumping and subsidy requests ready to brandish if political circumstances so warrant. 

China has taken great pains in recent years to replace a vacuum left by the United States by arguing that they are reliable multilateralists, wedded to the rule of law.  

An anti-subsidy case launched for purely political and tit-for-tat retaliatory reasons hardly inspires confidence in China’s attachment to those multilateral principles, quite the opposite. It blows China’s narrative out of the water.  Trust, once gone, takes an aeon to restore.  

EU agriculture subsidies proven WTO-proof 

The officials in the Chinese ministry of agriculture will have been tossing and turning in their sleep these last few days. It will be difficult for China to prove that EU cheese benefits from trade distorting subsidies paid to milk producers.  

As an EU official until last year, I was involved in a series of cases in which various trading partners were trying to prove that the income support to farmers paid by the Common Agricultural Policy somehow ended up as a subsidy for the finished product.  

We successfully demonstrated that, in the jargon, there is no “pass through” of money from the primary producers, whether it be with Canada on sugar, the US on table olives, or Australia and Peru on tomato paste or canned tomatoes. In all cases the World Trade Organization or our bilateral dispute settlement courts rejected the other countries’ claims.  

The EU also successfully rebutted claims that direct income support to farmers – who get their dosh irrespective of what they produce or even whether they produce – is product specific and thus a distorting subsidy.  

China will face the same arguments, facts and hurdles in its investigation, along with several WTO precedents and findings that they now cannot ignore.  

The European Dairy Association issued a breezily confident statement declaring the WTO conformity of the CAP toolbox of support schemes from which they benefit. They are right. 

The dog that chased a bus 

Chinese agricultural officials must feel even more ambivalent over the claim – set out in the relevant ministry of commerce notice – that the EU’s environmental payments to farmers represent a distorting subsidy.  

China is following in the EU’s footsteps by progressively paying its farmers to adopt eco-schemes and other forms of environmentally friendly farming practices.  

China would therefore be mortified if its own investigation into EU cheese subsidies were to conclude that green farm payments were trade distorting and thus countervailable.  

This would expose China’s own green subsidy schemes to challenge in the WTO and deal a systemic blow to any country providing green support. China will not want this to happen.  

I am reminded of the story of the dog that used to chase a bus. One day to its surprise it caught the bus. Having caught it, it did not know what to do with it. This is what China may have done in opening this anti subsidy case.  

I am confident nonetheless that if this investigation runs its course, China will determine, will have to determine, that the payment schemes to milk producers do not represent a subsidy to cheesemakers.  

Unless the political relationship with the EU sours dramatically, China will do little more than introduce some minor face-saving duties on cheese, if anything.  

Conclusion? The Chinese action is neither clever nor stupid. Only time will tell. 

John Clarke is a former Director for International Relations at the European Commission and senior EU trade negotiator. He previously headed the EU Delegation to the WTO and UN in Geneva. 

To read the commentary as it was published on the Borderlex webpage, click here.

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The EU’s dedication to advancing environmentally-friendly technologies and mitigating the impact of greenhouse gas emissions is being investigated following the implementation of tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. This decision raises significant concerns regarding the alignment and stability of the European Union’s environmental and trade policies. This apparent contradiction highlights the complex interplay between economic interests, environmental objectives, and global trade dynamics.

The air quality issue throughout Europe is a mix of positive developments and persistent issues and challenges for the greener future. In recent years, there has been a noticeable decrease in pollution levels in numerous cities, thanks to the implementation of effective policies, local initiatives, and improved air quality management practices. Nevertheless, numerous urban areas continue to grapple with higher pollution levels that surpass the health recommendations set by the World Health Organization.

The ongoing problem of air pollution in EU urban areas has led to a concerning number of premature deaths, estimated to be around 400,000 each year. This highlights the urgent need for effective measures to improve air quality and protect public health. There are ongoing challenges in effectively communicating air quality issues, garnering public and political support for additional measures, and ensuring policy coherence across different administrative levels. Although there have been some positive outcomes from local initiatives such as the promotion of cycling, and introduction of low-emission zones, it is clear that further efforts are required to achieve consistent and comprehensive improvements in air quality throughout Europe.

Role of Vehicles in Europe’s Air Pollution

Air pollution continues to be one of the significant concerns for both public health and the environment in Europe, particularly in urban areas, where transportation plays a major role as a contributor. Despite recent advancements, pollution levels caused by vehicles, such as cars, vans, and trucks, still surpass the recommendations set by the World Health Organization (WHO). This unfortunate reality results in approximately 330,000 premature deaths each year in the EU. The annual health costs attributed to road transport pollution are estimated to be between €67-80 billion, with a significant focus on diesel vehicles.

The EU’s Ambient Air Quality Directive (AAQD) and Euro standards have been subjected to criticism for their perceived inadequacy in addressing these issues. The latest Euro 7 standards, scheduled to take effect in 2028, are widely regarded as ineffective and unlikely to have a substantial impact on emissions reduction. Although there have been some advancements, such as the implementation of zero-emission and low-emission zones in urban areas, there are still areas that need improvements. Implementing effective solutions, such as enhancing fuel quality and adopting cleaner technologies, is of utmost importance in mitigating pollution and safeguarding public health.

