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Thomas Nielsen — Wed, 17 Jul 2024 11:25:15 +0000

Mexico’s push for exclusion from the United States’ solar safeguard measure, which jumped into the news this week, raises a point of potential interest for the IELP Blog audience.

The escape clause / efficient breach theory of safeguards holds that a WTO Member can temporarily retract a trade concession, hiking tariffs and thereby providing an opportunity for orderly adjustment by its domestic producers, while preserving the balance of concessions by compensating affected trading partners during the time the tariff umbrella is up. There is a general 3-year grace period for compensation, but that has long since lapsed in the case of the solar safeguard measure which has been in place for nearly 7 years without compensation being provided to anyone. The silence on this point, both from governments and from trade geeks, has been rather odd.

While all WTO members have been entitled to compensation for their trade losses resulting from the solar safeguard measure since Day 1 of Year 4, Mexico – by virtue of the NAFTA and the USMCA – has been entitled to compensation (or else exclusion from the measure) since Day 1 of Year 1.

According to the news reports, Mexico is currently seeking not compensation but exclusion from the measure … consistent with instructions President Biden included in his February 2022 proclamation extending the measure for four additional years. The issue has taken on increased importance with the measure’s recently-restored coverage of bifacial solar modules, which dominate Mexico’s solar exports to the United States. Suddenly, the measure has, in respect of intra-North American trade, a more painful bite.

If an exclusion is not quickly implemented, the compensation which Mexico could demand (and lawfully help itself to) would not be trivial. During the four-year reference period prior to the safeguard measure, 2013-2017, Mexico accounted for roughly 10% of U.S. solar panel imports. During the safeguard measure’s time in force, Mexico’s share of U.S. imports has fallen dramatically. Switching to absolute numbers and looking at the last calendar year (2023), if Mexico had been supplying 10% of U.S. imports (as during the reference period), the value of its solar exports would have been about $1.4 billion. Actual Mexico-to-U.S. shipments in 2023 were roughly $400 million. So the current run rate, in regard to Mexico’s trade losses as traditionally measured, is about $1 billion/year. Suspension of concessions on south-bound trade flows of that magnitude could be expected to cause a bit of a stir.

There are many contested items in the Mexico-U.S. bilateral trade agenda at the moment. This solar issue sticks out as one where Mexico has undisputable legal (treaty-based) rights, which its neighbor to the north is not respecting. A simple exclusion would be good for Mexico but also – given the $1 billion/year price tag if Mexico should decide to stop sleeping on its rights – would avoid an awkward problem for Uncle Sam.

The broader question of compensation’s disappearance from the public discussion on safeguards merits attention in its own right. Is this the new normal? And if so, what aspect of the safeguard system might disappear next … adjustment plans? I had always thought — and have been telling law students for the last ~22 years — that these elements of the safeguard system were fundamental ones, even if it is the safeguard tariffs themselves that garner most public attention.

To read the full commentary as it was published on the International Economic Law and Policy Blog, managed by WorldTradeLaw.net, click here.

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Matt Degn — Tue, 16 May 2023 15:30:20 +0000

While some gender gaps are closing, the pace of progress is too slow in trade. Reformers in government and business can show the way.

In 2013, Connie Stacey had a business idea: to create a clean, green and quiet replacement for fossil-fuel-powered generators. Stacey, 48, had worked in information technology previously and thought she could use battery technology as an alternative to diesel or gasoline. Her version would be bigger than the batteries in mobile phones, require no technicians or engineers to use, and could be infinitely scalable. She built a prototype, named it the Grengine, and started a company called Growing Greener Innovations to build and market it.

Then came the challenges, first in terms of scaling her product and then delivering it to global markets. She ran into a barrier so many women entrepreneurs face: securing financing. As of 2022, only 2% of venture capital worldwide went to women-owned businesses, with most of those funding decisions made by men. Stacey’s challenges securing financing also underscored the soft discrimination some women face. “I had already built the prototype and there were people who asked me, ‘But who actually invented it?’”

Then there was the issue of bringing her product to the global market. Only 15% of businesses engaged in international trade are led by women, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Stacey finally found success in 2018, when she entered a contest sponsored by the US Department of Defense, where the innovations themselves were the main focus rather than the founders or their fundraising. Stacey won in the energy-efficiency and grid technologies category, and that gave her the momentum she needed. She won awards from 14 other organizations from 2018 to 2023, as well as contracts to supply the Grengine to clients ranging from Canada’s military to a mine in Saskatchewan and a golf resort in Wales.

Today, Stacey exports to six countries, which puts her in that small minority of women-led businesses engaged in international trade identified by the WTO.

Breaking down the gender gap

The imbalance in international trade is one of many inequalities that comprise a global gender gap that will take another 135 years to close at the current pace of policy reform, according to the World Economic Forum (WEF).

The WEF breaks the gender gap into four areas. Two areas are considered almost completely closed: educational attainment, and health and survival. The other two gaps are more persistent: political empowerment, and economic participation and opportunity. Trade falls under the economic participation and opportunity gap. It’s a gap that impacts women as consumers, workers and entrepreneurs.

Consumers: Much has been written about the “pink tax,” or the retail premium women sometimes pay to buy a pink razor rather than a blue one. But this trade-oriented phenomenon goes deeper. According to a 2020 study published in the journal American Political Science Review covering two decades’ worth of tariffs on men’s and women’s apparel in 167 countries, imports of women’s goods were taxed 0.7% more than imports of men’s goods. In the US, tariffs add about 75 cents to the cost of men’s underwear, and US$1.10 to a pair for women.
Workers: In developing countries, women and men vie for formal employment with a company that is integrated into global value chains as it offers greater rewards and fewer risks than most other jobs. According to the World Bank, two-thirds of these positions go to men.
Entrepreneurs: Women struggle to gain the professional recognition they deserve. They also face challenges such as access to finance, balancing career aspirations with domestic responsibilities, and bribe demands or unwanted sexual encounters as they seek the necessary permits and paperwork.

The persistent gender gaps in trade, economics and politics are related: at the WTO, only 36% of ambassadors and 30% of ministers in charge of WTO affairs are women. To address the obstacles in trade, there need to be more women in these leadership roles.

Fixing the gender gap in trade is slowly gaining traction

The good news is that correcting the global gender gap in trade is beginning to gain traction among policymakers. However, it should also be on the radar for trade functions of businesses. Applying better gender-based data to strategies for businesses and for trade would have significant benefits in identifying barriers to women’s access to markets. Turning a sharper lens on gender issues could also help to scale up women-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), adding long-term value to their organizations.

Governments more frequently address the gender gap in bilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs), in language evolving from aspirational to enforceable. Additionally, more governments now consider the gender impacts of all policies and processes, in a methodology called gender mainstreaming.

Governments have also identified a data deficit as an obstacle to closing the gender gap. When they collect data about businesses, more statisticians are asking gender-specific questions, expecting that more data will lead to better policy.

As more states consider practical steps available to accelerate change, some regions have taken leading roles. In North America, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa, the overall gender gap is likely to close within 100 years. But in the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, and South Asia, it will take anywhere from 115 to 197 years, according to the WEF.

What all these leaders and laggards have in common, however, is that the pace of change is far too slow. If the global community is serious about this goal, the scope of its collective actions must match the scale of the problem.

The data on gender and trade are clear – for individual businesses and for whole economies.

Economically, closing the gender gap in trade would create up to US$12 trillion in GDP by 2025, according to a study by the Washington DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. In the UK, an independent study commissioned by the government, the Alison Rose Review of Female Entrepreneurship, found that if women started small businesses at the same rate as men, they would add another US$307.7 billion to the British economy – a 9.8% bump to 2021’s GDP of US$3.13 trillion.

The case for businesses is also clear. According to a 2021 study by Credit Suisse, companies with more than a 20% diversity threshold have enjoyed better EBITDA margins (higher by 1.6 percentage points) on average since 2010 compared with companies with a lower than 15% diversity threshold. Moreover, firms with higher levels of diversity, whether in management or the boardroom, have higher share price returns than companies with lower diversity levels. Comparing businesses with an above-average share of women on the board and in management to those with below-average shares (9.7% and 6.8%, respectively), the disparity in returns is roughly 300 basis points.

Diversity improves performance

A lack of diversity among venture-capital funders also helps explain why female entrepreneurs fall through the cracks. The Rose Review found that less than 1% of UK venture capital funding goes to all-female teams of entrepreneurs. This is similar to the global total, which has hovered between 2% and 3% in recent years. In the US, women account for only 5.7% of VC partners. These gendered results for venture capital persist despite a growing body of evidence that women make great leaders of start-ups: venture-backed technology companies run by women deliver higher revenue and a greater return on equity, for example.

