The unprecedented policy support from EU institutions and member state governments throughout the pandemic has helped to cushion the worst impacts on employment and income. This, coupled with the rapid adaptation of firms and households to a ‘new normal,’ has helped to keep national economies afloat and societies running. Unemployment has remained in check and household incomes have been relatively stable thanks to a raft of firm support and social protection measures. Salary subsidies, generous leave allowances and debt holidays extended since early 2020 are just a few of the interventions that would, prior to the pandemic, have been unthinkable in the scale that we saw in 2020, blurring the lines between the public and private sectors.   

While the economic fallout could have been much worse absent the sizeable government support, it is also fair to say member states are not yet out of the woods. Despite government efforts, the threat of poverty is still very real for a segment of people living in the EU. Our recent report, entitled Inclusive Growth at a Crossroads​, found that a further three to five million people are ‘at risk of poverty’ in the EU27 countries today than before the crisis. Europe is in its steepest recession since World War II, with output across the EU shrinking by more than six percent in 2020.

Green shoots of recovery are beginning to emerge as governments reopen national economies. EU member states must now ensure careful and efficient implementation of economic recovery plans that support inclusion, protect the vulnerable and foster economic growth to bounce back.   

Beyond the far-reaching fiscal strategies, monetary policy programs have complemented efforts as central banks have worked to ensure favorable financing conditions and ample liquidity in the banking system. While this has kept debt servicing costs at bay, it has still come at a cost. Notably, debt-to-GDP increased by 13 percentage points on average in 2020 across the EU27 – a steeper increase than during the global financial crisis of 2008.

At the human level, the realities of the pandemic have been highly unequal, and in a way not seen in previous financial crises. Sectors of the economy that are typically less sensitive to business cycles – like entertainment, the arts and accommodation – were severely affected as social distancing limited human interaction. Meanwhile, sectors that are typically more procyclical, such as industry and construction, were less affected despite an economic contraction.

Within the EU27, there is evidence of rising inequality in multiple areas that will need to be proactively addressed by strengthening service delivery and tailored labor market programs to reduce potential scarring. For example, in the labor market, low-wage workers, the self-employed, young people, and those on non-standard contracts were more likely to experience lasting disruptions to their work. This threatens to echo through future generations as the disruptions to schooling could exacerbate existing inequalities by limiting opportunities and suppressing the incomes of tomorrow’s workforce. Parents in poorer households are more likely to report that their children have experienced difficulties with the transition to online schooling. Proactive support to children at risk of early dropout and those whose learning has been most compromised will be needed as the new school year sets in.

Since the turn of the year, the vaccination rollout in the EU27 countries has provided a cause for optimism and improving the prospects for recovery. Supportive monetary and sustainable fiscal policies will still be required to carefully balance the support targeted to those that need it most. The EU’s recovery plan is an opportunity, aimed at putting the member states on a more sustainable path. This would include repairing the damage from the COVID-19 crisis, while promoting and accelerating the green and digital transitions.

Countries are now at a crossroads as they deal with the aftermath of a difficult eighteen months. And while the pandemic challenge is not yet over, there are glimmers of hope that allow populations to look forward to gradual reopening with cautious optimism. As pressures related to the pandemic ease, countries have the opportunity to pivot towards more sustainable growth with a renewed focus on fostering resilience and cohesion.​

Gallina A. Vincelette is the World Bank’s Country Director for the European Union (EU), based in Brussels, Belgium. She is responsible for guiding the Bank’s operational and knowledge engagement with client countries and the EU institutions.

Reena Badiani-Magnusson is a Senior Economist at the World Bank. She has worked on social protection, human development and poverty issues over the past 9 years at the World Bank in several countries across Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific and Africa. Reena holds a PhD from the Department of Economics at Yale University. She additionally holds a Masters in Environmental Economics from the MPSE in Toulouse University. 

To read the full commentary from World Bank Blogs, please click here. 

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After further tightening its net emission target by 2030 from 40% to at least 55% compared to 1990 levels to achieve climate neutrality target by 2050, on July 14 the European Commission released its long-awaited Fit for 55 policy. It contains a dozen proposals directed at upgrading existing climate, energy and transport legislation aimed at reaching such targets.

Among the different proposals, a new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, or CBAM, is probably the most relevant beyond the EU’s borders and, therefore, the most contentious.

The mechanism is intended as a way of mitigating the competitive disadvantage suffered by European industries as a result of the EU’s bold green policies by taxing the carbon content of imports into the EU, making them equivalent to goods produced in the EU in terms of carbon pricing.

In other words, non-EU companies exporting to Europe will need to pay the same price for their carbon footprint in Europe as European companies.

This is the way it will work: European importers of goods covered by CBAM will be required to buy certificates, the price of which will mirror that of the EU’s emissions trading system and then submit them to a newly established CBAM Authority.

This mechanism, which for many simply equates to a tax on imports, has been criticized by a number of national governments, including China and the U.S., but also international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. According to the IMF’s managing director Kristalina Georgieva, CBAM is too distortive a mechanism compared to other options, such as a carbon price floor. Others are arguing that CBAM may violate World Trade Organization rules.

