bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, http://www.wita.org/blog-topics/australia/ Tue, 21 Nov 2023 19:22:11 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.6.1 /wp-content/uploads/2018/08/android-chrome-256x256-80x80.png bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, http://www.wita.org/blog-topics/australia/ 32 32 bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/new-australia-korea-cooperation/ Wed, 23 Feb 2022 21:22:13 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=32637 The recent visit to Australia by South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in has been welcomed as the dawn of a new era of cooperation between our nations, no less than 60...

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The recent visit to Australia by South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in has been welcomed as the dawn of a new era of cooperation between our nations, no less than 60 years after the commencement of formal diplomatic relations.

As established middle powers in a region beset by hegemonic rivalry, Australia and Korea have much to gain from closer collaboration on major strategic challenges. December’s dialogue focused on two of the most high-profile of these: bolstering our nations’ military capabilities and defence interoperability and enhancing resource and energy security in an increasingly unpredictable geo-strategic climate. Yet, while these ‘hot button’ issues are important, there is another, equally pressing challenge that demands our cooperative action – and that could deliver rich rewards for all involved. This is the challenge of turbocharging the rapid and sustainable economic development of our regional partners, from India to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

For Australia and Korea, cooperating to address this challenge is not just a moral imperative, but a strategic one as well. The rapid development of our neighbours would enable Australia and Korea to further diversify our regional economic relationships and reduce our trade and investment dependence on China. And by cooperating to become more proactive and productive development partners, Australia and Korea could boost our neighbours’ trust in our commitment to shared economic prosperity as the necessary foundation of regional stability and security.

However, instead of cooperating more closely, over the past five years we have witnessed a large and growing gulf emerge between Australia’s and South Korea’s foreign economic policy approaches. Moreover, when it comes to the goal of promoting our neighbours’ rapid economic development, both countries’ approaches are far from perfect, insofar as they both involve risks and missed opportunities.

So, if Australia and Korea wish to cooperate more closely to promote rapid regional development – and to reap the associated strategic rewards – we must start by opening a dialogue about our countries’ current foreign economic policy approaches, and the limitations of those approaches from a development perspective. Only then we can then begin to develop a new agenda for Australia-Korea economic cooperation – one with true transformative potential.

Australia’s and Korea’s divergent approaches to foreign economic policy
Since 2017, Australia’s approach to foreign economic policy has been to position itself as a fierce defender of the US-led ‘rules-based international order’ (RBIO) and the related idea of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). Defending the RBIO now forms a core pillar of Australia’s foreign policy strategy. And as China’s sabre rattling has intensified since that time, so too has Australia’s defense of the established rules of the international economic game.

Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, Australian diplomats were strongly urging other countries – including South Korea – to step up and do more to defend the existing RBIO. In the economic arena, this approach meant defending the economic rules enshrined not just in the WTO, but also in the newer so-called ‘gold standard’ trade and investment agreements, like the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), originally the centrepiece of the Obama administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’.

In the wake of COVID-19 and China’s fierce reaction to Australia’s call for an international investigation into the origins of the virus – including trade sanctions – Australia has only strengthened its calls for a defense of the US-led RBIO. Following the surprise Bodog Poker announcement of the new AUKUS Security Pact between the US, UK and Australia in September 2021, Australia issued a joint statement with the US pledging to ‘strengthen the rules based international order’ – including the existing trading order – not least to protect against China’s growing unilateralism.

Korea, by comparison, has chosen a very different foreign economic policy approach. To avoid ‘picking sides’ between the US bodog casino and China, it has embraced the idea of ‘strategic ambiguity’. Following China’s punitive reaction to Korea’s decision to host the THAAD missile defense system in 2016, the Korean government has been especially wary of upsetting its powerful neighbour. In practical terms, this has meant avoiding strident public declarations of support for the US-led RBIO or a ‘Free and Open Indo Pacific’, while stressing where possible the compatibility between Korea’s approach to regional engagement and those of both the US (FOIP) and China (the Belt and Road Initiative). It has also meant declining to join trade and investment deals like the CPTPP that might be seen as ‘anti-China’ (or else waiting for China’s lead; in late 2021, Korea indicated its intention to join the CPTPP, but only after China had indicated the same).