These lessons are critical for global businesses looking to align with efforts to close the gender trade gap by ensuring they have inclusive representation in their own trade functions.

“Any kind of diversity improves your performance,” says Rocio Mejia, EY Global Trade and Indirect Tax Leader for Latin America North. “Having women in top roles provides different points of view. It’s always a combination of ideas that companies tend to follow, so it is better to have more ideas than fewer.” Companies that are inclusive are 1.7 times more likely to be leaders in innovation.

In May 2022, the United Kingdom and Mexico kicked off negotiations on a bilateral free-trade agreement. The signing ceremony was held in London’s Soho district, at the new headquarters of Diageo Plc. The largest distiller of Scotch whisky is also a major tequila producer, and recently announced a US$500 million investment in new production facilities in Jalisco, the Mexican state home to the blue agave plant used to make the drink.

When the time came for the countries’ trade ministers to shake hands and smile for the cameras, there were two women in the frame: Tatiana Clouthier, Mexico’s then Secretary of Economy, and Anne-Marie Trevelyan, the UK’s then Secretary of State for International Trade.

That two women would interact in such a high-profile negotiation was unusual because few women hold leadership positions that oversee international trade. As of January 1, 2023, women represented only 22.8% of government Cabinet ministers, and they typically headed ministries other than the high-profile ones that oversee trade policy, such as a ministry of finance, trade and investment; economic development; or foreign affairs. The five most commonly held roles for female ministers focus on issues concerning family, children, youth, the elderly and the disabled.

“When there are more females in those powerful positions, there is a greater emphasis on women’s issues and a natural understanding of the challenges bodog poker review they face,” says Ian Craig, EY Latin America South Global Trade Leader.

Chile takes a leading role

When Michelle Bachelet won a second term as president of Chile in 2014, she made gender equality gaps a focus. FTAs had rarely mentioned gender as an issue, and when they did so it was typically in an aspirational introductory passage rather than in the binding language of the body of the document. But Bachelet’s trade negotiators had already teamed up with some like-minded peers to push against that boundary. In 2016, Chile and Uruguay introduced the first FTA with a chapter covering gender issues. It contained general passages declaring the importance of ending discrimination against women, calling for considering gender in trade policy, and flagging trade as a way to equalize opportunity.

The two parties also declared an intention to cooperate on programs to help women build skills and networks, and to create labor market conditions that encourage female participation in job markets. Moreover, they established a gender committee to facilitate those objectives. However, these pro-equality moves are voluntary. The text clarifies that the dispute-settlement mechanism does not apply to the gender chapter.

Chile’s next generation of FTAs went further, with two treaties effective as of 2019 with Canada and Argentina. Chilean and Canadian negotiators included reminders in their bilateral FTA of other international agreements the two countries had signed, including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Argentina-Chile deal referenced CEDAW as well as several conventions of the International Labour Organization, which mandate equality in remuneration and opportunity, and address discrimination and other gender-based workplace issues.

Canada sets the bar higher

A Canadian FTA with Israel announced in 2019 raised the bar even higher. Canada and Israel negotiated an update to their existing FTA and specified in the gender chapter that its content is subject to the FTA’s binding resolution method. Further, instead of confining gender issues to the gender chapter, they are also addressed in the preamble of the FTA and in its labor chapter.

As an aside, it’s interesting to note that Canada’s Minister of Finance, Minister of International Trade and Minister of Foreign Affairs are currently all women.

It’s still too early to measure the progress we’re seeing

As of December 2020, an updated thorough assessment of 577 RTAs found that 83 of them had at least one provision directly referencing gender or women. This includes 305 agreements that are now in force and have been disclosed to the WTO. When provisions referring to implicit gender issues, such as human rights, the social dimension of sustainable development, and vulnerable groups are included, the total number of agreements rises to 257.

While this may be seen as progress, it’s too soon to expect measurable benefits, says Hong Kong-based Kareena Teh, Partner at LC Lawyers LLP (a member of the global EY network), who deals in disputes. “The dispute settle mechanism of the Canada-Israel FTA has yet to be tested with a gender-issues case. And FTA dispute mechanisms are just one path to narrowing the gender gap,” Teh says.

“If we take a carrot-and-stick approach, dispute settlement mechanisms are the stick,” Teh explains. “But FTAs could also include incentives to meet certain gender targets, which could be an easier way of achieving the same end.” Dispute settlement mechanisms could be difficult to apply because they are often oriented toward financial payments as settlements, and it is difficult to quantify damages payable for gender-based complaints.

Trade negotiators could also further improve FTAs through a process called gender mainstreaming. In public policy, this is a whole-of-government approach in which the responsibility to consider, analyze and address gender issues falls to more than just gender specialists. All activities must be screened for gender impacts before proceeding, including laws, regulations, government programs and research. For FTAs, gender mainstreaming would mean abandoning the approach of collecting gender-based issues and stipulations in a gender chapter, and instead ensuring that gender considerations are addressed in every chapter. This approach would leave room for both carrots and sticks, Teh says.

FTAs are an understandable focus for governments aiming to close the gender gap in trade. But trade policy isn’t the only path to progress. Practical responses to the problem can come from domestic laws and regulations, as well as from international organizations, the private sector and civil society. They include approaches such as establishing minimum standards, gender mainstreaming, training and oversight programs and incentive programs.

Many of the programs women can access are designed to tackle three main challenges they face as entrepreneurs: access to finance, mobility and information.

For the WTO, the international body most relevant to the challenge, a push for change coalesced into action at the 11^th Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires in 2017. Talks there led to 127 countries signing on to the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment, which aims to boost involvement in trade for women and to ensure they benefit from the activity. This led to an informal WTO working group that meets regularly (there are five meetings in 2023), as well as a Gender Research Hub, which has been collecting data on gender-related trade matters ever since and hosts the World Trade Congress on Gender every two years in Geneva. Their latest report, issued in 2022, focused on cross-border trade in the pre- and post-pandemic environment.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), meanwhile, offers the Trade and Gender Toolbox, which national policymakers can use to forecast how new trade policy proposals would impact women.

The UN and WTO also collaborate through the International Trade Center. Its SheTrades program offers a platform for women in business to network and support each other, and for buyers to find products and services offered by women. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s Global Trade and Gender Arrangement (GTAGA) commits signatory countries to promote trade policies that empower women and remove the barriers they face. At the World Bank, programming includes the Women, Business, and the Law initiative, which evaluates countries’ laws and regulations in hopes of triggering policy discussions that lead to the removal of legal restrictions on women aiming to export and import.

The World Bank and other multilateral or bilateral development banks and aid providers can play a dual role. In addition to providing programming to promote minimum standards or providing research, they can help close trade’s gender gap through their own decision-making processes on the loans and grants they offer. Most already require environmental and social impact assessments and environmental and social management plans for projects they finance. UNCTAD recommends 12 main ingredients for a management plan, one of which addresses gender concerns in labor.

Governments should seize opportunities to improve women’s access to finance, mobility and information

Outside of trade agreements, there are several opportunities governments can take advantage of to improve women’s access to finance, mobility and information.