Against the odds, the EU Commission has decided to push ahead with the CBAM proposal, although with a narrower scope focusing mainly on cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers and electricity, and a long interim period of up to 2035 before it is implanted in full. Furthermore, before this proposal becomes a reality it must be approved by the European Council and then pass the European Parliament, which could water it down further.

The prospect of the EU setting up a mechanism that will have such a wide global worldwide impact is as important as worrisome for China.

First of all, China is the world’s larger greenhouse gas emitter, with 27% of total carbon emissions globally. This means that any mechanism taxing emissions produced overseas should worry Beijing, no matter how small its scope at the very beginning.

Secondly, still the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods, China’s market share has actually increased due to the pandemic, with close to 20% of global exports in 2020.

Thirdly, as the European Union is the most important standard-setter in the world, its CBAM may be replicated by other nations or trading blocs. The biggest risk for China would if the Biden administration potentially reversed Washington’s long-standing opposition to CBAM.

China’s introduction of its own emissions trading market is important, although the number of sectors included is very narrow — basically, electricity only — and cannot be properly compared with that of the EU, which will expand even further to transportation and construction as a consequence of the Fit for 55 policy.

The first price offered for carbon in China remains miles away from that of Europe — $8 per ton of CO2 compared to over $55 in the EU — but the direction is clear. The potential convergence with EU prices is not only welcome for environmental reasons. It will also have a bearing on the impact of CBAM on China, as the possibility of a rebate exists for countries with similar prices in their own emissions trading markets.

While this might be encouraging for China, the major outstanding risk is the fact that CBAM’s sectoral coverage is sure to expand to include ceramics, glass, paper and other chemicals. Over time, it will likely include all manufactured products.

Given that the EU carbon price is currently already above 50 euros per tonne of CO2, it can be safely assumed that the effective price of carbon paid by EU producers in import-competing sectors subject to the EU’s emissions trading system will gradually rise to at least 50 euros per tonne by 2035.

Given that the contribution of coal to the production of its electricity remains above 70%, China could see its external competitiveness severely hindered by a more comprehensive CBAM. bodog sportsbook review Even more so if it were to be applied by more developed countries, especially the U.S.

All in all, the mechanism for carbon border adjustment announced by the EU Commission might currently appear close to irrelevant in China given its limited scope, as well as the possibility that it might be overturned by the WTO. However, long-term oriented Chinese policymakers will surely see the risks of such an embryonic measure being expanded in its sectoral scope, and being implemented by others.

On that basis, expect an intensive Chinese lobbying campaign in the EU’s headquarters and key member states to dilute the proposal even further and, when possible, eliminate it fully.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero is Asia-Pacific chief economist at Natixis and a senior research fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think tank.

To read the full blog from Nikkei Asia, please click here.

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A green bond is a traditional bond where the proceeds from issuance are used for a project that meets certain pre-established environmental criteria. In the case of default, the investor typically has recourse to the issuer’s entire balance sheet, as structures based only on the underlying green project or its revenues are rare. To the end investor, the additional value from holding the green asset derives from this enhanced transparency and association with the green project financed by the bond (even though refinancing is common). However, definitions of what activities are sustainable are often fuzzy or conflict across jurisdictions. Reporting on the use of proceeds, let alone a project’s impact, is often lax. The problems with  issuer disclosure and communicating information on the use of proceeds to investors are more pronounced in emerging markets, exactly where the bulk of low-carbon investment will be needed over the coming years.

The EU green bond standard would address these inherent problems with a rigorous regime of transparency and supervision. Only projects that are in line with the EU taxonomy of sustainable activities would be eligible for funding, and issuers would need to provide additional information at the time of issuance, and subsequently through regular reporting on the use of proceeds and its impact. Crucially, only external reviewers supervised by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) will be allowed to sign off on an EU green bond.

Green bonds will be a crucial part of financing the low-carbon transition, given their typical long durations and end-loaded repayment structures, which fit well with large infrastructure projects. Use of the EU green bond label will be voluntary, so the extent to which investors use it and mobilise capital for the low-carbon transition should be one measure of its success. But the standard will also define a framework for green assets in the capital markets. As such, it should foster scale and liquidity of the asset class, so that investors can discern a yield curve specific to green debt instruments. Green bond funds and the securitisation of green bank loans could mobilise additional funds, but will depend on there being a uniform standard across different issuers and jurisdictions.

A global blueprint?

Given these wider objectives, there are two possible fates for the EU green bond standard. It may come to define a widely recognised quality benchmark that is replicated in other markets. This kind of ‘Brussels effect’ in global capital markets has, for instance, been observed for the EU format for retail investment funds (UCITS), which are now widely used outside the EU, including in emerging markets.

Alternatively, the EU’s ‘gold standard’ ambition may remain out of reach for most issuers. Compliance with the technical standards in the EU taxonomy in particular could become a problem. Issuers will weigh the costs and complications of additional disclosure and of going through an ESMA-approved and supervised external reviewers against the benefits of accessing a wider investor base. Alternative private green bond standards and certification processes may well continue to proliferate. Several EU capital market products have already been shunned by market participants in this way, as for instance has been the case with European long-term investment funds, first designed in 2015, but barely used since then.