EU’s Environmental Policy

The EU’s environmental policy is driven by a commitment to precaution, prevention, rectifying pollution at its source, and holding polluters accountable. Its primary objective is to tackle pressing challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution. The policy is based on Articles 11 and 191-193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and covers a range of environmental issues including air and water pollution, waste management, and climate change. In this respect, the notable advancements include the 2019 European Green Deal, which places a strong emphasis on environmental issues and sets the ambitious goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. The 8th Environment Action Programme (EAP) sets forth a comprehensive set of goals for the year 2030. These goals encompass a wide range of areas, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, building climate resilience, transitioning to a circular economy, eliminating pollution, and safeguarding biodiversity.

Horizontal strategies of the EU have encompassed various aspects such as sustainable development and biodiversity. The 2024 Nature Restoration Law aims to restore land, sea areas, and ecosystems. On an international level, the EU actively participates in global environmental agreements, including the Paris Agreement. The Aarhus Convention guarantees the involvement of the public in making environmental decisions. Implementation requires a coordinated effort at the national, regional, and local levels, with the support of tools such as the Environmental Implementation Review and the European Environment Agency (EEA).

EVs are Better for Environmental Sustainability   

A recent report from the European Environment Agency (EEA) highlighted the environmental benefits of battery electric cars compared to petrol and diesel vehicles. The report, “Electric Vehicles from Life Cycle and Circular Economy Perspectives,” emphasized the overall eco-friendliness of electric vehicles throughout their entire life cycle. Although, the production of EVs may result in higher emissions, but their overall impacts on greenhouse gases and air pollutants is significantly lower throughout their lifespan. At present, electric vehicles produce emissions that are approximately 17-30% lower than those of traditional petrol and diesel vehicles. This percentage could potentially increase to 73% by 2050 as the carbon intensity of the EU’s energy mix continues to decrease.

The EVs contribute to the improvement of local air quality by reducing emissions along with minimized release of particulate. In addition, the EVs help to decrease noise pollution, particularly in urban environments. The report highlights the potential for mitigating these impacts by implementing circular economy practices that prioritize the reuse and recycling of batteries.  The EEA highlighted the concerns rising in EU transport sector emissions since 2014. Preliminary data from 2017 reveals a significant 28% increase in emissions compared to 1990 levels. Despite significant increases in registrations of battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids in 2017, these types of vehicles still make up a relatively small portion of total new registrations. 

EU’s Protectionism Against Chinese EVs

In a recent statement on 8 May, 2024, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, expressed her concerns regarding the influx of affordable EVs from China into the European market. In response to this, the EU launched an investigation into manufacturing of EVs in China for potential subsidies in 2023. 

A regulation was enacted by the European Parliament on June 8, 2016, with the objective of safeguarding domestic industries within the EU from the impact of subsidized imports originating from non-EU countries. An official notice released on July 3, 2023, stated that Chinese electric vehicles were having a detrimental impact on the electric vehicle industry in the Union. The EU’s approach demonstrates a strong alignment between public and private sectors. European manufacturers and suppliers involved in the complaint were granted complete immunity and anonymity, a privilege that was not extended to Chinese firms. In addition, prominent companies such as Tesla and Volkswagen, who have manufacturing operations in China, are not subject to these tariffs. The EU has expressed concerns regarding the impact of China’s industrial overcapacity on EU-China trade. 

China, on the other hand, has accused the EU of engaging in “foul play.” China has raised objections to these tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The European market for electric vehicles (EVs) is significant, with projections indicating it will reach a value of USD 145 billion by 2024 and experience a growth rate of 12.5% by 2028. The electric vehicle market has experienced substantial growth, with a notable 25% surge in sales during the first quarter of 2024 in comparison to the corresponding period in 2023. The sales growth in 2022 was also 25%. 

On a global scale, electric vehicles (EVs) are projected to make up 20% of all vehicle sales. China is expected to dominate the market with a 45% share, followed by Europe with 25% and the US with 11%. Chinese manufacturers, including BYD, are strategically investing in European production facilities, such as a new plant in Hungary, in response to EU tariffs and trade restrictions. In addition, they are establishing collaborations with European EV companies to lower expenses and considering the possibility of manufacturing EVs in Europe, which could help minimize the effects of tariffs. In July, there was a significant decline of 45% in Chinese EV exports to the EU, despite the efforts made previously. Overall, the EU’s protective measures against Chinese EVs are motivated by considerations surrounding market competition and trade imbalances. Chinese companies are responding to the changing landscape by expanding their operations in Europe and forging important partnerships. However, the current trade tensions serve as a reminder of the challenges involved in international trade within the fast-paced electric vehicle industry. 

EU’s Concerns and Response 

The European Union’s investigation into Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs) in 2023 underscores concerns regarding the potential unfair competitive advantage created by Chinese government subsidies. According to the EU, there are claims of significant state support for Chinese EV manufacturers, resulting in reduced production costs and enabling them to offer lower prices compared to their European counterparts. The market distortion has the potential to negatively impact European EV producers, resulting in a decrease in their market share and profitability. This, in turn, could lead to financial losses and put them at a competitive disadvantage. The investigation conducted by the EU seeks to evaluate the potential violation of trade regulations and the negative impact on the European industry caused by these subsidies. In response, the EU has the option to implement tariffs or other trade barriers in order to address these unfair practices and safeguard its domestic market.