Enforce standards. Governments can enforce standards through their procurement processes. Laws and rules can establish that winners of government contracts must commit to specific conditions, such as providing opportunities to qualified women-led subcontractors. Currently, impact assessments and procurement rules are often treated as “box-ticking exercises” in which investors do the bare minimum required to win approval, according to a World Bank report.
Tailor training and facilitation resources to women. Training and facilitation programs often focus on the main challenges women face as entrepreneurs. They are available from in-country export-promotion agencies, from development banks, government agencies, or civil society groups. Tailoring these resources to women specifically and offering them in a women-only setting can help eliminate the possibility of discrimination, as in many cases the people running these programs are men.
Consider culture and local norms when devising mobility solutions. The mobility problem is often rooted in local conditions and cultures, says Taramani Agarwal, a Dehli-based Public Policy Development Manager at EY Global Delivery Services India LLP. In many parts of the world women cannot simply pack up their goods and travel to another country to sell or arrange for shipping. People in remote settings may lack affordable transportation. Husbands might prefer their wives stay close to home to look after children. Women could face discrimination or unwanted sexual advances at any point in any business trip: to a market, supplier, bank or shipping point. Joining digital platforms may be a solution in the future because work can be done from home, but research thus far on their gender impacts is unclear. A local solution in Northeast India involved small, stall-based markets near India’s international borders, Agarwal says. This marketplace model of “boarder haats” [sic] is not exclusive to women. However, given the suitable conditions to trade products at the border markets, local women are able to make money for their sustainable livelihood. “We found that customs officers and trade officials needed to be gender-sensitive for this to work,” says Agarwal, who was then employed by a non-governmental organization working to facilitate trade. Her team recommended gender training for customs officials, freight forwarders and others involved in the process, as well as addressing the setting. The border-haat concept comes with a bonus for tax authorities – it reduces informal trade and offers an opportunity to connect with entrepreneurs and encourage them to register their businesses and pay taxes. Offer gender-exclusive opportunities to access information. Jesmina Zeliang, who is from India’s remote Nagaland state, and is the founder of a home décor and textiles business that sells goods to global retailers such as Crate & Barrel and Christian Louboutin, realized she needed help when growth had slowed and buyers had stopped calling. Zeliang started with programs for developing-country entrepreneurs offered by the Delhi-based Export Promotion Council for Handicrafts and the Dutch Entrepreneurial Development Bank. She evaluated her business’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and studied export marketing. She learned to target markets by understanding common color choices for home decoration in different countries and developing a pitch more sophisticated than carrying samples and knocking on doors. She added international contacts to her professional network and soon built relationships into contracts. She’s now on the board of the Export Promotion Council as its sole female member. Zeliang took advantage of many of the same types of support that men also find valuable: training, networking and joining trade associations or local chambers of commerce. The groups and programs Zeliang used weren’t tailored to women specifically. But there may be value in gender-exclusive versions.
Develop models that speak to women. Vicki Saunders runs a non-profit crowdfunding platform called Coralus International. She raises funds for women entrepreneurs using a values-driven approach. Those donors are then entitled to vote on proposals from female entrepreneurs, and the winners receive a five-year loan worth US$100,000 in the local currency at zero interest. Coralus operates in Canada, the US, New Zealand, Australia and the UK. She has thus far raised about US$14 million and funded 146 ventures. “Our model has little to do with women specifically beyond that you have to be one to participate,” Saunders says. Saunders’ platform also addresses the ways in which women network and interact in professional communities, as well as the gap in finance. The entrepreneurs she backs participate in regular sessions, typically over video platforms. “People take turns talking about their products and services,” Saunders says. “Often, they hadn’t been thinking of exporting, but suddenly they’re able to tap international markets because someone else on the call knows a local distributor. It’s tough to build a business on your own, but it becomes so much easier when you get people together in the same room. We’re focused on relationships and not transactions.”

Where trade was once considered a gender-neutral activity, it is now understood to have gendered impacts. The 2017 Buenos Aires Declaration identifies improved data collection as a way to fix that.

“We need data disaggregated by sex so we know how different policies impact men differently than women,” Teh says.

According to the OECD, policymakers should collect data for indicators such as the ratio of women’s to men’s income in comparable trade-based economic sectors or value chains, the percentage of women in higher-paid positions across sectors or value-chain segments, the ratio of women and men enrolled in trade-specific capacity-building training programs, and the number of procurement contracts awarded as a result of the increased certification of women-owned businesses.

A data-centric approach has worked to measure and close other kinds of gender gaps, according to the WEF. Since 2006, for example, the report has measured the ratio of males to females enrolled in secondary education. Disseminating that data led to 184 countries adopting a monitoring framework bodog sportsbook review to ensure inclusion, and education became one of the two main gender gaps the WEF considers almost completely closed.

Conclusions across countries about how trade policy impacts women can be difficult, however, because countries collect that data in different ways, according to UNCTAD. One way to address this would be greater harmonization in the ways governments conduct surveys and other data-gathering exercises, to make data easier to compare across countries.

Disaggregating data by gender has also improved the private sector’s understanding of how women experience their goods and services. For the automotive industry, gender-specific data on vehicle crashes has helped to reveal that women are 47% more likely to suffer injury and 17% more likely to die because the crash-test dummies used in safety assessments mimic the bodies of men only instead of both genders. In financial services, data have shown that women are more likely to seek a new investment advisor when their spouse dies because advisors have worked in the past to develop a relationship with the husband only.

Although governments are the logical starting point for improving the data available to policymakers, they can’t do it alone – particularly in bigger countries, where relevant agencies may not have the resources to collect statistically significant data samples, especially in remote regions.

International organizations also play a role in data gathering and analysis. In recent years, several organizations have studied digital-commerce platforms and how their impact differs on male and female entrepreneurs, with mixed results. In Indonesia, a United Nations study found that 54% of women-owned microbusinesses use the internet to sell their products, compared with 39% of those that are men-owned. Using survey data from the Indonesian government, the study found that about 40% of micro and small businesses led by women used digital platforms to expand their businesses, compared with about 10% less for those led by men. However, in the Philippines, the Asian Development Bank found that women are more likely to use platforms, but that men who use digital platforms in similar ways are more likely to earn more.

Another solution to address the data gap, while showing where the structural barriers to trade for women persist, is the SheTrades Outlook developed by the International Trade Center. This evidenced-based policy tool helps to identify policies, laws or programs that contribute or prevent women’s participation in the economy and trade. The SheTrades Outlook covers 55 indicators grouped under six interlinked pillars. It also has a repository of over 100 good practices on women’s economic empowerment around the world.

It’s early in the quest to understand the lasting impacts of digital platforms, just as it’s too soon to gauge the effectiveness of gender provisions in FTAs. The hunt for data will continue. “If you want gender-sensitive data, you need to ask gender-sensitive questions,” Teh warns.

This makes statistics collection similar to FTAs, representation in senior government roles and barriers to access. To improve gender-neutral outcomes, all stakeholders involved need to create opportunities for women to participate, lead and influence the process.

Gender parity is central to conversations among businesses that are increasingly focused on social and environmental issues. However, businesses need to translate rhetoric about progress into meaningful action that has a lasting impact.

For organizations that are serious about gender-parity in global trade, here are three ways they can help close the gender gap.

Lobby governments to forge stronger ties among domestic policy, trade and strategic goals. Organizations can lobby governments to not only acknowledge the importance of incorporating a gender perspective into strategic goals around inclusive economic growth, but also to develop and enact meaningful policies that mandate action – using carrot, stick, or both.
Lead by example by placing more women in key decision-making roles. As we’ve noted, the data is clear that governments develop better policies toward closing the gender gap when women are in senior decision-making roles. And businesses are more profitable. Organizations that prioritize diversity in their boards and senior leadership positions – and especially positions that have an impact on international trade – can do more than boost their bottom line. In leading by example, they can demonstrate to governments and policymakers that more women in roles that can accelerate the closure of the gender gap in trade becomes a win-win for everyone.
Create a trade function within your organization that recognizes the value women-led businesses can bring to global markets. In a more disrupted international trade environment, organizations would benefit from setting up a trade function. In addition to exploring new markets, finding suitable partners and developing a framework for trade compliance in the jurisdictions in which you operate, this trade function can establish policies that prioritize partnerships and alliances with women-led businesses. Such policies would strengthen your ecosystem and help women-led businesses maximize their potential in global markets.

Closing the gender gap in international trade shouldn’t take 135.6 years. With governments, policymakers, non-governmental organizations, and corporations working together to break down the barriers that women-led businesses face, gender-parity in international trade could be a reality within the next decade. That’s a goal worth realizing.

To read the full article, please click here.

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Courtney Brown — Wed, 23 Feb 2022 16:46:21 +0000

CAIRO – The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which entered into force on January 1 last year, promises to accelerate the diversification of the region’s economies and reduce the impact of commodity-price cycles on growth. Whereas Africa’s external trade is dominated by primary commodities and natural resources, the first shipment under the AfCFTA – from Ghana to South Africa – comprised manufactured goods of the sort that largely drive intra-African trade.

Many therefore hope that the AfCFTA – by creating a single market of 55 countries with a total population of more than 1.3 billion and a combined GDP of $3.4 trillion – will catalyze industrialization as firms take advantage of economies of scale to spread the risk of investing in smaller markets. To that end, the trade agreement will eliminate tariffs on 90% of goods (the ultimate goal is 97% liberalization).

The AfCFTA will likely boost foreign direct investment across Africa – empirical evidence elsewhere shows that joining a free-trade area could increase it by around a quarter – and shift its emphasis from natural resources toward labor-intensive manufacturing industries. Moreover, the pact has the potential to transform African economies, significantly increase the continent’s share of global trade, and strengthen its bargaining power in international trade negotiations.

But while many have touted the AfCFTA as a game changer for Africa, trade liberalization alone will not necessarily guarantee economic success.