Implementing the standard

To simultaneously define a high-quality bond standard while creating scale and liquidity in capital markets, pragmatic implementation by the EU supervisor, and full support from public sector issuers in the EU, will be crucial. Three measures in particular could define success.

First, the EU itself and other EU supranational and sovereign issuers will likely be the largest single class of green bond issuers over the coming years. Green bond issuance by the European Commission under the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme may amount to €250 billion over the next three years, roughly equal to total global issuance of green bonds in 2020. To date, issuance by ten EU sovereigns amounted to over €80 billion, and is set to increase rapidly given strong investor demand and the presumed benefits to funding costs in sovereign debt markets. To ensure credibility, the EU and other public sector issuers now need to adopt the EU green bond standard in their own capital market activities.

At the national level, we have already shown that the problems in classifying public expenditures under the EU taxonomy can be overcome(France has already done so). Some EU states have shown how a clear green bond framework can define credible forward-looking commitments on the use of bond proceeds in the national budgetary process. But under the proposed, regulation green bond issuance by EU countries would be subject to a weaker standard than issuance by the private sector, as reviews by government auditors will not be subject to ESMA supervision. Government agencies would in effect determine what could become a key non-financial attribute of sovereign debt.

Issuance by the Commission under the NGEU programme began in June. Ultimately, the EU as the largest issuer of green bonds will need to account to bond investors for spending of the proceeds in EU countries. It is in the interest of both the EU and member states that their own green bond issuance complies with the same high standards as corporate issuers. There should not be a separate green bond type for public sector issuers.

Second, EU regulators should define straightforward ways through which taxonomies in other jurisdictions can be mapped into alignment under the EU taxonomy. Many of such classification systems are in use globally, and EU coordination with the key jurisdictions should make different systems compatible (as suggested by Fabio Panetta). The United Kingdom and the United States are likely to develop taxonomies which are more principles-based. Discussions between the EU and the Chinese authorities within the International Platform on Sustainable Finance suggests the two classification systems are not fundamentally at odds. Ultimately, issuers from non-EU markets should be able to access EU capital markets. EU bond investors may want to document a coherent standard aligned with the EU taxonomy in their global portfolios.

Finally, ESMA, as the EU’s capital market supervisor, will need quickly to build up the skills and capacity for its new role as supervisor of green-bond reviewers. The criteria proposed by the European Commission are sensible, as they will put in place a minimum standard for qualifications, transparency and limitation of conflicts of interest. ESMA should as much as possible enable entities outside the EU to issue on the basis of the EU standard. This should especially reflect the requirements in emerging markets, where corporate disclosure and reporting standards are still weak.

The financing requirements of the EU Green deal are substantial and will primarily rest with the private sector. The new EU standard will put green bond markets on a sounder footing, though implementation should mobilise additional issuers and facilitate cross-border funding in capital markets, which are quickly embracing sustainability.

Alexander Lehmann, a German citizen, joined Bruegel in 2016 and is now a non-resident fellow. His work at Bruegel focuses on EU banking sectors and how private debt and non-performing loans can be addressed in the aftermath of recessions. Work on EU capital market development now also comprises the EU sustainable finance agenda. Currently he is also a lecturer at the Frankfurt School of Finance, and an adviser to a number of central banks and governments in eastern Europe.

To read the full commentary from Bruegel, please click here. 

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The European Union is a global leader in climate policy. It has made considerable progress in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, whether measured per capita, per unit of GDP, or by its use of renewable energy. It is raising its decarbonization targets under its Green Deal and in the run up to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP26) in Glasgow in November. The EU’s climate plans include a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), outlined in a leaked preliminary draft and due to be formally proposed in July. This would be essentially a tax on imports designed to offset the (notional) difference in carbon price between the EU and its trading partners high emission traded sectors such as steel and aluminum. The EU is under pressure to provide compensation to high emitters who pay higher prices for carbon permits under its emission trading system (ETS). Meanwhile, the CBAM is supported by many in civil society as an effort likely to encourage countries to adopt more ambitious emission reduction measures.

To read the full report from the Policy Center for the New South, please click here.

Uri Dadush is a Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, previously known as OCP Policy Center in Rabat, Morocco and a non-resident scholar at Bruegel. 

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Climate change presents huge risks to the functioning of the world’s economies.

This matters to the IMF because climate change presents huge risks to the functioning of the world’s economies. The right climate policies can address these risks and also bring tremendous opportunities for transformative investments, economic growth, and green jobs—so much so that our Board recently approved proposals to include climate change in our regular country economic surveillance and our financial stability assessment program.

Bodog Poker At the heart of our policy discussions with member countries is carbon pricing—now widely accepted as the most important policy tool to achieve the drastic cuts to emissions we need. By making polluting energy sources more expensive than clean sources, carbon pricing provides incentives to improve energy efficiency and to re-direct innovation efforts towards green technologies. Carbon pricing needs to be supported by a broader package of measures to enhance its effectiveness and acceptability including public investment in clean technology networks (like grid upgrades to accommodate renewables) and measures to assist vulnerable households, workers, and regions. Nonetheless, at the global level, additional measures equivalent to a carbon price of $75 per ton or more are required by 2030.