On July 3, 2023, the European Commission implemented provisional countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles (EVs) in response to concerns regarding unfair competitive practices. The duties for BYD, Geely, and SAIC were determined to be 17.4%, 20%, and 38.1% respectively. These rates were established after conducting tests on electric vehicle samples and evaluating the subsidies provided. Companies that have not undergone testing are subject to a 20% duty, whereas those that have refused to cooperate are subjected to the highest rate. The EU’s action is intended to address the perceived imbalance caused by Chinese government subsidies, a matter that China disagrees with. The responsibilities will be applicable to electric vehicles that have been registered starting from March 7, 2023. 

Paradoxes of EU’s Environmental Policy

The EU’s tariff regime on Chinese EVs brings attention to certain contradictions within its environmental protection policies. Although the tariffs have been implemented to protect European manufacturers from unfair competition resulting from Chinese subsidies, there is a potential conflict with the EU’s environmental protection goals. The imposition of tariffs on electric vehicles could potentially impede their widespread adoption and hinder the overall progress in reducing emissions.

This short-term protection of domestic industries could potentially hinder the long-term shift towards cleaner technologies. In addition, it is important to consider the broader impacts of making EVs more affordable, as this can greatly contribute to global climate efforts. The tariffs fail to adequately acknowledge the environmental consequences of EV production materials or take into account the wider advantages of higher EV adoption, which could undermine the EU’s overarching environmental sustainability goals.

To read the analysis as it was published on the Eurasia Review webpage, click here.

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My answer is a cautious “Yes”. Below I discuss several key factors that could determine whether the WTO survives and how they might influence the future role of the WTO.

Will the friends of the WTO continue to see residual value in it?

We have to be realistic. The WTO’s ability to constrain US trade policy has weakened considerably and is likely to weaken more under a second Trump administration. The best-case scenario that can be expected from a second Trump administration is benign neglect and even that is not the only plausible scenario.

The question is how much residual value other key members (e.g. Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, China, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil) will see in a WTO that, in practice, does not regulate their trade relationships with the United States. The WTO’s weakened ability to regulate trade relations with the United States is a huge loss, that is for sure. Yet, the scope of other trade covered by the WTO should be sufficiently large to provide an incentive to these countries to keep the faith in the WTO. While some of these countries have a vast network of free trade agreements (FTAs) that would give them some security should the WTO fail, the network is neither broad nor wide enough to entirely replace the WTO. Also, the need to comply with WTO rules can help stave off internal protectionist pressure as well as pressure from allies to take protectionist actions against certain countries. How much political capital they invest in supporting and driving the WTO will be one of the most decisive factors in determining whether the WTO survives a second Trump administration. To their credit, many of these countries already have taken a bigger role in the WTO since US leadership started to wane. But the next four years could require them to become even more proactive if the WTO is going to continue being relevant.

Would the Trump administration allow the WTO to continue operating?

Three scenarios seem plausible. A first scenario is one of neglect in which a second Trump administration effectively would ignore the WTO’s rules but would not actively seek to obstruct the WTO’s operations. The WTO’s role regulating trade relations with the United States would continue to weaken. However, it would still play an important role regulating trade relations between the other 163 members. WTO members may even continue their efforts to modernise WTO rules through plurilaterals and other initiatives. Some of these members still may hold hope that the United States can be brought “back into the fold”, while others may resign themselves to “ride out” the administration. This scenario partly describes the situation during the first Trump administration if one ignores the blocking of the appointment of adjudicators to the WTO Appellate Body. In this scenario, the WTO is more likely to survive, albeit with the risk of further weakening, unless the other 163 members succeed in their efforts to modernise the rules without the participation of the United States.

A second scenario is one in which a Trump 2.0 administration decides to actively disrupt the operation of the WTO. Concerns about this scenario may already be reflected in the proposal recently submitted regarding African countries to bring forward a decision to reappoint the Director-General. A threat to the WTO’s budget is another concern. Survival of the WTO in this scenario is not assured.

While some may consider that paralyzing the WTO would be in the US interest, such a move would be short-sighted. WTO rules protect US exports of goods, services and intellectual property rights. The US network of trade agreements does not have the geographic breadth of the WTO and has remained largely static for several years. Relying on unilateral action alone to fight foreign trade barriers is inefficient. Thus, there may still be sufficient incentives for a second Trump administration to play the role of an absent parent but without entirely blocking the operation of the WTO.

The third scenario is one where a second Trump administration pursues a “WTO minus China” strategy. This could take the form of tariffs clubs within the WTO that exclude China. The clubs could be sectoral, along the lines of the proposed Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and aluminium, or broader in scope. These clubs would undermine the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, a key tenet of the WTO. However, some would argue that such clubs are no different than FTAs, which are allowed.