To be sure, the agreement has rightly attracted much attention in academic and policy circles. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the African Export–Import Bank have all compiled extensive studies on the AfCFTA’s potential impact. And the Journal of African Trade recently published a special issue on “The AfCFTA and African Trade,” which I co-edited with Andrew Mold of the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

All these analyses point to the agreement’s significant and positive impact on economic development. Specifically, the empirical results according to computable general equilibrium models – which allow for trade-diverting and trade-creating effects of tariffs and non-tariff shocks by exploiting countries’ comparative advantage and price adjustments – are highly encouraging. Aggregate headline estimates derived from these models show that the AfCFTA would increase Africa’s GDP by 0.5% after full implementation in 2045, relative to a scenario without continental trade integration.

Real wages would increase for both skilled and unskilled workers, and especially for the latter, suggesting a shift toward more inclusive growth. The World Bank estimates that the AfCFTA could lift 30 million people out of extreme poverty and around 68 million out of moderate poverty by 2035, with women benefiting more than men. Trade integration could also have a significant impact at the household and corporate level: Combined consumer and business spending is projected to reach $6.7 trillion by 2030.

Trade within Africa is expected to grow strongly under the AfCFTA, with intracontinental exports increasing by 34% (equivalent to around $133 billion annually) compared to a scenario without the agreement. Moreover, around two-thirds of intra-African trade gains will likely be realized in the manufacturing sector – historically the most effective elevator out of poverty. This would set the stage for a welfare-enhancing and mutually reinforcing relationship between intraregional trade and industrialization, resulting in sustainable growth of well-paid manufacturing jobs while broadening countries’ tax bases and improving their external accounts.

But substantial non-tariff barriers, regulatory differences, and divergent sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical standards increase the costs of cross-border trade within Africa by an estimated 14.3%, well above the average tariff of 6.9%. Removing these constraints and deepening the integration of African businesses into global value chains will significantly boost intra-African trade and drive growth. The World Bank estimates that full implementation of the AfCFTA could raise Africa’s real income by 7% (about $450 billion) by 2035, with trade facilitation measures to cut red tape and simplify customs procedures responsible for $292 billion of this increase.

Overcoming Africa’s chronic infrastructure deficit – both physical and digital – will boost the power of trade creation and help to ensure the successful implementation of the AfCFTA. By tackling the continent’s supply-side constraints, policymakers can enhance both production and logistics in a region with more landlocked countries (16) than any other. As investors seek to capitalize on the economies of scale offered by the AfCFTA, integrating markets and improving connectivity must be a top priority.

Clarifying the AfCFTA’s rules of origin – which determine whether products are duty-free under the agreement – also is key to accelerating industrialization and the development of regional value chains. Despite the challenges posed by COVID-19, negotiators have made significant progress on the rules-of-origin agreement, which should be concluded later this year. That will pave the way for phase-two negotiations on key drivers of future growth, including protocols on investment, competition policy, and intellectual-property rights.

But, as the rush to conclude bilateral trade agreements with third-party countries suggests, Africa’s most important trade-integration challenge may be the perennial one of putting the region’s collective interest first. Although the AfCFTA does not bar member countries from entering such negotiations, bilateral deals with third parties could affect African trade patterns and set precedents for regional trade and investment rules. In practice, they could lead to trade deflection, given that the AfCFTA’s most-favored-nation clause automatically extends tariff concessions granted to a third party to AfCFTA members.

As Jeffrey Sachs has argued, “Without a doubt, if Africa becomes economically integrated, it will be a global leader and the largest economic region in the world.” As of this writing, 41 countries have ratified the AfCFTA. But if the pact is to become the launchpad for Africa’s deeper integration into the global economy, governments must complement trade liberalization with robust trade facilitation measures, and strengthen regional coordination in order to engage with external partners as a unified trading bloc.

Hippolyte Fofack is Chief Economist and Director of Research at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

To read the full commentary from Project Syndicate, please click here.

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Courtney Brown — Sun, 16 Jan 2022 05:00:35 +0000

Press accounts last week reviewed new record merchandise trade surpluses for China with the world and a growing trade surplus with the United States despite the Section 301 tariffs and other actions which reduced the bilateral trade deficit in 2019 and 2020 from the figures in 2018. See Reuters, China posts record trade surplus in Dec and 2021 on robust exports, January 14, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/currencies/chinas-exports-imports-grow-more-slowly-december-2022-01- 14/ (“The trade surplus hit $676.43 billion in 2021, the highest since records started in 1950, up from $523.99 billion in 2020, according to data from the statistics bureau.” “China’s hefty trade surplus with the United States, a key source of contention between the world’s two biggest economies, hit $39.23 billion in December, widening from $36.95 billion the month before, but below this year’s high of $42 billion in September.”). While U.S. trade data are not yet available for December, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China for eleven months of 2021 was $319.151 billion, suggesting full year deficit with bodog sportsbook review China of more than 8 billion — reversing the declining deficits of the last several years with China.

For the U.S., 2021 will be the first year where the trade deficit in goods exceeds $1 trillion dollars. So while the U.S. has significant deficits with a number of countries, for the Biden Administration and Congress, the most concerning aspect of the deficit is the effect of distortions flowing from China’s economic system, one that is at odds with the U.S. market-based system and not consistent with WTO basic principles.

I have in prior posts reviewed the incompatability of the Chinese economic system with WTO norms. I have also provided the views of a former WTO Deputy Director-General on the importance of convergence of economic systems as opposed to coexistence, and the views of trade officials in the U.S. and EU on challenges posed by Chna’s economic system. See, e.g., December 11, 2021: 20 Years of China’s Membership in the WTO — a brief critique, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/12/11/20-years-of- chinas-membership-in-the-wto-a-brief-critique/; October 16, 2021: What role China could play in WTO reform — possibilities are real but chances of a positive role are not, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/10/16/what-role-china-could-play-in-wto-reform-possibilities-are- real-but-chances-of-a-positive-role-are-not/; April 8, 2021: USTR 2021 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers — areas of concern with a focus on China, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/04/08/ustr-2021-national-trade-estimate-report-on-foreign-trade- barriers-areas-of-concern-with-a-focus-on-china/; March 31, 2021: “Blowing up the trading system” — Clyde Prestowitz’s suggested way for the world to move forward in light of China’s economic system, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/31/blowing-up-the-trading-system-clyde-prestowitzs- suggested-way-for-the-world-to-move-forward-in-light-of-chinas-economic-system/; March 29, 2021: China and the WTO – remarks by Dennis C. Shea to the Coalition for a Prosperous America, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/03/29/china-and-the-wto-remarks-by-dennis-c-shea-to-the- coalition-for-a-prosperous-america/; January 17, 2021, USTR on January 14, 2021 released its 2020 report to Congress on China’s WTO compliance, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2021/01/17/ustr-on-january-14- 2021-releases-its-2020-report-to-congress-on-chinas-wto-compliance/; November 10, 2020: The values of the WTO – do Members and the final Director-General candidates endorse all of them?, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/11/10/the-values-of-the-wto-do-members-and-the-final-director- general-candidates-endorse-all-of-them/; August 24, 2020: USTR Lighthizer’s Op Ed in the Wall Street Journal – How to Set World Trade Straight, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/08/24/ustr-lighthizers- op-ed-in-the-wall-street-journal-how-to-set-world-trade-straight/; July 25, 2020: A new WTO without China? The July 20, 2020 Les Echos opinion piece by Mogens Peter Carl, a former EC Director General for Trade and then Environment, https://currentthoughtsontrade.com/2020/07/25/a-new-wto-without-china-the-july-20- 2020-les-echos-opinion-piece-by-mogens-peter-carl-a-former-ec-director-general-for-trade-and-then- environment/.

As has been reviewed in annual USTR reviews of China’s compliance with WTO commitments, the challenges faced by China’s trading partners are many and largely unaddressed despite efforts through dispute settlement, through bilateral negotiations and otherwise. The U.S.-China Phase 1 Agreement resulted in minimal affirmative movement in U.S. exports to China and there are open issues in terms of China’s implementation and enforcement of other commitments. See, e.g., Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 23, 2021, US-China phase one tracker: China’s purchases of US goods, As of November 2021, https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases- us-goods. While there were increases in U.S. exports to China over 2017 levels in 2020 and 2021 for agriculture, manufactured goods and energy, there were large declines for non-covered goods, so that there was relatively little actual overall progress on merchandise trade and large declines in services trade. See, e.g., USITC data web, U.S. total exports to China (2017, $130.0 BN; 2018, $120.2 BN; 2019, $106.4 BN; 2020, $124.5 BN; 2021 (11 mos.) $137.7 BN); U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, MONTHLY U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, NOVEMBER 2021, January 6, 2022, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf (Exhibit 20b).