In contrast to Australia’s loud and proud of support for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific, Korea has tended to argue in more general terms for an ‘inclusive’ regional economic order while seeking to deepen its bilateral relationships with India and ASEAN nations under its New Southern Policy Plus initiative. Effectively, Korea has chosen to play it safe – insofar as it has sought to avoid articulating a substantive vision for an alternative regional and/or international economic architecture – lest it inadvertently offend China or the US.

Limitations of Australian and Korean approaches from a regional development perspective
Despite their growing differences since 2017, our countries’ foreign economic policy approaches do share one important characteristic: they both have their limitations from a regional development perspective, and entail significant risks and missed opportunities that deserve serious consideration.

The major flaw in Australia’s approach is that many aspects of the RBIO it is defending actually make it harder – not easier – for our neighbours to develop their economies. As we explain in more detail below, many existing trade rules severely limit the policy space that governments need to transform their economies and lay the foundations for sustainable growth. Australia’s foreign economic approach thus risks undermining its strategic objective of strengthening regional allies and becoming their development partner of choice, especially in light of China’s growing influence.

At the same time, Korea’s approach represents a somewhat missed opportunity. As one of the world’s most successful late developers, Korea actually understands what it takes to rapidly transform an economy and lift millions of people out of poverty, thereby enhancing social security and political stability. However, as we have already indicated, many of the policies that Korea relied on to develop its economy are now made more complex or outlawed completely by international and regional trade and investment rules that work against the goal of development.

For example, a number of WTO agreements, such as the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) Agreement, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), outlaw many of the industrial development policies successfully employed by South Korea in its rapid industrialization phase, including policies to induce technology transfer and the use of local content. Many of the WTO’s development-unfriendly rules are reinforced and even extended in regional and bilateral trade deals.

Korea is thus in the perfect position to help design and promote a more development-friendly trade and investment regime – one that would provide more space and scope for the industrial and innovation policies needed to advance its allies’ rapid development. To be sure, Korea is already sharing its development experience and expertise bilaterally with its developing country neighbours, especially through its ODA policies and more recently its New Southern Policy.

However, when it comes to reforming the existing international trade and investment architecture that can constrain local development initiatives, Korea remains wary of adopting a more ambitious and high-profile leadership role. Korea’s ODA-focused approach to advancing regional development is also limited because it is not just developing countries that could learn so much from Korea’s experience of successful techno-industrial transformation, but developed countries as well – not least Australia.

Charting a way forward: a new agenda for Australia-Korea cooperation for development
Here, then, is a perfect opportunity for Australia and Korea to re-think their existing foreign economic policy approaches and to collaborate to address a major strategic Bodog Poker challenge: that of both envisaging and helping to build a truly development-friendly trade and investment regime in the region.

The first practical step would be for our governments to acknowledge and seek to understand more deeply the complex ways in which existing trade and investment rules can frustrate the pursuit of rapid and sustainable economic development.

As noted above, it is already well documented, that many existing trade and investment agreements limit the policy space for developing country governments, making it harder for them to ensure that freer trade and investment delivers positive development outcomes, such as the establishment and/or upgrading of local industries and the creation of well-paying jobs on the ground.

However, less well understood are the ways in which existing trade and investment rules may be exacerbating some of the most pressing economic, social and environmental challenges of our time.

Take four of the most significant – and deeply interrelated – challenges facing our developing country neighbours (not to mention our own economies): financialisation, de-industrialisation, health insecurity and climate change. Financialization occurs when the financial sector abandons the ‘real’ or ‘productive’ economy in favour of short-term speculative investments and was a key cause of the 2008 global financial crisis. By starving manufacturing investment or favouring dividends payment against re-investment and worker bonuses, financialisation is also a key driver of de-industrialization (i.e. the hollowing out of manufacturing capacity and capability), low investment and growth, and rising inequality in both developed and developing countries.