Any attempt to exclude China would raise tensions in the WTO. A strong response from China can be expected. Moreover, candidate Trump has spoken about raising tariffs on all imports across the board, not just those originating from China. A second Trump administration might raise tariffs and then seek concessions from trade partners (other than China) in exchange from bringing them down again. This would be seen as an attempt to renegotiate its WTO obligations and would certainly create frictions with other trading partners. Meanwhile, many of these trading partners also are likely to resist effort to exclude China. It is hard to see how these tensions would be resolved. What is clear is that this scenario would put the WTO under severe strain.

Will China agree to address some of the concerns raised by its trade partners?

The United States has justified some of its trade actions by arguing that they are necessary to confront with a Chinese regime that doesn’t “play fair”. US concerns about Chinese overcapacity and the role of state-owned enterprises are shared by many WTO members.

China should have a strong interest in preserving the WTO given its role providing stability to trade relations with many of its trading partners and in preventing further fragmentation. But other WTO members expect China to do more to address the concerns of other WTO members. WTO members want China to make more information available about its subsidies, at all levels of government. It could also show more willingness to address overcapacity and make commitments on state-owned enterprises. If it does not, the frustration with the WTO framework will grow among partners other than the United States. These partners also will see unilateral action as the only effective way to address concerns with Chinese policies, further increasing internal tensions at the WTO.

Can WTO members overcome India’s obstructionism?

India has been obstructing WTO initiatives for many years, including attempts to move forward among smaller groups of WTO members (so-called “plurilateral” initiatives). Its position is unlikely to change in a second Trump administration. Members’ frustration with Indian obstructionism has been growing. Some members are taking a firmer stand against it and pushing for changes to WTO decision making. Members will need to continue to challenge India and to seek ways to make decision making more flexible. The problem is that a second Trump administration may not want decision making to be more flexible and may prefer a hamstrung WTO. What role India would take in such a scenario, and other members’ reactions to it, would prove critical for the organisation’s survival.

Will WTO members find a balance between trade and national security?

National security concerns will continue to weigh heavily on future trade policy. Invocation of national security as a justification for trade measures is likely to continue and may even grow under a second Trump administration. Indeed, it was the first Trump administration that used national security to justify trade measures on steel and aluminum.

The United States has put forward a consistent position on national security at the WTO, under which there can be no independent review of a country’s invocation of the security exceptions. This position is unlikely to change in a second Trump administration. If anything, the position is likely to harden.

My sense is that most other WTO members are uncomfortable with giving countries absolute discretion on the invocation of the security exceptions. Invocation of security as a justification for trade measures will continue to generate tension in the system. Although a written accommodation may be unrealistic (including because the United States would likely block it), a tacit, political accommodation on the issue could be an option.

***

Given the above, the survival of the WTO is by no means guaranteed. Much will depend on the political capital that other WTO members are willing to invest in preserving it, China’s willingness to address concerns raised by many WTO members, as well as the approach ultimately taken by a second Trump administration. Overcoming Indian obstructionism would help modernise the WTO, which, in turn, will make survival more likely. However, the inability to move forward is more of a medium-term than an immediate threat. Finally, there will always be some tension between trade and national security. A more robust political process (as opposed to litigation) would allow the WTO to contribute to managing those tensions.

What role would the WTO play then if it survives? The WTO will continue to be caught between the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China. It is increasingly difficult to conceive of a scenario in which the WTO regulates both trade with the United States, on the one hand, and trade with China, on the other hand. It looks likely that a Trump 2.0 administration will either feel unconstrained by the WTO and ignore it, or it would seek to drive a wedge between China and other WTO members. Neither scenario will appeal to other WTO members who would much rather be able to rely on WTO rules in their trade relations with the United States and who also see value in the WTO for their engagement with China. WTO members will need to be strategic. It is in most members’ interest to preserve the WTO.

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It is hard to think of an issue that brings together the United States’ deeply divided political class more than the need to contain China’s growing influence, whether through trade restrictions, tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), or banning TikTok. But while the national-security argument for such protectionist measures is undeniably compelling, it is unclear whether US political leaders and the American public are prepared for the potential economic fallout.

The prevailing belief among policymakers is that the surge of Chinese imports into the US market during the 2000s hollowed out America’s manufacturing base, making the kind of rapid military build-up that enabled the Allies to win World War II all but impossible. In US policy circles, the “China Shock” is often portrayed as a massive error that devastated towns across the Rust Belt and led to a sharp increase in inequality.

Consequently, there is widespread agreement among policymakers and commentators that the US must prevent a “China Shock 2.0” by imposing massive tariffs and trade restrictions on Chinese technologies such as cell phones, drones, and, crucially, EVs, solar panels, and green-energy equipment. President Joe Biden and his predecessor, Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee in November’s presidential election, disagree on bodog sportsbook review most issues. When it comes to dealing with China, however, both appear to be competing for the title of America’s most protectionist president.

But the China Shock narrative that underpins current US trade policy is deeply flawed. While competition with Chinese producers has adversely affected some manufacturing jobs, free trade has undoubtedly created more winners than losers. Moreover, low-income US consumers have been among the biggest beneficiaries of low-cost Chinese imports. Policymakers who believe that unwinding trade with China will not result in price increases and significant political backlash are in for a rude awakening.