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Obviously for nations facing the challenges of dealing with the distortions flowing from China’s economic system, one can attempt to work through the WTO and seek reforms that will address at least some of the major distortions. The U.S., EU, Japan and others are attempting that in the areas of industrial subsidies, state owned and controlled entities and other areas. The prognosis for movement is limited in the near term and even in the middle or long-term as long as China is committed to maintaining its system. Plurilateral negotiations on Joint Statement Initiatives also offer some hope for certain areas, assuming China is a participant and actually implements obligations undertaken.

Plurilateral trade agreements, such as CPTPP, could be another option. China has applied and would have to undertake some significant reforms to enter. The real question would be whether those changes would change the underlying disconnect between the state system pursued by China and market disciplines followed by many others.

Others have argued for major countries withdrawing from the WTO and setting up a system where China is either not a member or must become a market economy in fact to participate. Arguably if the EU and US were to join the CPTPP and seek further modifications, and if China’s application were not accepted until China’s system were significantly modified, this would be an option. A suggestion from the former EC Trade Commissioner is for the EU and U.S. to join the CPTPP. See PIIE’s Cecilia Malmstrom, The EU should use its trade power strategically, January 4, 2022, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/eu- should-use-its-trade-power-strategically (“The European Union should also seek to enter the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and convince the United States to do the same. The European Union already has agreements with most members of the CPTPP, but an FTA would signal the European Union’s readiness to strengthen global trading rules with its partners.”).

The United States has pursued a strategy of strengthening various tools to address discrete issues with China and working with China to have them honor their existing WTO and bilateral agreements. Presumably that approach will continue to be pursued, but the downside of such an approach without more is the long time delay to meaningful change which means ongoing harm to the U.S. industrial base, workers and communities.

Warren Buffett in 2003 and again in 2016 advocated for a system of issuing import certificates to exporters equal to the value of the exports which certificates could be sold, etc. and which would result in a trade balance in goods. See, e.g., Fortune, Warren Buffett: Here’s How I Would Solve the Trade Problem,
April 29, 2016, ttps://fortune.com/2016/04/29/warren-buffett-foreign-trade/. His idea was to address the trade deficit overall and not focus on trading partners whose economic systems don’t mesh with the U.S. model. But an approach vis-a-vis selected countries pending the necessary economic reforms would be a narrower option and more focused on the underlying concern.

Last month in the Harvard Business Review, an article by Thomas Hout argued for a cap and trade system with China. See Harvard Business Review, Thomas Hout, A New Approach to Rebalancing the U.S-China Trade Deficit, December 20, 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/12/a-new-approach-to-rebalancing-the-u-s-china- trade-deficit. The cap and trade approach is similar to Warren Buffett’s idea but limited to trade with China, as the author notes.

“Such a cap-and-trade system for imports from China would be much like the one for greenhouse gas emissions in various parts of the world. The beauty of this system is its insulation from political favoritism and bureaucracy: Market forces would determine who buys licenses and what gets imported. The cap’s level can be managed relative to a target such as GDP or the size of the trade deficit.” The author suggests flexibility in its implementation to limit any disruptions to U.S. businesses.

Conclusion

The Biden Administration has put its initial efforts into addressing domestic competitive needs such as the infrastructure legislation and the Build Back Better bill. At the same time, the Administration has been reviewing how the U.S. should be dealing with China across a broad array of issues including trade.

A multifaceted approach will certainly be needed. While the U.S. has pursued various multifaceted approaches in the past, China’s decision not to abandon state direction and control requires a recognition that global trade principles alone will not ensure fair trade conditions for U.S. companies either in the U.S., in China or in third countries.

In such a situation, considering a cap and trade system for trade with China and encouraging our major market-based trading partners to do the same would seem an important tool for achieving greater sustainability in our trade relationship with China.

Terence Stewart, former Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, and author of the blog, Current Thoughts on Trade.

To read the full commentary from Current Thoughts on Trade, please click here.

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Jude Althagafi — Thu, 23 Sep 2021 13:58:18 +0000

France has declared a “crisis of trust” in the United States after Australia scuttled a previous deal to buy diesel-electric submarines from France in favor of nuclear-powered ones from the United States. In reaction, President Macron recalled France’s ambassador to the United States and canceled a Washington gala. In a show of solidarity with France, some EU officials are suggesting that the planned launch of the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in Pittsburgh on September 29 should be postponed as well. Such a move would be a mistake, one that hurts EU interests. Instead, the EU should keep its eye on the strategic goal of using the TTC to foster closer collaboration with the United States on bilateral and global digital policy.

While France may be the odd-man-out in the submarine deal, it should recognize that this has nothing to do with a weakened U.S. commitment to transatlantic relations and more to do with its primary focus on balancing and containing China’s growing influence. Along with most EU member states, France has shown an unwillingness to take on China, preferring to forge politically appetizing economic agreements with China even if they come at the expense of long-term strategic interests.

While the Europeans might defend their approach to China by arguing they want to maintain strategic autonomy, the reality is that on many digital issues, they treat China like a preferred partner while giving the cold shoulder to the United States. The clearest example of this has been in the EU’s approach to digital policy. The EU has launched multiple efforts aimed at the United States, its close ally and partner, from attempting to build a European cloud to counter U.S. cloud providers to repeated attacks on successful U.S. tech companies through new tax, data protection, and competition policies. Most galling of all is the EU’s resistance to the transfer of European personal data to the United States, claiming that the U.S. government is an untrustworthy partner—despite U.S. intelligence agencies supporting counter-terrorism activity in Europe—while seemingly ignoring the risk presented by the Chinese government by not scrutinizing data transfers to China Never mind how the EU overlooks the surveillance activities of its own member states.

Europe loves seeing itself as a global regulatory superpower when it comes to digital policy. Yet, the EU’s actual impact on global digital regulations—whether on data protection, AI, cybersecurity, or digital markets—will inevitably be limited if it fails to work with like-minded partners to embed its values and approaches in a larger part of the global digital economy. As much as it may try, it can’t enforce its regulations on everyone, certainly not on China. Pragmatic cooperation with the United States (and other like-minded partners) is a way to extend its strategic influence and promote its interests and values. The contrast with digital authoritarian and protectionist countries could not be clearer in terms of what other values and rules may fill the vacuum in the absence of global leadership.

While some EU officials have stated that they do not want the TTC to focus on confronting China, ignoring the challenge posed by China’s rise is both impractical and imprudent. From AI to supply chains to intellectual property to 5G to cybersecurity, digital trade and technology policy will be heavily shaped by China’s actions and ambitions. Thankfully some EU member states, like Denmark, recognize what’s at stake and remain committed to transatlantic cooperation. Both U.S. and European strategic bodog casino interests require limiting Chinese innovation mercantilism and digital authoritarianism—when the EU does not work with the United States on this goal, it should not be surprising to see the U.S. government focus attention on other allies and partners who want to build this multilateral coalition. Hopefully, other EU member states, and the European Commission, put France’s emotions to one side and get back to focusing on the region’s interests. As the great French leader Charles de Gaulle stated, “no nation has friends, only interests.” It is in the interest of France and the EU to work with the United States on the TTC.

Daniel Castro is vice president at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) and director of ITIF’s Center for Data Innovation.

Nigel Cory is an associate director covering trade policy at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. He focuses on cross-border data flows, data governance, intellectual property, and how they each relate to digital trade and the broader digital economy.

To read the full commentary from the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, please click here.

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Johnny Morris — Tue, 15 Jun 2021 15:37:08 +0000

Judged by the recent past, the G7 meeting in the UK (with key US allies) was a resounding success. But then again, the Trump administration created a low bar. In 2019, there was no G7 communiqué for the first time—because of divisions on trade. And in 2020 there was no meeting—the US host “postponed” it until the year ran out.

Yet this year, there was a long communiqué, and it had a full section even entitled “Free and Fair Trade.” Once more, the G7 committed to championing “the rules-based multilateral system” that the previous US President so disparaged.

The G7 statement now calls “for the world’s leading democratic nations to unite behind a shared vision.” That vision is “to ensure the multilateral trading system is reformed, with a modernised rulebook and a reformed World Trade Organization (WTO) at its centre.”

This general commitment is followed by specific ones. The first stresses the need to make “progress” for the WTO’s next Ministerial Conference in November, with the hope of “a meaningful conclusion” of negotiations on fisheries subsidies. Meanwhile, subsidized fleets deplete the oceans of fish. The baseline for progress may be low, but engagement is critical.