Taken together, financialisation and de-industrialisation pose major economic, social, political and geostrategic challenges. Not only do they undermine economic development by thwarting the creation of higher-wage, higher skilled jobs, diminishing export earnings and throttling investment for innovation. They also intensify inequality, fracture social cohesion, make democratisation less likely or more fragile in developing nations, and fuel populist sentiment across the board. In our own region, two of the countries worst affected by premature de-industrialization are also the most populous and strategically significant – India and Indonesia – which should be a major concern for Australia and Korea.

Moreover, as we’ve seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, countries with higher levels of inequality and weaker local manufacturing capability have been far less able to meet major health challenges. And the economic, social and political instabilities and inequities associated with financialisation, de-industrialisation and global health crises will only be exacerbated by the growing number of environmental catastrophes wrought by climate change.

From a trade and investment policy perspective, it is thus vitally important to understand the ways in which trade and investment rules can exacerbate the problems of financialisation, deindustrialization, health insecurity and climate change. For example, agreements that require rapid capital account liberalization and financial sector privatization and deregulation can increase speculative activities and starve the productive sector of funds, amplifying financialisation and de-industrialisation. Agreements that promote the privatization of health services and limit the accessibility of IP protected medicines (including vaccines) can worsen health insecurity. And agreements that enable unrestrained trade in fossil fuels can worsen climate change.

Yet rarely do we hear Australian and Korean leaders or diplomats discuss the pressing problems of financialisation and de-industrialisation facing our regional neighbours – or how existing trade and investment rules might be exacerbating these challenges and complicating national responses to these and other pressing problems, such as climate change and pandemic management.

We therefore see an urgent need for policymakers to better understand the complex relationships between trade and investment rules on the one hand, and the pressing problems of financialisation, deindustrialization, health insecurity and climate change on the other. We also see an urgent need for policymakers to better understand the potential for new kinds of innovative trade and investment rules to help address these challenges.

So where to from here?
If there can be anything positive to come out of the devastating pandemic currently ravaging the globe, it is likely to be that crisis can open minds to change.

So rather than continuing to defend a broken system – or shying away from bodog sportsbook review systemic reform – Australia and Korea must seize the opportunity and open the door to serious and sustained cooperation on this major common challenge. The first step would be to open a meaningful dialogue between our countries about the limitations of the current trade and investment regime, and about what a truly development-friendly alternative might look like.

Embracing this change – and collaborating to realise it – is in both our interests.

Elizabeth Thurbon is a Scientia Associate Professor in International Political Economy at the School of Social Sciences, UNSW Sydney and an Australia-Korea Foundation Fellow at Asia Society Australia. Her research specialism is the political–economy of techno-industrial development and change, with a focus on the strategic role of the state in addressing major transformative challenges, including the clean energy shift.

Keun Lee is Distinguished Professor of Seoul National University (Economics), and is also the Vice-chairman of the National Economic Advisory Council for the President of Korea (Chairman). He is a regular writer to Project Syndicate, a Fellow of the CIFAR (Canada) program on Innovation, Equity and Prosperity. He is the winner of the 2014 Schumpeter Prize.

To read the full commentary by the Asia Society, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/china-in-europe-2021/ Tue, 05 Oct 2021 19:18:15 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=30512 Not the Main Course   For months, October 5 has been marked in the calendar as the day when the European Union’s 27 leaders would talk about China. Officials in...