To be sure, the economic impact of US trade restrictions could be minimized by rerouting Chinese imports through third-country suppliers, enabling Americans to buy Chinese-made solar panels as though they were produced in India, albeit at a higher price. But while this tariff theater may be popular with voters, it is hard to see how this would improve national security any more than rerouting Chinese fentanyl into the US through Mexico helped solve the opioid crisis.

Moreover, it would take years for “friendlier” countries to develop their own manufacturing bases that can compete with China’s, especially at the low prices offered by Chinese producers. In some sectors like EVs, China’s production capacity has given it an almost insurmountable lead over Western countries. Given this reality, the United Auto Workers’ goal of having Americans buy electric cars produced in high-wage, unionized US facilities will be extremely difficult to achieve, no matter how much Biden or Trump may support it.

A more targeted approach would ideally distinguish between trade involving sensitive military technologies and other goods, but doing so is more complicated than many seem to realize. The convergence of military and civilian technologies has become painfully apparent during the Russia-Ukraine war, with low-cost drones originally designed for carrying packages being repurposed as bombers and private mobile networks playing a pivotal role in major battles. Additionally, as the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, the US and its allies depend on Chinese medical supplies.

For those of us who believe that multilateral cooperation is necessary to address the world’s most pressing problems, from climate change to regulating artificial intelligence, the escalating rivalry between the world’s two major powers is deeply troubling. From the US perspective, China’s authoritarian government undermines the foundational liberal values that underpin the global economic and political order. China’s relentless cyberattacks continue to pose an immediate threat to the US economy and American companies, and a potential Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan would have far-reaching global consequences.

From China’s perspective, the US and its allies are cynically trying to maintain a world order established through centuries of European and American imperialism. Much to the chagrin of US diplomats, many other countries appear to share this sentiment, as evidenced by the widespread disregard among developing and emerging economies for Western sanctions against Russia.

Some may hope that China’s economic slowdown will curb its geopolitical ambitions. But its ongoing difficulties are just as likely to push China toward a confrontation with the US as they are to foster cooperation.

Nevertheless, despite what many in the US may think, economic decoupling is not a viable option. Although the Biden administration’s trade restrictions and bellicose rhetoric are a response to Chinese provocations, both countries must find a way to compromise if they want to achieve stable, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth.

Kenneth Rogoff is a professor of economics and public policy at Harvard University and recipient of the 2011 Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics

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To address its growing demand for critical minerals, the United States has started to deepen its partnerships with the Central Asian republics — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. But it is not easy.

The 2022 Critical Minerals List identifies 50 minerals as crucial for the United States, underscoring their vital role across various industrial and technological sectors. Currently, the United States predominantly sources these essential materials from China. This dependency is extreme for certain minerals, with the country relying entirely on China for its supply of arsenic, gallium, graphite, tantalum and yttrium.

But the restrictions imposed by China on gallium and germanium exports in August 2023 have caused controversy. The fact that China has 94 per cent of the world’s gallium resources and 83 per cent of germanium resources poses a particular problem for the United States.

According to the Pentagon’s statement following China’s restriction decision, the United States has not developed the industrial capacity for producing gallium, though they do have some germanium reserves. US officials called for alternative markets to be found, and it was during this period that the United States decided to improve relations with Central Asia.

In September 2023, US president Joe Biden met with Central Asian leaders in New York. During this meeting, the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue was agreed upon and established, operating within the C5+1 Diplomatic Platform. The inaugural meeting of this dialogue was held in February 2024. The main objectives were maintaining the security of critical minerals in Central Asia, ensuring market diversification and increasing the region’s importance in this field.

Since the early 1990s, the Central Asian republics have become increasingly significant players in the global energy and economic markets. This region also holds a critical position in the supply of essential minerals. According to various reports, Central Asia is home to 38.6 per cent of the world’s manganese ore reserves, 30.1 per cent of chromium reserves, 20 per cent of lead reserves, 12.6 per cent of zinc reserves and 8.7 per cent of titanium reserves.

Compared to countries like China, Turkey and South Korea, the United States was relatively late to look to Central Asia. After the 2000s, the United States, which had a more protectionist approach in the security perspective due to the effects of 9/11, was content to watch the growing influence of other actors in Central Asia. Realising the need to formulate a new regional policy after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, prompted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the United States administration began to take interest in the region again.

On the other hand, China has been increasingly economically dominant in the region since the early 2000s. Trade with countries in the region grew exponentially, especially after Chinese president Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Trade volume reached US$89 billion in 2023, up from US$70 billion in 2022. The China–Central Asia Summit also institutionalised relations in 2023.

Another important partnership China has with Central Asia is in critical minerals. China operates many underground resources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and has strong cooperation with Kazakhstan. In addition to zinc and uranium, China’s imports of molybdenum from Kazakhstan have increased by 444 per cent in 2020 compared to 2017.

Under these circumstances, a critical minerals partnership with the United States brings various opportunities and risks to Central Asia. But countries in the region are afraid of being dominated by China and open to offers from alternative actors.

The United States has a favourable reputation in the region, and there is confidence in its ability to fulfill its commitments. But employing rhetoric about competition with China, a nation with established influence in the region after years of neglect from other nations, is not likely to succeed. The United States needs to move forward with a more moderate policy. Already, the large amounts of debt that countries in the region owe to China makes the United States a more attractive partner.