The second expresses concern about “forced labour in global supply chains.” The statement does not call out China by name, possibly because of pushback from other G7 members, but it specifically mentions “the agricultural, solar, and garment sectors,” all of which involve production in Xinjiang.

The final paragraph commits to working together and “with the wider WTO membership” to address major issues that implicate China. Once more, China is not mentioned expressly, but the US clearly has China in its scope on “forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft, lowering of labour and environmental standards to gain competitive advantage, market-distorting actions of state owned enterprises, and harmful industrial subsidies,” and “transparency.” As I have argued elsewhere, singling out China by a so-called “alliance of democracies” is not just risky, but a mistake. The issues, however, are real.

Perhaps most interesting is the G7’s commitment to advance the “proper functioning of the WTO’s negotiating function and dispute settlement system” (emphasis added). This could have been worded more elegantly (“functioning” of a “function”?), but it is an advance.

Unstated is that there is tension—if not outright contradiction—between the G7 commitment to a “rules-based multilateral system” and the US neutering of WTO dispute settlement. Here the US remains alone among the G7 and the “broader membership.” The communiqué nonetheless offers hope here, signaling that the G7 aims to see WTO dispute settlement “function properly.”

On this front, the Biden administration’s strategy, it seems, is first to resolve disputes over the Trump tariffs imposed on G7 and other US allies, against which the allies retaliated. Resolving this dispute is politically tricky. The tariffs provide protection to the US steel industry, and that industry is in swing states that are critical for the 2022 election. The control of the US Senate and House are at stake. The Biden administration will thus proceed carefully, biding its time, consulting with labor union constituencies. Still, the two sides are making progress, agreeing to suspend new tariffs while they negotiate.

If the Biden administration can settle tariff disputes with its G7 allies, then maybe, just maybe, the US will be in a cleaner position to make concrete proposals to return to binding multilateral trade dispute settlement. Then the system might be “rule-based” once more.

Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor at the University of California, Irvine and author of Emerging Powers in the World Trading System: The Past and Future of International Economic Law.

To read the original commentary from WorldTradeLaw, please visit here

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Johnny Morris — Fri, 11 Jun 2021 16:42:16 +0000

It is very easy to romanticize the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. Easy, but misleading. So when the two countries agree, as they just have, on a new Atlantic Charter, it is worth analyzing what is really at stake and the degree to which the charter represents reality rather than romance.

The original Atlantic Charter was a foundational document in transatlantic relations. It was struck by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill in 1941 after they met on board the USS Augusta in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. It was a way of signaling their intention to work together for the same cause in wartime.

The key elements were a preference for an open international system that would allow for self-determination, the removal of trade barriers, freedom of the seas, disarmament, and peace. Neither side was seeking territorial gains (as had happened in the First World War).

The charter aimed to sketch out American and British aims for the Second World War and beyond. And, to a surprising degree, its spirit and intentions prevailed. The results found expression in the United Nations system, in NATO, in post-war decolonialization, in world trade arrangements. The document has come to be recognized not just as a key element in the victorious alliance against Nazi Germany, but also as an expression of a new American vision for the world—one that the United States (largely) shared with the weary titan on the other side of the Atlantic.

This moment—between these two iconic figures, engaged in an epic struggle against the ultimate evil—is magical; it still exerts a pull on the imagination that most diplomacy cannot rival. But that allure shouldn’t distract from the fact that the charter was not merely a vague wish list. It had a concrete function in the very tough relationship between two wartime allies.

The text was idealistic, but also a compromise. The United Kingdom had hoped to draw the United States into the war, but that would take until December 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States was keen to relieve the United Kingdom of its colonial possessions and its protectionist arrangements with its colonies, and only partially succeeded. FDR and Churchill, though they fought side by side against Nazism, could not have been more different in their instincts.

The agreement between Joe Biden and Boris Johnson (two men who are perhaps even more unalike than their wartime counterparts) is in many ways not comparable to the original Atlantic Charter. Neither (with the greatest of respect) are Joe and Boris to the original FDR and Winston. And though this is a dramatic moment in world affairs, it is not 1941.

Nonetheless, the new charter reflects a shared sense of the values that are most vital to champion in the world, including democracy, open societies, and a rules-based world order. The second iteration has also been modernized, with references to cybersecurity, disinformation, and the countries’ nuclear deterrents.

And once again there is a fight underway and a need for solidarity to win it. The idea behind these declarations is to signal—to friends and foes alike—not only a common orientation and direction of travel, but also a common purpose.

The rise of China presents both countries with difficulties that are more complex than those posed by the rise of Russia after the Second World War, in the sense that the United States and United Kingdom will remain very closely entangled with China’s economy even as they clash with its political leaders.

As Washington seeks to build a web of alliances to counter China, it is tapping into long-established cultural and political ties with some countries (Australia, and Canada, for example) while also reaching out to partners that are less certain in the struggle with Beijing and do not wholly share US sentiments about open markets, open societies, or democracy. The United Kingdom falls squarely in the former camp. It is not the decisive ally that it was in 1941, but it remains a hugely valuable one. Though it is far from being an Indo-Pacific power, the United Kingdom still has many diplomatic relationships to complement those of the United States. And while the United States and United Kingdom can’t aspire on their own to set the agenda of the world’s democracies these days, they can show the way and encourage others to come along—a style of leadership more appropriate to 2021.

“Shared values” between the United Kingdom and the United States have, of course, concealed many differences over the years. Neither country was especially keen on democracy for all in 1941. In the United States, racial injustice has persisted for decades after the Atlantic Charter. The United Kingdom may have retreated rapidly from India following World War II, but it remained a colonial power for many years after the conflict. Yet even eighty years ago, both countries had a sense of democracy as an important value and sought more than just the advantages of realpolitik.

The second Atlantic Charter, as with the first, is a moment in time in which the two countries are recommitting themselves to common purpose—a moment when they admit their differences (there are tensions over Northern Ireland, for example), but within the context of one of the closest international relationships in the world. That relationship is ultimately based not just on memories of wartime struggle or the Magna Carta or even the narrow interests of their deeply intertwined banking systems, but on popular solidarity between the two nations and a concrete commitment to work together to shape the better, fairer, and safer world that could lie ahead.

It is important to agree on what one is fighting against, but also on what one is fighting for. About the latter, the United States and the United Kingdom can, largely, agree.

Andrew Marshall is the vice president of communications for the Atlantic Council.

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Ashley Singh — Mon, 31 May 2021 15:43:22 +0000

Switzerland’s bilateral relationship with the European Union has been the subject of intense debate for years. In 2014, the two sides began negotiations on the terms of an institutional framework agreement that would institutionalise their bilateral relationship. On 26 May, the Swiss government announced that it was withdrawing from these negotiations and would not sign the agreement.

The EU has repeated that, in the event of failure, it will no longer conclude any new market access agreements with Switzerland and will not update any existing agreements. This would cause problems ranging from new certification hurdles for the medical sector and the mechanical engineering industry to a reduction in electricity security and severe limitation of opportunities for Swiss researchers to participate in Horizon Europe.

*The EU-Switzerland institutional framework agreement
The ‘InstA’ is intended to institutionalise the relationship between Switzerland and the EU more strongly, in particular by dynamically updating the current bilateral market access agreements and providing a dispute settlement mechanism for any conflicts over the application and interpretation of the bilateral agreements. The objective of the institutional framework agreement is to consolidate and further develop bilateral relations between Switzerland and the EU. In addition to Swiss fundamental opposition on sovereignty grounds, the agreement ultimately failed because three outstanding issues (relating to wage protection, the EU citizenship directive, and state aid rules) could not be resolved.

Erosion of the bilateral relationship or creeping EU accession?

Switzerland is a direct democracy, so any international treaty must be ratified through a popular referendum. But the Swiss public is split on the InstA issue. This is not surprising as the opinions of Swiss voters differ widely on the opportunities and risks of concluding the institutional framework agreement and its failure. The only thing both sides agree on is that the question “framework agreement, yes or no” is of great relevance for the future bilateral relationship.

InstA supporters fear an erosion of the bilateral path and a gradual exclusion of Switzerland from the European single market bodog casino and other benefits of the European integration project. The opposing side fears that the conclusion of the institutional framework agreement will weaken Switzerland’s national sovereignty and that the agreement could be the first step toward ‘creeping EU accession’.

Expectations of how the bilateral relationship will develop after the signing or failure of the institutional framework agreement vary widely, as a survey of 1492 respondents conducted in September 2020 by a team of researchers led by Stefanie Walter at the University of Zurich shows. Respondents were asked to assess the medium-term development of bilateral relations on a scale of 0 (no cooperation) to 10 (Switzerland joining the EU). Figures 1 and 2 show the expectations of both sides about the development of the EU-Switzerland relationship in these two scenarios: acceptance (Figure 1) and failure (Figure 2) of the institutional framework agreement.