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For months, October 5 has been marked in the calendar as the day when the European Union’s 27 leaders would talk about China. Officials in Brussels had been preparing a special China paper to feed into the discussion. The idea was to have the first high-level exchange about China strategy in a year. In recent weeks, however, that plan was quietly abandoned. China will still be on the menu when leaders gather for their informal dinner in Slovenia on Tuesday, but it is no longer the main course. Instead, Afghanistan and—at the request of France—Australia’s submarine deal with the United States and the United Kingdom have thrust their way onto an agenda that now has the curious think-tanky title “The EU’s place in the world.”  “The initial idea was to have a China strategy discussion. Now the pure China discussion is unlikely to happen,” a senior EU official told me. “Once again, there is a feeling that we need to talk about urgent matters, not the broader trends.” After a meticulously choreographed first six months of Biden administration diplomacy on China, the past two months have been a disaster when viewed through the prism of the transatlantic relationship. The two sides did pull off their Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting in Pittsburgh on September 29, despite a late French push to postpone the meeting and then to water down its joint statement. –    But for advocates of a robust transatlantic agenda on China, recent events have been anything but encouraging—even if one sees the withdrawal from Afghanistan as necessary and Australia’s embrace of a defense alliance with the United States as understandable. “There is only one winner coming out of all of this and it’s the PRC,” the senior EU official said.

French Fury

Washington is going out of its way to make amends for having kept France in the dark on the submarine deal. Joe Biden came as close as a U.S. president ever comes to a public apology in the joint statement that followed his September 22 call with Emmanuel Macron. A statement from Quad leaders, days later, conspicuously welcomed the EU’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific. France’s Ambassador Philippe Etienne has returned to Washington and met with National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, who is promising the French “in-depth consultations on a range of strategic matters”. And there is more to come: I was told Biden may visit Macron in Paris later this month before travelling on to Rome for the G20 summit. But no one in Washington should think that a pat on the back and a few mea culpas will put this to rest.In the latest Watching China in Europe podcast, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, who served as France’s ambassador to China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan as well as as deputy foreign minister until 2019, described the AUKUS deal between Washington, London, and Canberra as a “shockwave.” He suggested that Paris would now push back more forcefully against U.S. pressure to refocus NATO on China: “Do we need to gather together all the countries alongside bodog poker review the U.S. to attack China? No.” Another French diplomat rejected any suggestion that Paris and Washington had moved on from the AUKUS episode: “There is a feeling out there that the Macron-Biden statement has ended this. We don’t see it that way.” I was told that the Élysée is rethinking the contours of a big Indo-Pacific event it plans to host in February, as one of the highlights of France´s EU Council presidency. Do not expect Australia or the United Kingdom to receive an invitation. Paris is putting the relationship with Canberra on ice until the next Australian election, expected in the spring of 2022, in the hope that voters boot out Prime Minister Scott Morrison. Neither does it seem inclined to listen to Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s pleas to “donnez-moi un break” or “prenez un grip”. The franglais jibes have only added fuel to a raging French fire.

Rapidly Closing Window

None of this is good for efforts to mount a collective response to China. But it would wrong to put all the blame on the Biden administration and its Anglo allies. What the AUKUS deal shows above all is the sense of urgency in Washington and Canberra when it comes to China. The same sense of urgency is not there in Europe. Even French diplomats conceded to me that the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy lacked strategic teeth and will need to be made more “political” in the months ahead. “We are caught between our own unwillingness to step up and an American protector who is less interested,” a German defense official told me. As Tom Wright of Brookings noted recently, Europe and the United States face a rapidly closing window of opportunity to get on the same page and create facts on the ground while Biden is in office. How soon will it be before another “America First” president emerges in Washington or political changes in Europe make transatlantic cooperation an even harder sell?  The conditions for such cooperation are much better now than they are likely to be in the years ahead.