Ahead of the United Nations’ 26th annual climate change conference (COP26) in November—the most important climate conference since Paris 2015—we see promising signs of growing climate ambition. Many countries have stated new climate objectives—60 countries have already pledged to be emissions-neutral by midcentury and some, including the European Union and United States, have offered stronger near-term pledges. Importantly, carbon pricing schemes are proliferating—more than 60 have been implemented globally, including key initiatives this year in China and Germany.

Yet stronger and more coordinated action in the decade ahead is critical.

While some countries are moving ahead aggressively, ambition varies country-by-country such that four-fifthsof global emissions remain unpriced and the global average emissions price is only $3 per ton. As a knock-on effect, some countries and regions with high or rising carbon prices are considering placing charges on the carbon content of imports from places without similar schemes. From a global climate perspective, however, such border carbon adjustments are insufficient instruments as carbon embodied in trade flows is typically less than 10 percent of countries’ total emissions.

In part, the slower progress reflects how hard it can be for countries to unilaterally scale up mitigation policies to meet their Paris Agreement commitments—not least because of concerns about how it may affect their competitiveness and worries that others may not match their policy actions. The near-universal country participation in the Paris Agreement, so critical for its legitimacy, does not make for easy negotiation.

So how do we get carbon pricing to where it needs to be within ten years? A new paper from IMF staff, still under discussion with the IMF Board and membership, proposes the creation of an international carbon price floor arrangement that complements the Paris Agreement and is:

1. Launched by the largest emitters. The chart shows, that China, India, the US and the EU will account for nearly two-thirds of projected global CO2emissions in 2030 (if no new mitigation actions are taken). Including the full G20 takes this to 85 percent. Once launched, the scheme could gradually expand to encompass other countries.

2. Anchored on a minimum carbon price. This is an efficient, concrete, and easily understood policy instrument. Simultaneous action among large emitters to scale up carbon pricing would deliver collective action against climate change while decisively addressing competitiveness concerns. The focus on a minimum carbon price parallels the current discussion on a minimum for the tax rate in international corporate taxation. More broadly, international harmonization through tax rate floors has a long tradition in Europe.

3. Designed pragmatically. The arrangement needs to be equitable, flexible and account for the differentiated responsibilities of countries given, among other factors, historical emissions and development levels. One way to do this is to have, say, two or three different price levels in the agreement that vary according to accepted measures of a country’s development. The arrangement could also accommodate countries where carbon pricing is not currently feasible for domestic political reasons, so long as they achieve equivalent emissions reductions through other policy instruments.

An illustrative example shows that reinforcing Paris Agreement pledges with a three-tier price floor among just six participants (Canada, China, European Union, India, United Kingdom, United States) with prices of $75, $50, and $25 for advanced, high, and low-income emerging markets, respectively and in addition to current policies, could help achieve a 23 percent reduction in global emissions below baseline by 2030. This is enough to bring emissions in line with keeping global warming below 2°C.

The application of carbon pricing across Canadian provinces gives a good prototype for how a price floor could translate to the international level. The federal government requires provinces and territories to implement a minimum carbon price rising progressively from CAN$10 per ton in 2018 to CAN$50 in 2022 and CAN$170 in 2030. Jurisdictions are free to meet this requirement through carbon taxes or emissions trading systems.

At the international level, a well-designed carbon price floor agreement would yield benefits to individual countries as well as to the collective. All participants would be better off from stabilizing the global climate system, and countries would enjoy domestic environmental benefits from curbing fossil fuel combustion—most importantly, fewer deaths from local air pollution.

There is no time to waste in putting in place such an arrangement. Imagine us in 2030. Let us make sure that we will not look back at 2021 just to regret the missed opportunity for effective action. Let us instead look back with pride at global progress towards keeping global warming below the 2oC threshold. We need coordinated action now—and it should be centered on an international carbon price floor.

Vitor Gaspar, a Portuguese national, is Director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department. Prior to joining the IMF, he held a variety of senior policy positions in Banco de Portugal, including most recently as Special Adviser. He served as Minister of State and Finance of Portugal during 2011–2013. He was head of the European Commission’s Bureau of European Policy Advisers during 2007–2010, and director-general of research at the European Central Bank from 1998 to 2004. Mr. Gaspar holds a PhD and a post-doctoral agregado in Economics from Universidade Nova de Lisboa. He has also studied at Universidade Católica Portuguesa.

Ian Parry is Principal Environmental Fiscal Policy Expert in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, specializing in fiscal analysis of climate change, environment, and energy issues. Before joining the Fund in 2010, Ian held the Allen V. Kneese Chair in Environmental Economics at Resources for the Future.

To read the full commentary from the International Monetary Fund, please click here.

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There is reason for optimism. The two economies share today a common climate ambition and, representing 40% of global gross domestic product and 30% of goods imports, other countries cannot simply ignore what happens here. The key question is, how can the EU and the US decarbonise domestically while also creating an incentive for other countries to move in the same direction? In our view, the answer can be found in the joint introduction of carbon border adjustment measures.

A carbon border adjustment measure is a tariff on imported goods based on their carbon content. This tariff, the amount of which would be equivalent to domestic carbon prices, will be necessary in any country that intends to seriously scale-up decarbonisation. The introduction of strong carbon pricing measures and strong environmental regulations to curb emissions runs the risk of carbon leakage, a situation in which, in order to cut costs, companies shift the production of carbon-intensive goods to countries with weaker policies. Economies with tough climate measures then import those products. Thus, carbon border adjustment is not about protectionism, but about ensuring a level-playing field in a situation in which some countries are doing more than others to implement their decarbonisation pledges.