But regional infrastructure problems, leaders’ pragmatic preferences, irrevocable agreements with China and possible disruptions in the critical minerals supply process are all compelling reasons to stay with China, not to mention the sheer geographical proximity.

While there is no guarantee the United States has the will or ability to engage successfully with Central Asia, it could strengthen its position in the region by offering technology and undertaking critical projects that China has not been able to deliver. A shift in focus from purely military security to a broader energy security strategy could be a key component of this new initiative. The United States has no choice but to create a brand new and deeper regional policy if it desires to compete with China.

Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul.

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While China’s saber rattling may be performative, it serves an important reminder. If a “Taiwan contingency” was triggered today, it would leave the US desperately short of goods vital to economic security, including pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, and semiconductors. And while many economies in Southeast Asia already provide alternative sources of supply, uncertainty in the region means the US must also cultivate supply chains outside the “weapons engagement zone,” the area within immediate reach of China’s vast missile arsenal. 

Luckily, there are opportunities to diversify much closer to home. But taking advantage of them requires a shift in US policy toward more active engagement with strategic partners throughout the Americas. 

The current US strategy for “de-risking” trade is simply to move as much production back home as possible. The government has already offered a variety of financial incentives, including grants and loans under the CHIPS Act, to reshore semiconductor production. Those efforts, along with tariffs and other trade barriers, are designed to make it more viable financially to manufacture critical goods in the US. 

However, efforts to reshore production run up against two problems. 

First, the US doesn’t have the labor it needs to produce everything at home. Skills shortages have already delayed the opening of semiconductor fabrication plants, such as TSMC’s operation in Arizona. And even where skills are not the issue, US workers are too expensive for the labor-intensive, low-margin jobs that are done more efficiently abroad. That’s precisely why many semiconductor firms globalized pieces of the production process to begin with, moving chip-conventional packaging and testing overseas, where affordable labor is more readily available. 

Second, even if the US had the workers, it doesn’t always have the raw materials. Because it lacks its own deposits, the US imports at least half its supply of 44 minerals and commodities necessary for production. That list includes graphite, which has wide applications in batteries, lubricants, and, of course, semiconductors. The US gets 100 percent bodog sportsbook review of its graphite from overseas—with China being the main supplier. 

Given the economic realities, self-sufficiency isn’t an option. The US can’t produce everything it needs at a scale to insulate the economy from disruptions across the Pacific. 

So, what can it do? One answer is that it can learn from its competitors. China didn’t become a hub of global manufacturing by investing solely in domestic capacity. It pursued an aggressive, decades-long effort to partner with countries of high strategic importance, including those with rich critical mineral reserves. China’s investments in markets across Asia, Africa, and increasingly in Latin America, have placed it in the position we see today as a center of raw materials extraction and processing. 

There’s a lesson in that for the US. Rather than trying in vain to reshore everything, America must remember that its allies and partners can help guarantee its economic security—especially those in the region. 

A more proactive, outward-looking strategy involves two priorities. One is trade agreements. Allies have been exasperated by the perceived uncertainty in US policy in recent years. The US must reboot trade deals to reassure its economic partners. Investments to provide new, reliable sources of supply  require reliable, long-term access to America’s market. Only concrete guarantees will provide the economic incentives to align production with critical US needs. 

At the same time, America’s development finance efforts should be coordinated with trade deals to help partner countries bolster capacity. China has invested hundreds of billions in trade-enabling infrastructure across emerging markets and developing countries, plugging countries into a China-centric supply network and cultivating export markets. The US already has commenced similar efforts in Africa’s Lobito Corridor and in the Philippines Luzon Economic Corridor. These efforts should be expanded, especially in the Americas.

The good news is that several new, bipartisan initiatives are moving in a positive direction. 

The Americas Act seeks to (among other things) extend membership in the USMCA (US, Mexico, Canada Agreement)  to additional Latin American economies. It provides a way to not just balance against China’s growing influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, but to help lock in mutual market access enjoyed under the USMCA umbrella. This could help make the US supply chain more resilient to a Taiwan contingency. 

Similarly, the Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act looks to empower the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to make larger investments in the chips supply chain in the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, it targets investments at all steps of production (from mining through chips testing and production) in countries otherwise not eligible for DFC loans. This recognizes the value of supporting strategic priorities consistent with the DFC’s development mission. 

These two bills are in their early stages and their fate remains uncertain. But sponsorship from both sides of the aisle reflects a growing understanding that the US can’t go it alone. Strength always comes in numbers, and if a fight starts overseas, it will be essential for the US to have friends close to home. 

Jeffery Kucik is a Global Fellow with the Wilson Center and an Associate Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy and the James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona.

Mark Kennedy is the Director for the Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition.

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The anti-China trade policy aims to protect American jobs and businesses from China’s unfair trade practices in technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. The Biden administration is concerned about the unfair trade practices which put American companies in a challenging position to compete against China’s 70-90% control of global production of inputs, which are necessary for American technologies, infrastructure, energy, and health care. It risks America’s supply chains, workers, businesses and economic security. Biden’s ‘Investing in America’ has generated investments above $860 billion in electric vehicles (EVs), clean energy, and semiconductors. He also directed the increase in tariffs on imports of $18 billion, targeting Chinese products like EVs or lithium battery items, solar equipment and semiconductors. The tariff on EVs will jump from 25 to 100%.