Trade, Technology & Connectivity

The TTC meeting in Pittsburgh offered glimmers of hope, with both sides committing to closer cooperation on export controls, investment screening, and standard setting. I was told that officials in Washington have also begun discreet discussions with partners like the Netherlands and Japan in a bid to forge a consensus, outside of the Wassenaar Arrangement, on export controls related to semiconductors. A common approach from like-minded countries on this important issue would send a strong signal. There are also signs that Europe is preparing to move on other China-related policies that have been stuck for years in a bureaucratic morass. It was encouraging to see European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen embrace a revamp of the EU’s connectivity strategy—renamed Global Gateway—in her state of the union speech in mid-September.Still, there are reasons to question whether the European Commission is serious about developing a real geopolitical alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as big member states have been urging. At the same time as it is touting Global Gateway, I learned, EU institutions are also poised to double down on connectivity cooperation with China, with the launch of a major $2 million study (with funding split between Brussels and Beijing) of rail transport corridors between Europe and China. The study, to be carried out by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, has raised eyebrows among some EU diplomats because it includes the possibility of rail corridors through countries like Iraq, Syria, India, Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Some see this as a use of EU taxpayer money to further Beijing’s BRI ambitions in its zones of interest. The European Commission will have to explain how this project fits with Global Gateway, an initiative that Von der Leyen has made clear is aimed at countering Beijing’s influence.  
 
German Election
 
This edition of Watching China in Europe would not be complete without a quick look at Germany’s recent election results and what they could mean for Berlin’s policy toward China. There are differences of opinion on that front. Some observers believe that German policy would change little under a coalition of the Social Democrats, Greens, and Free Democrats (FDP) – the most likely scenario. Others, including myself, believe the departure of Angela Merkel and the entry into government of the Greens and the FDP, who advocate a tougher line toward Beijing, will change the dynamic in Berlin. This is a view that is shared by many of the diplomats who have Bodog Poker worked closely on China policy in Berlin and Brussels in recent years. But the fact that Social Democrat Olaf Scholz, the probable next chancellor, has no real foreign policy profile adds an element of doubt to any and all predictions.One German diplomat who expects a shift to a harder stance in Berlin pointed to the changes that would occur across the government with Merkel’s conservatives out of power.  Not only would she be leaving but also the officials—from her economic adviser Lars-Hendrik Röller to Economy Minister Peter Altmaier—who helped drive her China policy. “Regardless of Scholz, if you have the Greens in charge of the foreign and economy ministries, which is not a stretch, then you will have a very different dynamic in Berlin,” this diplomat said. Another veteran diplomat was more cautious: “Will we have a change of attitude, a change of rhetoric? Yes, I think we will,” this diplomat said. “The question is how much these changes translate into a real shift in policy.” This diplomat predicted that France’s Emmanuel Macron would try to take advantage of Merkel’s absence to create more distance between Europe and the United States. “How does Scholz react if Macron is pulling him in this direction? We don’t know.”The next government will face important decisions in its first months, including on Huawei’s role in Germany’s 5G network and the renewal of the EU’s Xinjiang sanctions in March. Escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait could force Berlin to position itself more vocally on one of China’s reddest lines. One diplomat who has regular exchanges with Chinese counterparts said this was the biggest concern in Beijing. “It is their worst nightmare. They see the Taiwan debate shifting. They see what the Greens and FDP are saying. If Germany starts speaking more loudly, they have a real problem.” Further departures from the 16+1 grouping with China are also possible early next year, with Estonia, Romania, and the Czech Republic all considering following Lithuania’s recent lead, I was told. If these countries were then to incur the wrath of Beijing, as Lithuania has, then the parties in the next German government would face an early test of their commitment to more European solidarity vis-à-vis Beijing.
 
Noah Barkin is a senior visiting fellow in the Asia Program based in Berlin. He specializes in Europe’s relationship with China and the implications of China’s rise for the transatlantic relationship.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/us-trade-leadership-australia-uk/ Mon, 27 Sep 2021 18:15:24 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=30428 The recently unveiled U.S.-Australia-U.K. trilateral security partnership is intended to deepen the security ties between the three longtime allies. The new partnership has been marketed as a strategic security alliance,...