In the context of the European Green Deal, the EU is already planning the introduction of a carbon border adjustment measure covering the electricity sector and energy-intensive industrial sectors by 2023 at the latest. This could be a good start to the system, which must then be expanded to all imported goods to be efficient and effective. Until last year, European policymakers feared that the United States would have considered such a move as the start of a trade war, but with President Biden there is now an opportunity for a very different conversation. During the presidential campaign, he himself pledged the introduction of carbon border adjustment measures on carbon-intensive goods imported from countries that are failing on their climate and environmental obligations. Furthermore, the US Congress is working on two carbon pricing bills that also include carbon border adjustment.

The best way for the EU and the US to jointly introduce carbon border adjustment would be to form a ‘climate club’, which can be done in three steps. First, they would have to coordinate their domestic decarbonisation roadmaps more closely. Each can choose its own approach, but near-term milestones should be broadly similar, to avoid carbon leakage. Second, they would have to agree on a clear methodology to measure the carbon content of all goods, including the most complex. Third, they would need to make sure the system is transparent and open to all countries willing to join, as this would ensure compliance with the provisions of the World Trade Organisation.

By setting-up such a climate club, the EU and the US would not only ensure their industrial competitiveness while they accelerate domestic decarbonisation, but they would also give others – starting with China Bodog Poker – a significant incentive to scale-up their domestic climate measures to be part of the club, and thus avoid being subject to such tariffs in key export destination markets.

To further increase its contribution to global decarbonisation, alongside its international acceptance, part of the revenues collected from a carbon border adjustment mechanism should be used to fund the deployment of clean technologies in low-income countries.

Thanks to clean-technology developments and unprecedented political momentum, the world has a chance to reverse its failure to tackle climate change. The EU and the US have a historical duty to lead. Doing so by creating a climate club founded on the joint introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism, open to all willing countries, offers the greatest guarantee of success.

Simone Tagliapietra is a Senior fellow at Bruegel. He is also Adjunct professor of Energy, Climate and Environmental Policy at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and at The Johns Hopkins University – School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

Guntram Wolff is the Director of Bruegel. Over his career, he has contributed to research on European political economy and governance, fiscal, monetary and financial policy, climate change and geoeconomics. Under his leadership, Bruegel has been regularly ranked among the top global think tanks and has grown in influence and impact with a team of now almost 40 recognized scholars and around 65 total staff. Bruegel is also recognized for its outstanding transparency.

To read the full commentary from Bruegel, please click here. 

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Despite some progress, the G7 have so far failed to adequately commit to the urgent need to tackle ever growing natural resource consumption and generation of waste – the primary drivers of climate change, biodiversity loss and many other environmental and geopolitical challenges.

Looking beyond the G7 towards upcoming summits, such as COP26 and the G20, this article will outline three principles for a truly global green recovery: efficiency, sufficiency and fairness.

The climate emergency and COVID-19 pandemic have exposed and exacerbated major cracks in the foundations of the neoliberal economic model – the rise of nationalism and protectionism, growing wealth inequality, fragile global supply chains, uneven access to basic human needs and worker exploitation. It is no coincidence that society is experiencing them simultaneously as they are, by and large, symptoms of the same underlying cause – the global race to endlessly maximize and capture economic growth through resource consumption.

In 2019, for the first time in history, humanity consumed over 100 billion tonnes of the earth’s resources in just one year. Extraction and processing of natural resources is responsible for approximately half of the world’s carbon emissions and 90 per cent of biodiversity loss. Such high rates of resource consumption are causing, and will continue to cause, irreparable damage to ecosystems.

A green recovery from the pandemic is a ‘once in a generation’ opportunity to address these issues and to make the economic system greener, fairer and more resilient. The green recovery took centre stage at the G7 with the announcement of the B3W partnership and expressed support for the transition to sustainable management and use of natural resources. But what does sustainable management and use of natural resources mean in the context of a global green recovery?

Is Green Growth the Answer to a Green Recovery?

Many argue that the green recovery should be underpinned by pursuing green growth – in other words growing the economy while simultaneously reducing environmental impact through increasing material and energy efficiency. The EU’s €1.8 trillion post-COVID-19 fund and President Biden’s $6 trillion stimulus package proposal are prime examples of the green growth agenda, as is the B3W with its commitment to accelerating ‘clean and green growth’.

Assuming that all green recovery fiscal stimulus packages focus entirely on green investments – setting aside the fact that, to date, most of them have largely failed at this – there remains no empirical evidenceto suggest that green growth driven by efficiency gain has been – or can be – achieved anywhere near the scale needed to prevent dangerous climate change and other dimensions of ecological breakdown.

The reason for this is that efficiency gain is the driver of economic growth. The more efficient your economy becomes, the faster it grows and the more resources it consumes – otherwise known as the Jevons paradox.

For the G7 to keep their promise of ‘protecting at least 30 per cent of global land and at least 30 per cent of the global ocean by 2030’ and ‘support the transition to sustainable management and use of natural resources’ they must look beyond simply curtailing waste and consider how to absolutely reduce natural resource consumption in a fair manner.