The effectiveness of the sanctions on China is questionable. The overall disappointment of the Trump trade deal, signed on 15 January 2020, was the dispute resolution mechanism’s failure to ensure the agreement’s effective implementation. According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the deal also included China’s commitment to buy substantial additional US goods worth $200 billion, of which China bought only 59%. The US wanted its financial service providers to have enhanced access to compete on a more level playing field and expand their services export offerings in the Chinese market. The US administration failed to bring China to terms with provisions of the trade deal, including fair trade practices, transparency in administrative proceedings, and technology transfer and licensing on market terms. On the contrary, several experts argued that the trade deal would benefit China in the long-run at the cost of American interests.

The Biosecure Act, brought in January 2024, forbids US federal agencies from partnering with China’s Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), Wuxi AppTec and several biotech companies that collect foreign persons’ genetic data. It calls out the Chinese military-civil fusion strategy to modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The fusion requires an organisation to cooperate with the CCP intelligence work mandatorily. The Act prohibits companies with certain biotechnology providers of concern in this regard. The Time to Choose Act was introduced in February, which prohibited the Department of Defense and other federal agencies from contracting with domestic companies like McKinsey & Company, which deals with the Chinese government. On April 24, on grounds of stealing consumer data and breach of privacy, a law was signed forcing ByteDance to sell off its TikTok operations in the US within nine months or face a ban. It will affect the 170 million users in the country. In response, China banned WhatsApp and Threads from the Apple store after Facebook and Instagram. However, these apps are not popular in China, so they will not significantly impact Meta.

China argues that these attempts are aimed at hurting its emerging sectors in technology, upsetting its economy, and countering its ideology. China labels the recent American measures to impose additional tariffs as a ‘domestic stunt’ to act tough just before the American elections. The US economy has many links with China. Efforts to decouple US-China economic relations can distort international trade practices.

The trade war also has an impact on global trade. A Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) column estimated its effect with a rise in import tariffs in 2018-2019 worth about $450 billion-$350 billion by the US and $100 billion by China. However, third countries’ trade found increased opportunities rather than just causing shifts in trade patterns. Vietnam, Thailand, Korea, and Mexico benefited in global markets from products where US-Chinese trade declined from this conflict. Meanwhile, exports fell from Ukraine, Egypt, Israel, and Colombia. The foreign policy behaviour of major powers can be considered an indicator of the dynamism in the global power structure.

The trade war between the world’s two largest economies further adversely affects multilateralism and the international governance system. It defers several unresolved issues of the Global South, including a further reformation of the Bretton Woods system where the western countries have a deciding say. Further, it thwarts the global efforts to achieve UN SDGs by 2030, for instance, in the energy sector, which needs international cooperation.

Chinese foreign policy is driven by one constant factor that seeks its rise in the changing global power equation. To this effect, its foreign policy towards the US and India has shown consistency.

The Beijing administration will not likely change its course due to the US pressure tactics to get concessions from China in trade practices. According to Xinhua, US unilateral trade protectionist measures would not affect China and its development efforts. Elections and domestic politics in the US and India often use foreign policy as a base to garner public support for the respective regimes. Both countries are disproportionately affected by China’s advances in the global economic landscape. India has a $85 billion trade deficit in 2023-24 in favour of China, while the US has a $279 billion trade deficit in 2023.

The Government of India banned 59 Chinese apps in June 2020 citing concerns of threats to sovereignty and national security. The US has also shown its strength in foreign policy behaviour by banning Chinese companies from entering the country or calling out political leaders for not conforming to international laws. However, tit-for-tat responses further weaken faith in multilateralism and the practice of rules-based international order.

 Mehdi Hussain is a former assistant professor of political science at Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi.

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As the U.S. tightens trade and investment restrictions with respect to China and invests in developing critical sectors such as semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), and clean energy, deeper cooperation between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico under the United-States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is needed. The USMCA gives businesses and traders certainty about the economic relationship between the three countries, and the long history of their cooperation should make North America the key economic platform for a more competitive and dynamic economy that is best placed to reduce exposure to Chinese supply chains and compete globally. However, in order for this to happen, USMCA countries need to work together to address the gaps that have opened between U.S. trade and investment restrictions on China and Mexico and Canada’s trade and investment settings. Going forward, the U.S. should coordinate more closely with Canada and Mexico on any new trade and investment restrictions applied to China. The fact is that for the U.S. to effectively de-risk its economic relationship with China, a more coordinated North America approach is required. Failure to build a cohesive North American approach will likely lead to the U.S. adopting a more go-it-alone, less effective approach when it comes to China, and would be a missed opportunity to further strengthen North American economic relations.

The economic importance of North America

Trade and investment across North America underpinned by the USMCA is the most important economic relationship for the US, Mexico and Canada. Over $1.8 trillion dollars in annual trade happens between these three countries, accounting for approximately 17 million jobs. Around 75% of Canada’s exports and 78% of Mexico’s exports are to the U.S., and around 33% of U.S. exports go to Canada and Mexico. As a result, Bodog Poker North America is a geography of deeply interconnected supply chains, particularly in automotive, but also medical equipment, IT products, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and more.