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The recently unveiled U.S.-Australia-U.K. trilateral security partnership is intended to deepen the security ties between the three longtime allies.

The new partnership has been marketed as a strategic security alliance, with the Biden administration underscoring that “[AUKUS] is a fundamental decision—fundamental—that binds decisively Australia to the United States and Great Britain for generations.”

A key part of that binding will need to be built through strong economic ties, and the rise of a new U.S.-Australia-U.K. security alliance to potential prominence may amount to little more than hollow promises if the United States fails to demonstrate leadership in advancing free trade and investment.

If the U.S. is to be a credible leading force in the Indo-Pacific, America must prove itself a positive and dependable actor—not a reactive and unpredictable one—particularly when it comes down to trade and investment.

The U.S. can and should step up its own game considerably. Washington’s evolving efforts to become more deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific region, raise the American profile, and elevate its participation in the region are very well advised. However, without a discernible trade component, particularly America’s leadership in building a predictable open trading environment, it will be an empty gesture.

The U.S. relationships in the region need substance, and the substance that counts in a concrete and practical way these days is trade. America should strengthen enduring alliances and build on nascent ones by increasing measurable economic opportunities and collaboration—by removing barriers to open trade.

America needs to get back to the free trade table, which will reinforce the network of alliances and partnerships America has invested in and built over decades.

It’s notable that China’s quick response to the Bodog Poker announcement of the new U.S.-Australia-U.K. alliance was not military, but economic. In less than 24 hours, Beijing had formally applied for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), an 11-nation regional free trade agreement.

Clearly, China is aiming at flipping the strategic game plan on the United States through trade and investment.

In this evolving geostrategic context, the new U.S.-Australia-U.K. partnership must go beyond a trilateral security pact. A unique triangle network of free trade can be built upon that, and more importantly amplify the security alliance to the next level.

2020 marked the 15th anniversary of the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement. Over the years, the two allies have enjoyed greater trade and investment interaction since the pact entered into force in 2005. The agreement eliminated previous trade barriers, resulting in a doubling of trade between the two countries and a tripling of two-way investment between the two countries to about $1.3 trillion.

Like the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, in an effort to secure and build on the already vital economic and security partnership between the U.S. and the U.K., the two nations embarked on negotiations for a long-desired free trade agreement last year, shortly after the U.K. withdrawal from the European Union.

Unfortunately, the negotiations—a high priority for both then-President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, with bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress—have been derailed at this juncture.

Worse, the recent White House summit between President Joe Biden and the U.K.’s Johnson did not provide a clear timeline for reinvigorating the stalled bilateral free trade agreement talks between Washington and London.

Revitalizing the stalled bilateral free trade negotiations with the U.K. and implementing the U.S.-U.K. Free Trade Agreement in a timely fashion is critical, now more than ever. 

The Biden administration underscored that “[f]or more than 70 years, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have worked together … to protect our shared values and promote security and prosperity. Today, with the formation of AUKUS, we recommit ourselves to this vision.”

Advancing free trade and investment is vital to ensuring that vision. Economic security driven by the advancement of economic freedom at home and abroad—not by the proliferation of protectionism—truly enhances national security, which in turn buttresses greater economic dynamism.

The time for Washington to act on that is now. 

Anthony B. Kim researches international economic issues at The Heritage Foundation, with a focus on economic freedom and free trade.

Sharan Kumar is a Fall 2021 Member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation

To read the full commentary from The Heritage Foundation, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/uk-australia-sue-governments/ Tue, 01 Jun 2021 18:59:07 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=27892 Australians remember Philip Morris suing the government. We should not hand UK corporations the same weapon The British trade minister has confirmed that corporate rights to sue governments are being...

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Australians remember Philip Morris suing the government. We should not hand UK corporations the same weapon


The British trade minister has confirmed that corporate rights to sue governments are being discussed in the final negotiations for the Australia-UK free trade agreement before an announcement at the G7 meeting in the UK on 11 June.