The summation of all of this is simple but stark. A green recovery dependent on green growth may reduce carbon emissions, but it will continue to accelerate natural resource consumption and therefore the destruction of the natural world.

This poses a difficult but essential question for global leaders: how can B3W ensure sustainable management and use of natural resources under a growth-based scenario?

Three Principles for a Global Green Recovery

Many leading thinkers have sought to answer this question with ideas such as Doughnut Economics, Wellbeing economics, Degrowth or the Safe Operating Space. But despite increasing political traction, these ideas have yet to be translated into binding multilateral agreements. With 2021 being the ‘super year’ for the environment, there has never been a better time to convert these ideas into action. What is needed for a truly global green recovery are the principles of efficiency, sufficiency and fairness.

Efficiency: Circular use of materials and energy
There is no way the world can remain within the 1.5°C target or address biodiversity loss without massive resource efficiency gains. The G7 must reaffirm their commitment to the Bologna roadmap which aims to coordinate and progress actions to increase resource efficiency and transition to a more circular economy. The goal of the circular economy is simple: to design out waste and pollution by keeping products and materials in use for as long as possible. Resource efficiency and circular economy should be deeply integrated into the B3W initiative.

However, efficiency gain on its own is not enough to overcome the accelerated resource demand fuelled by the need for constant economic (green) growth – for that we turn to sufficiency.

Sufficiency: An adequate amount of something essential
Sufficiency means consuming the right quantity of material goods and services necessary for optimal health and wellbeing — avoiding underconsumption (poverty) but also conspicuous overconsumption (environmental destruction). Sufficiency is growth agnostic in that it promotes growth where it is needed to eliminate poverty and in economic activities which are beneficial to people and the planet, such as renewable energy or the caring economy. In this respect, the G7 commitment to support clean and green growth in low-income countries is commendable and essential. But to allow developing countries the space to grow within the planetary boundaries, developed countries must also significantly curtail their levels of consumption.

Achieving sufficiency is not necessarily contrary to proponents of green growth. If proponents of green growth are in fact correct, and it is feasible to decouple economic growth from material and energy consumption, placing a moratorium on resource extraction – like the cap on carbon emissions agreed through the Paris Agreement – will only serve to complement this goal. A multilateral agreement on a ‘Safe Operating Space’ is required to ensure fair and sustainable management of natural resources.

Fairness: Reduce inequality through redistribution
Critical to achieving sufficiency is fair redistribution. There is an urgent need to strengthen resource equality and redistribution, both within and across nations, to ensure that all communities have the necessary resources, capacity and material share to deliver wellbeing. Wealth accumulation also needs to be distributed fairly to those who contributed to it, including the public sector where it can be reinvested into more resource efficient public goods and services such as public transport, healthcare and education.

Finally, any global recovery must also put a just transition front and centre. Many people’s jobs and livelihoods – particularly the poorest – are, and will continue to be, affected by the transition to a wellbeing economy, as well as the effects of climate change. The $100 billion per year climate finance fund and financing for the Sustainable Development Goals to achieve the human development targets for 2030 should be substantially increased to support this transition.

In conclusion, the G7 have shown leadership in committing to the B3W partnership and recognizing the need for sustainable management and use of natural resources. But the question remains: what does sustainable natural resource management mean in the context of building back better? The principles of efficiency, sufficiency and fairness could serve as the framework for world leaders to address this question at the upcoming G20 and COP26 summits.

Dr Jack Barrie is an expert on the topic of the circular economy. He holds a PhD from University of Strathclyde on circular economy innovation policy, and previously held the role of Schmidt-MacArthur fellow with the Ellen MacArthur Foundation.

Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources department. At Chatham House he specializes in research on the global transition to an inclusive circular economy with a specific focus on collaborative opportunities between key countries, closing the investment gap and building an evidence base for trade in the circular economy.

To read the full commentary from Chatham House, please click here.

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A new, untested regulatory mechanism for the promotion of (more) sustainable trade through trade preferences is about to be introduced for the first time worldwide. By a relatively narrow margin, Switzerland ratified the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between EFTA states (Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland) and Indonesia on 7 March 2021, in a popular referendum. While it is limited to trade in palm oil and its derivatives, the new regulatory mechanism has the potential for overcoming most of the shortfalls in existing “Trade and Sustainable Development” (TSD) chapters, for instance, in EU trade agreements: it is binding, enforceable, and thereby creates a tangible economic incentive to switch from conventional to sustainable production. It may, however, also create new legal pitfalls: 1) dependency on private standards or labels, 2) reliance on private certification processes, and 3) uncertainty with regard to the long-term impact of a given standard or label.

Legal basics of trade preferences for sustainable production

To date, WTO law considers differential treatment between products or services based on non-product-related process and production methods (npr-PPMs; process and production methods which do not result in a different product, e.g. organic versus conventionally produced cotton) discriminatory. As a result, unilateral policy measures with extra-territorial application and differentiation between “sustainable” and “conventional” production are in principle in violation of WTO obligations.