The figures show that respondents who would definitely or rather vote in favour of the institutional framework agreement rated the impact on a cooperative relationship with the EU as stronger than respondents who would vote against it: on average a value of 6.7, compared to a value of 5.8 on the side of the opponents.

Interestingly, both sides expected similar ‘integration effects’ from the institutional framework agreement. Both groups saw the institutional framework agreement as a step towards stronger cooperation with the EU in the order of about one point on the 0 to 10 scale. However, since both groups also assessed current bilateral relations differently (red line in the charts), the proponents expected the institutional framework agreement to lead to stronger cooperation with the EU overall than the opponents.

This movement toward more cooperation corresponds to the preferences of respondents who were in favour of the institutional framework agreement (dark blue dashed line), as they generally saw a somewhat closer relationship between Switzerland and the EU – but not EU accession – as the ideal scenario. For the opposing side, however, this was not the case: for these voters, the status quo of Swiss-EU bilateral relations with its dense web of bilateral treaties strongly corresponded to their ideal. A change toward more cooperation as a result of the institutional framework agreement would therefore shift the status quo in a direction they would not favour.

Figure 1: Bilateral relations: ideal scenario, status quo and expected development on adoption of the institutional framework agreement, September 2020.

Opinions on failure diverge sharply

Opinions on the consequences of a failure of the institutional framework agreement, on the other hand, diverged more sharply. Although both sides expected a move toward a less-cooperative relationship, the supporters of the agreement feared a much more significant deterioration in bilateral relations overall.

Taking the assessment of the current state as a reference point, supporters expected a reduction in cooperation to the tune of 2.2 points, while opponents expected a reduction of only 0.9 points. At the same time, the mean value of bilateral relations expected in case of failure was significantly closer to the opponents’ ideal scenario than in case of acceptance of the agreement (distance of 0.3 points in case of failure and 1.7 points in case of acceptance).

For the supporters of the agreement, on the other hand, a failure would mean a significant deterioration in Swiss-EU relations compared to their ideal scenario (distance of 3.4 points). In contrast, an acceptance of the agreement comes close to their ideal scenario with a distance of 0.3 points.

Figure 2: Bilateral relations: ideal scenario, status quo and expected development in the event of a failure of the institutional framework agreement, September 2020

What are the opportunities and risks of a Plan B?

Given the differences in wishes and expectations on both sides, it was not surprising that both sides also assessed the risks of a failure of the institutional framework agreement differently.

Based on data from February 2021, Figure 3 shows that respondents who would certainly vote against the agreement thought that an erosion of the bilateral treaties would have no impact on Switzerland. Neither did they not see any risks in the case of new negotiations on an institutional framework agreement, but expected the EU to be about as willing to compromise as in the current draft. That said, they also did not see much chance that the EU would be more willing to compromise.

All other groups, on the other hand, feared that Switzerland would be negatively impacted if the EU indeed refuses to update existing agreements and does not conclude any new agreements with Switzerland until an institutional framework agreement is signed. In addition, respondents who would vote for the institutional framework agreement expected that the EU would be less willing to compromise in the event of a failure and a subsequent second attempt at negotiations, than with the current draft.

Recollections of the failed German-Swiss state treaty on the settlement of the aircraft noise dispute suggest that this is certainly a possible scenario. That treaty was rejected by the Swiss parliament in 2003 as not sufficiently favourable to Switzerland. Germany subsequently imposed unilateral restrictions on flight movements, so that Switzerland ended up in a significantly worse situation than envisaged in the rejected state treaty.

Figure 3: Individual expectations about the consequences of failure and renegotiation of the institutional framework agreement, February 2021

Such strong differences in individual expectations about the consequences of non-cooperative decisions in international relations are not unusual.

Various studies document similar differences, for example, among British respondents before the 2016 Brexit referendum, when the pro-Brexit side considered the risks of Brexit to be significantly lower than the opposing side and were convinced, for example, that the UK would not lose barrier-free access to the European single market even after a Brexit. Similarly, in the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, a majority of ‘No’ voters were convinced that a no vote would force the other euro states to make greater concessions in negotiations on the terms of a bailout package. However, these expectations about the willingness of the negotiating partner to make far-reaching concessions proved to be too optimistic in both cases.

The negotiating strategy: Brexit as a model?

The parallels to Brexit are not merely theoretical; the Brexit process has strongly shaped the political process in Switzerland around the institutional framework agreement. Negotiations were conducted in the shadow of Brexit, the debate on the institutional framework agreement repeatedly referred to Brexit, and the Brexit process itself helped to influence the voting intentions of the Swiss electorate on European policy. Against this background, it is not surprising that the question of the extent to which the British negotiation strategy should be a model for Switzerland has been the subject of heated debate.

Figure 4 shows that respondents’ opinions on this question also diverged widely. While opponents of the institutional framework agreement believed that the British threat to let the negotiations fail rather than accept a bad deal led to a greater willingness to compromise on the part of the EU, those in favour of the agreement saw no effect on the EU’s willingness to compromise.

Together with the perceived low risks of a failure of the negotiations and the perceived success of the British threat strategy, it is not surprising that respondents who reject the institutional framework agreement also tended to see the British Brexit negotiation strategy as a role model for Switzerland. By contrast, supporters of the institutional framework agreement tended to see this confrontational strategy as a deterrent example for Switzerland.

Figure 4: Individual assessments of the British Brexit negotiation strategy, February 2021

Unequal perceptions of supporters and opponents

Overall, it is clear that the political divide between supporters and opponents of the institutional framework agreement exists not only at the level of political elites, but can also be observed among the electorate. It is noteworthy that both sides not only assess the effects of a conclusion and a failure of the framework agreement differently, but that they even perceive the status quo of current bilateral relations differently.

Although an erosion of the bilateral treaties would be a lengthy affair, upcoming EU decisions on Switzerland’s participation in the European research programme Horizon Europe, or in the EU COVID-19 certificate scheme, will provide the first indications as to whether the optimism of the opponents or the fears of the supporters are justified.

Stephanie Walter is a full professor for international relations and political economy at the Department of Political Science (IPZ) at the University of Zurich.

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Ashley Singh — Thu, 15 Apr 2021 15:34:22 +0000

The trade bloc known as Mercosur has just reached its 30th anniversary, but its members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) are not in a celebratory mode. Long-standing divergent views on the bloc’s external trade policy have recently escalated, risking a split between three members that favor entering into free trade agreements (FTA) with third countries and Argentina, which opposes such a move.

How and whether Mercosur resolves this dispute is a topic of interest for no small number of countries. Mercosur is a type of trade bloc known as a customs union, in which member countries trade freely among themselves and impose a common external tariff (CET) on imports from nonmember countries. There are 17 customs unions involving developing countries in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. But individual member countries in these unions have negotiated some 40 bilateral FTAs, without the backing of their respective group members. One recent example is Kenya’s trade deal with the United Kingdom, which entered into force earlier in 2021 amid tensions with its customs union partners in the East African Community. Mercosur members may be headed in that direction if they cannot agree on a common approach.

General speaking, customs unions limit the ability of individual members to pursue FTAs with extraregional partners, unless all members agree to be part of the arrangement. Infighting is not uncommon in such situations. But except for the European Union, these groups are imperfect customs unions, at best. In the case of Mercosur, for example, 3,200 tariff lines, accounting for 32 percent of its tariff schedule, are exempted from the CET—that is, members impose different tariffs on imports from third countries. Moreover, goods do not circulate freely in the union, as they do in the European Union, but are subject to compliance with intraregional rules of origin.

The incentive for negotiating separate trade accords is considerable. FTAs can embody deep commercial disciplines, offering the opportunity to integrate into global value chains and increasing investment. Few developing countries can afford to pass up that promise, even if it means upsetting customs union peers. So, more countries, including members of Mercosur, are tempted to go solo.

But there are also valid concerns and drawbacks to fracturing customs unions with breakaway bilateral trade deals. Such negotiations can disrupt intraregional trade and integration, which can be an important driver of growth for developing countries, particularly given increased protectionist sentiment in advanced economies, and can also help members benefit from regional public goods.

The answer to this dilemma is for country groupings throughout the world to exhibit flexibility in trade negotiations with appropriate guardrails that address concerns by both camps.