De-risking the US economic relationship with China

The U.S. goal of reducing its economic interdependence with China—so-called de-risking—is a key focus for the U.S. that will likely only intensify. To this end, the U.S. has adopted a range of trade and investment restrictions on China. These include tightened inbound investment screening, new requirements on U.S. investors to notify the U.S. Treasury Department about investment into China into particular sectors, export controls that include restrictions on access to U.S. technology used to produce high-end semiconductors, and tariffs. Recently, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) completed its Section 301 review of the U.S.-China tariffs which led the Biden administration to increase tariffs on $18 billion of imports from China, which included increased tariffs on semiconductors, 100% tariffs on EVs, and higher tariffs on EV batteries, to name a few.

A new North American approach to China?

While the U.S. has been working to restrict trade and investment with China, Canada and Mexico have not taken similar measures. For instance, Mexico does not have an inbound investment screening regime and Canadian and Mexican tariffs on Chinese imports are in many cases significantly lower than U.S. tariffs. These differences in trade policy toward China is increasingly in tension—economically and politically—with the very open trade economic relationship under USMCA. The central issue is that U.S. action to reduce Chinese access to its markets and technologies can be undermined should China increase trade and investment with Mexico and Canada in order to enter the U.S. market while avoiding U.S. trade and investment restrictions. For example, exports from Mexico of EVs from facilities owned by Chinese EV maker BYD could enter the U.S. under USMCA and pay zero tariffs if it meets the agreement’s rules of origin, regional steel and wage rate requirements, and could also benefit from the $7500 IRA tax credit for EVs assembled in North America. Alternatively, BYD could still export EVs to the U.S. from Mexico and pay the WTO MFN rate of 2.5% for automotive imports, compared to the 100% tariff rate the U.S. would apply to imports of EVs directly from China.

Developing a North American EV sector should be the goal for all USMCA parties, leveraging the already deep automotive supply chains. For instance, in 2022, over 50% of Mexico’s imports of parts and accessories for motor vehicles came from the U.S. Accelerating the mining of critical minerals in Canada and Mexico, expanding refining capacity, and building battery manufacturing will also be needed.

Yet to ensure that the U.S. continues to see EVs (as one example) as an industry that should be built out across North America, gaps in economic policy toward China between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico need to be addressed. In the case of EVs, this could include Mexico adopting an inbound investment screening regime and Mexico and Canada adopting tariffs similar to the U.S.’s on EVs from China.

Some progress under USMCA

Thankfully, it does appear that closer cooperation on China is starting to come into focus for the three governments. At the fourth annual meeting of the USMCA Free Trade Commission (FTC) on May 22 led by USTR Ambassador Katherine Tai, Canadian Trade Minister Mary Ng, and Mexican Secretary of Economy Raquel Buenrostro, how North America can cooperate more effectively to address the China challenge was a consistent theme.

For example, the parties agreed to “jointly expand their collaboration on issues related to non-market policies and practices of other countries, which undermine the Agreement and harm U.S., Canadian, and Mexican workers, including in the automotive and other sectors.” The nonmarket economy of most concern is China, and responding to China’s trade practices and broader global impact of its economic model will be key to ensuring that the investment by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico into their EV sectors are not undermined by imports of heavily subsidized EVs and components from China.

Another area of cooperation identified in this FTC meeting was building on a previous agreement by the three governments to develop better ways to cooperatively respond to emergency situations that impact trade flows. During COVID-19, a lack of coordination led initially to trade across North America shutting down. Strengthening processes for cooperation across North America can help each government respond to future pandemics and other emergency disruptions to trade, including those caused by rising tensions with China. The underlying point here is the opportunity and need for North American cooperation in order to strengthen collective economic security.

A third area of focus in this FTC meeting was agreement to do more together to prevent imports of goods produced with forced labor. This is a commitment that all parties have made under the USMCA. The main focus here for the U.S. has been preventing imports of goods from the Xinjiang region made using Uighur labor, and the U.S. has legislation that addresses this specifically. However, much work remains to be done, including increased transparency into supply chains. North American cooperation on these labor issues would send a strong signal about shared values in North America around slave labor and labor rights more broadly.

Recommendations

Deepening cooperation among the U.S., Mexico, and Canada when it comes to China is needed to ensure that the USMCA and the open trade and investment regime it enables is supportive of intensifying economic competition with China. Failure to cooperate more deeply on how to respond to China risks the U.S. adopting a more go-it-alone approach. The outcomes from the recent USMCA FTC meeting are a good step toward deeper cooperation on China, however a more comprehensive approach is needed. This could start with the three governments working together, along with industry and other stakeholders, in reviewing their economic policies toward China, identifying where differences in economic policy create risks of Chinese goods entering each of their markets through one of the other partner markets, particularly in sectors deemed critical from a national security and economic security perspective. Assessing what could then be done to plug these gaps would help to develop a more coordinated approach to North American economic policies concerning China. Making progress here would strengthen North America as an economic unit and underscore for the U.S. that its economic well-being and strategic goals are best achieved by working within North America, rather than going it alone.

Joshua P. Meltzer is a senior fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at the Brookings Institution.

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