While npr-PPMs can still be implemented on a national basis – for instance through minimum wages, the enforcement of labour standards, or national emission ‘cap and trade’ systems – such trade-related interests normally cannot be applied to imports. Hence, unless a substantial number of WTO Members participates in similar policies, applying such policies nationally may put the domestic industry at a disadvantage compared with their foreign competitors. WTO members are thereby disincentivised in raising their national minimum standards in environmental, climate and labour protection.

In very rare circumstances, unilateral extra-territorial application of a specific npr-PPM might actually qualify as “necessary to protect public morals” or “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” within the general exceptions in the main WTO treaties (e.g. Article XX GATT; Article XIV GATS). Safer and more direct, however, are trade preferences for sustainable production in bilateral or regional trade agreements as long as the minimum requirements for trade agreements are fulfilled (Article XXIV GATT; Article V GATS). In theory, WTO Members may agree on any kind of sustainability preferences they wish. As Bronckers & Gruni and many others show, however, WTO members have to date done so rarely, if at all: up until today, TSD chapters are for the most part limited to the adoption and/or implementation of international core environment, climate and labour treaties, and non-compliance remains non-sanctionable. 

A new regulatory mechanism: accelerating the transition from conventional to sustainable production through preferential trade liberalization

This is where CEPA might turn out to be a game-changer. CEPA is the first trade agreement which encompasses a regulatory distinction between conventional and sustainable production. The TSD chapter requires “all vegetable oils and their derivatives traded between the parties” to be traded in accordance with the “laws, policies and practices aiming at protecting primary forests, peatlands, and related ecosystems, halting deforestation, peat drainage and fire clearing in land preparation, reducing air and water pollution, and respecting rights of local and indigenous communities and workers” (Articles 8.10(2):a and 8.10(2):e). 

While this provision is excluded from the scope of CEPA dispute settlement, along with the rest of the TSD chapter, it is nevertheless likely to be rigorously enforced. Instead of burdening Indonesia with the enforcement of CEPA Article 8.10, importing CEPA parties (i.e. the EFTA-states) will establish domestic control-systems to ensure that only palm oil and its derivatives produced in line with Article 8.10 benefits from CEPA preferential treatment. In Switzerland, this means that importers of Indonesian palm oil and palm oil derivatives have to prove RSPO-certification (international sustainability standard established by the “Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil”), if they want to benefit from CEPA tariff-reductions. The domestic processes of import control and governance in Switzerland are established in a separate ordinance, de facto moving responsibility for enforcement to Swiss authorities. Therewith, CEPA creates an enforceable, tangible economic incentive to switch from conventional to sustainable production, while avoiding bilateral trade conflicts by limiting enforcement to import control and governance of domestic importers.

While preferential treatment of sustainable production is limited to palm oil in CEPA, its regulatory mechanism could in principle be applied also to other products and commodities in future trade agreements. The mechanism hinges upon a suitable international standard or label. If such a standard or label is available and both sides agree, the same type of domestic import control and governance could be extended to any kind of trade preference (e.g. organic beef, fair trade bananas, climate neutral clothes, etc.).

The curious case of Indonesian palm oil in CEPA

In the case of Indonesian palm oil, circumstances are quite unique. According to the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, almost all palm oil and palm oil derivatives imported to Switzerland are: 1) already certified (due to consumer preferences), and 2) originate in Malaysia. Preferential treatment of RSPO-certified Indonesian palm oil is therefore unlikely to change the overall share of certified palm oil imported to Switzerland, but may perhaps lead to a shift from Malaysian to Indonesian origin. This may be the reason why Indonesia was prepared to agree to the CEPA regulatory mechanism for certified palm oil in the first place – Indonesia gains a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their main Malaysian competitor.

Finally, since only a small share of Indonesian palm oil is currently RSPO-certified, it is possible that – contrary to what is intended – deforestation will increase at first as a consequence of the CEPA regulatory mechanism: evidence suggests that prior to RSPO-certification existing palm oil plantations will expand. In addition, RSPO-certification is known to reduce deforestation in primary forests and high tree cover areas, but has no impact on deforestation in lower tree cover areas. Ultimately, an increase in trade in palm oil and its derivatives is bound to have a negative impact on the environment even with RSPO-certification.

Will the CEPA approach catch on?

Social and environmental drawbacks of trade liberalisation are well-documented and widely acknowledged today: as it turns out, global trade and competition alone do not suffice to lessen inequality between and within states and to promote sustainable economic development. Already back in 2011, Dani Rodrik famously identified the drawbacks of economic globalization as the “Globalization Paradox” where he argued: “The reality is that we lack the domestic and global strategies needed to manage globalisation’s disruptions. As a result, we run the risk that the social [and environmental] costs of trade will outweigh the narrow economic gains and spark an even worse globalisation backlash”(at 88). Is the approach taken in CEPA one way to address this?

CEPA is the first trade agreement elevating a private sustainability standard to a binding requirement for preferential treatment. Furthermore, an otherwise non-sanctionable provision in the TSD chapter becomes enforceable through domestic legislation (and domestic courts). CEPA thus creates a template for binding, enforceable sustainability preferences in trade agreements – a regulatory precedent with the potential to become a new sustainability standard for TSD chapters in trade agreements.