Developing rules to facilitate bilateral FTA negotiations by customs union members

Some of the confusion over when and how a customs union member could enter into bilateral FTA negotiations could be clarified by the development of clear-cut rules to facilitate negotiations and address risks to intraregional trade. The goal would be to minimize frictions and potentially even to modernize and deepen the customs union. The objectives would include:

Fostering transparency and engagement: At the outset and throughout the FTA negotiation, the customs union member seeking a trade agreement with an external country should share information and consult with other customs union members on the objectives, progress, and results of the negotiation. Consultation with peers can build trust and develop a shared understanding of the agreement.
Reducing the common external tariff: A high CET rate will be increasingly at odds with bilateral FTAs and would increase opportunities for arbitrage within the customs union. Agreement on objectives could reduce CET rates, thereby improving the export competitiveness of the bloc.
Preserving the ability of customs union members to collect the CET on imports of third parties: A customs union member that is not a party to the bilateral FTA should not suffer unintended consequences such as loss of tariff revenue resulting from goods entering the bloc through lower-tariff members. Duty collection, however, should not result in increased obstacles at the border.
Sustaining and deepening trade facilitation measures to expedite cross-border transit: Improving intraregional trade is often an important goal of regional integration schemes. In the context of a bilateral FTA by one or more customs union members, border controls that slow or disrupt intraregional trade should be avoided. Priority trade facilitation measures could include a regional transit and guarantee system, usually involving computerized transit systems and electronic data exchange systems; regionally harmonized customs clearance software; regional authorized economic operator programs; and coordinated border management and one-stop border posts.
Leveraging the bilateral FTA for the benefit of all customs union members: Flexible rules of origin and cumulation provisions that allow use of inputs and intermediaries sourced from other customs union members to manufacture goods that benefit from free trade under the FTA can open new opportunities for firms in these other countries and foster regional value chains.
Facilitating accession of other customs union members to the FTA: Clear and expeditious rules for customs union members to join a bilateral FTA entered into by one member can lead to more competitive, integrated markets, expanded investment opportunities, and development of regional value chains.
Building on the bilateral FTA to modernize and deepen the customs union: Deep bilateral FTAs often include disciplines or rules in new areas not covered in developing-country customs unions. While not all of them may be appropriate for the regional setting, others could help upgrade the customs union framework.

Making it hard for a customs union member to bilaterally negotiate FTAs could be destructive, leading to a negotiation failure or a breakup of the customs union. Neither outcome would be healthy. Setting up measures like these could help facilitate more flexible FTA negotiations, minimizing the impact on the customs union.

To read the full commentary from the Peterson Institute For International Economics, please click here.

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Emily Kachinski — Mon, 08 Mar 2021 20:58:13 +0000

More and more, women are paving the way for young girls to become leaders in their own communities. We hear every day of the accomplishments of African women—from the everyday front-line work of women against the pandemic to the elevation of others to positions of influence and responsibility. At this momentous time in the history of the global trading system, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Nigerian finance minister, former managing director of the World Bank Group, and nonresident distinguished fellow with the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, became the first woman ever and first African to head the World Trade Organization. We also note the elevation of Monique Nsanzabaganwa, former deputy governor of the Rwandan Central Bank, as the Africa Union’s first female deputy chairperson, with responsibility to carry out much-needed reforms to sustain Africa’s continued march toward greater solidarity and integration.

Thus, in the 2021 edition of our flagship report Foresight Africa, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative has chosen to highlight the transformative leadership of women—in management roles, on the front lines of the pandemic, and in everyday life—by opening each chapter with a salient quote from an eminent woman.

Now, to celebrate International Women’s Day this year, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative asked leading women to reflect on the challenges facing young women and to share their thoughts on how we can more effectively encourage and empower young women and girls to become leaders themselves. Each woman was approached for this purpose because they took action against all odds, rising to great heights in their communities, on the continent, and on the global stage. Below are the responses from these inspiring women.

Rt. Hon. Winnie Kiiza
Former Leader of Opposition, Parliament of Uganda

Even though women are vaulting to leadership spaces, our communities remain obstinately resistant to women in leadership roles. They (the patriarchy) too often perceive women as too delicate to lead. This trend, among many other deeply-seated and unconscious gender biases, force potential women leaders to withdraw into their shells. Yet, women possess inherently strong attributes that can help lead more effectively.

As women leaders, we should and can operate under the existing patriarchal system by sharing our accomplishments and ambitions, so as to change and shape our communities’ perceptions about women’s ability to lead, and create a source of inspiration for women to rise above the gender bias and fear.

Hafsat Abiola
President, Women in Africa Initiative

Africa’s girls and women stand to gain most from shaping their continent into a place that releases its enormous potential. It is to them that I look for leadership. So many are living on the margins of society, in the black and gray economies, in community associations, in peer lending groups. They are not integrated into the economy or the institutions of governance. It is high time they were. Indeed, we will go on talking about Africa’s potential until this army-in-waiting of changemakers take charge. They can and must connect their businesses to the economy and anchor the state to their vibrant communities. They can give birth to an Africa that becomes the finest expression of how to develop a continent. Africa was the cradle of civilization. Tomorrow, it can be a leader in a globalized world.

Dr. Frannie Léautier
Senior Partner and CEO, SouthBridge Investments

This year, more than any other year, we should celebrate women in leadership. The COVID-19 pandemic has fallen heavily on the shoulders of women. Many have lost sources of livelihood. Most have triple duty, caring for families, managing households, and holding down economic activities. And some have faced the brunt of the pandemic as caregivers and essential service providers. Yet others have stepped up to also solve challenges in their communities. We should engage our young women to realize that they already have superpowers they can invoke to solve problems and lead—locally, nationally, and internationally. They should trust in these superpowers, ones of observing, listening and learning; empathizing with others; experimenting and persevering when doing what’s hard; and crystallizing lessons into actions that bring systemic change. But most importantly, we should encourage them to not be afraid to dream big or to start small, as seeking solutions to the day-to-day problems facing us and our communities can lead to broader change in the world.

Arunma Oteh, OON
Former Treasurer, World Bank

Harnessing Africa’s phenomenal female leadership is critical to “building forward better” post COVID-19. Indeed, when given the opportunity, African women bring to bear important leadership qualities such as courage, compassion, character, and empathy. They are also able to succeed with managing complex situations because they are authentic, collaborative, rigorous, results-oriented, and sacrificial. These are all attributes that society needs today to rebuild after the greatest crisis of our lifetime and to end the twin challenges of poverty and inequality. I am optimistic that, if we equally leverage men and women, young and old, we can transform what has been a multi-faceted crisis into possibilities that will unleash Africa’s enormous potential.

For more on women in leadership and the unique obstacles they face, see the recent Brookings event, “Women and Leadership” with new World Trade Organization Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and former Prime Minister of Australia Julia Gillard.

See the blog, “5 ways women are driving Africa’s transformation and contributing to a global reset” by Winnie Byanyima and Caroline Kende-Robb for more on the remarkable role of women in Africa’s long-term recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

For strategies on how women and girls can be put at the center of the COVID-19 response, see the blog by the World Bank’s Mamta Murthi, “Putting girls at the center of the COVID-19 pandemic response in Africa.”

Furthermore, you can learn more about the pressing challenges facing women and girls under COVID-19, in Damaris Parsitau’s Foresight Africa 2021 viewpoint, “Invisible lives, missing voices: Putting women and girls at the center of post-COVID-19 recovery and reconstruction.”

Finally, each chapter of this year’s Foresight Africa report begins with a salient quote from an eminent woman, emphasizing the transformative leadership of women—in management roles, on the front lines of the pandemic, and in everyday life. You can find all of those reflections here.

To read the original report from Brookings, please click here

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While some gender gaps are closing, the pace of progress is too slow in trade. Reformers in government and business can show the way.

Breaking down the gender gap

Fixing the gender gap in trade is slowly gaining traction

Diversity improves performance

Chile takes a leading role

Canada sets the bar higher

It’s still too early to measure the progress we’re seeing

Governments should seize opportunities to improve women’s access to finance, mobility and information

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Rt. Hon. Winnie Kiiza Former Leader of Opposition, Parliament of Uganda

Hafsat Abiola President, Women in Africa Initiative

Dr. Frannie Léautier Senior Partner and CEO, SouthBridge Investments

Arunma Oteh, OON Former Treasurer, World Bank

Rt. Hon. Winnie Kiiza
Former Leader of Opposition, Parliament of Uganda

Hafsat Abiola
President, Women in Africa Initiative

Dr. Frannie Léautier
Senior Partner and CEO, SouthBridge Investments

Arunma Oteh, OON
Former Treasurer, World Bank