Given that trade agreements will continue to be subject to the optional referendum and remain disputed in Switzerland, it is to be expected that from this point on at least every EFTA or Swiss trade agreement will need to encompass a similar provision in order to meet the threshold of securing the support of a majority of Swiss voters. The implications for on-going and future trade negotiations involving Switzerland are therefore considerable. Spill-over effects to other trade negotiations – notably involving the EU – are quite possible.

But there are also good reasons why other countries have to date been reluctant to introduce a comparable regulatory mechanism in their FTAs. First, it establishes heavy dependence on a particular (private) standard or “label” and on certification processes which are oftentimes not entirely transparent and fair. Unintended consequences cannot be excluded. Second, it is both patronising domestic consumers and foreign producers and thus also revives outdated and failed trade and development policies. Ultimately, it is not entirely certain that preferential treatment limited to certified products and commodities will necessarily benefit the environment, the people and the climate the way it is intended to. 

Nevertheless, if we want to address negative side-effects of international trade – such as pollution and environmental degradation, the exhaustion of natural resources, dangerous working conditions, along with a rise in inequality – we need to look beyond existing WTO law and TSD chapters in trade agreements. The CEPA provides a fresh way of thinking about the role of trade preferences in the protection of the environment, the climate and labour. 

The views and opinions expressed in this blog are solely those of the bodog poker review original authors and contributors. These views and opinions do not necessarily represent those of TradeExperettes, the TradeExperettes editorial team and/or any or all contributors to this site.

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A Parliament report on the issue — which was up for a final vote on Wednesday — isn’t binding, but it offers an indication of a bitter fight that will play out as the Commission prepares to present its proposal by the summer.

The European Parliament on Tuesday adopted a last-minute change to its report on the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) — a levy the EU wants to impose on some imports from jurisdictions with laxer climate policies that could undercut European producers forced to pay for their greenhouse gas emissions.

The change called for heavy polluters like the steel and cement sectors, currently getting free permits under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), to continue getting that benefit even once the CBAM goes into effect.

That’s likely to spark fierce international opposition as the World Trade Organization doesn’t allow for so-called double protection.

Parliament “sent a very bad signal as it voted against phasing out free allowances under EU ETS. We still strongly advise against this option which would lead to double compensation & which would definitely put CBAM under threat at” the WTO, tweeted the EU branch of the Jacques Delors Institute, whose president emeritus is former WTO director general Pascal Lamy.

The Parliament wants the CBAM to mirror the ETS, with certain products hit with a tax linked to the price paid by EU producers for their emissions. Carbon dioxide currently trades at about €40 per ton.

The goal is to avoid “carbon leakage,” the term for companies leaving the EU to avoid high carbon costs. This is currently dealt with by allowing EU polluters a number of free emissions allowances. The Commission feels that the CBAM does away with the need for free permits, as it still protects EU industry.

“We are assessing various scenarios to allow for smooth and predictable transition from … free allowances and [to the CBAM],” EU Economy Commissioner Paolo Gentiloni told MEPs on Monday.

The Commission is wary of leaving both systems in place, as that could result in legal action at the WTO by the EU’s trading partners.

The “design needs of course to respect WTO rules and trade agreements,” Gentiloni said, adding that such a levy would be in place by 2023 and be designed to extend its scope gradually.

Surprise amendment

The original Parliament report, authored by Green MEP Yannick Jadot, said a border fee would “go hand in hand with the parallel, gradual, rapid and eventual complete phasing out” of free allowances for the sectors covered “so as to avoid double protection.”

But industry groups are fearful of losing free allowances, arguing that it would make their exports uncompetitive and risk knock-on effects such as substituting materials that would be subject to a carbon border levy for others that would be exempt. Industry groups Eurofer, Cefic, Cembureau and Fertilizers Europe, representing the steel, chemicals and cement sectors, among others, lobbied in favor of keeping the allowances ahead of Tuesday’s online vote, according to a text seen by POLITICO.

The industry concerns fell on fertile ground, and conservative lawmakers managed to push through their amendment calling for free permits to remain.

“We have to be careful when we say [the carbon border adjustment mechanism] is an alternative to existing measures, It clearly doesn’t work in the same way,” Adam Jarubas, the European People’s Party shadow rapporteur on the file, said ahead of the vote. He wants the Commission to keep both measures in its proposal, “otherwise the transition will turn to a direct switch and our economy is not ready for such an experiment.”

Conservative MEPs cheered Tuesday’s outcome.

Angelika Niebler, the co-chair of the German Christian Democrat CDU/CSU group in the Parliament, said Wednesday that a CO2 border adjustment mechanism “was no silver bullet” and as long as other major trading blocs didn’t follow the EU’s climate course it was crucial to support industry. “Otherwise our economy would be doubly penalized,” she said.

NGOs lamented the outcome, calling it “a blow, but we expect logic, scientific evidence and coherence to prevail in the upcoming legislative proposals on the Emissions Trading System and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism,” said Doreen Fedrigo, industrial transformation policy coordinator at Climate Action Network Europe.

Jadot said there will be “a fierce struggle” in the coming months. “It began with an alliance between the most conservative right and the extreme right of this Parliament, around certain industrial lobbies, to break the most ambitious parts of the report.”

“The battle has only just begun,” he said.

To read the original blog by Politico, please click here. 

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