The agreement is part of the post-Brexit rush by the UK to conclude deals to make up for its loss of zero tariff access to the huge European market. It’s therefore puzzling that the UK appears to be promoting, and that Australia may agree to, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions which are likely to fuel community opposition to the deal in both Australia and the UK.

All trade agreements have state-to state-dispute processes. ISDS is an optional extra only included in some bilateral and regional trade agreements. ISDS began when former colonies became independent and provided compensation to companies if their assets were expropriated. But the system has developed concepts like “indirect expropriation”, “legitimate expectations” and “fair and equitable treatment”, which allow corporations to seek compensation by claiming that regulatory changes reduce the value of their investment and/or that they were not fairly consulted about the change.

ISDS is unpopular because it gives global (but not local) corporations special rights to sue governments for millions of dollars in international tribunals if they can argue that changes to regulation by any level of government will harm the value of their investment. ISDS claims can be made over public health, environment and other public interest laws made by democratically-elected governments.

Legal experts such as the former high court chief justice Robert French have noted that ISDS has no independent judiciary. Cases are conducted by temporary tribunals staffed by practising advocates who can represent a corporation in one case and then sit on a tribunal the next. There are no precedent or appeals, leading to inconsistent decisions.

Australians remember that the US Philip Morris tobacco company sued Australia for billions over our plain packaging law. The Philip Morris company could not sue under the US-Australia free trade agreement, because community opposition resulted in the Howard government refusing to include ISDS in the 2004 agreement.

Tobacco companies comprehensively lost a compensation claim in Australia’s high court, and had to pay the government’s costs. Philip Morris found an obscure Hong Kong-Australia investment agreement which included ISDS, shifted some assets to Hong Kong, declared they were a Hong Kong company and claimed billions in compensation, prompting community outrage.

Dr Patricia Ranald is Convener of the Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network and a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney.

To read the full commentary on The Guardian, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/australias-supply-chain-dependence-on-china/ Tue, 02 Mar 2021 18:37:53 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=26522 The Australian and United States governments both ordered urgent reviews of their supply chains last week amid growing concern about their vulnerability to disruption by China. Australia’s Productivity Commission, which...

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The Australian and United States governments both ordered urgent reviews of their supply chains last week amid growing concern about their vulnerability to disruption by China.

Australia’s Productivity Commission, which typically takes three or four months to prepare an interim report and a year or more to complete a study, has been given just one month to deliver its initial findings on the nation’s dependence on imports. A final report also looking at risks to exports is to be handed to the government by the end of May.

The final report will identify supply chains ‘vulnerable to the risk of disruption and also critical to the functioning of the economy, national security and Australians’ well being,’ as well as proposing risk-mitigation strategies.

The parallel investigation in the US is initially examining supply-chain risks in four key industries—computer chips in consumer products, large-capacity batteries, pharmaceuticals and critical minerals—with all relevant federal agencies required to report on risks within 100 days. This will be followed by a broader year-long review.

The Strategist No easy fix for Australia’s supply-chain dependence on China | The Strategist

To read the original article from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, please click here

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/chinas-large-market/ Thu, 14 Jan 2021 17:53:37 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=25922 We’ve heard a lot about “unfair” trade over the last decade, but there might be something worse on the horizon: bad trade. Recent events in Australia suggest a scenario where...

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We’ve heard a lot about “unfair” trade over the last decade, but there might be something worse on the horizon: bad trade. Recent events in Australia suggest a scenario where trade with China might mean giving up some sovereignty and free speech. Preserving the best economic policy – openness – is as important as ever, so we’ll need to be vigilant.

Governments often have geopolitical or diplomatic spats without sacrificing unrelated commercial trade flows. But it appears China is breaking such diplomatic norms. In May, Australia called on the World Health Organization to conduct an independent and comprehensive investigation into the origins of the deadly coronavirus. Soon after, China targeted Australia’s top 20 exports with otherwise-unexplained sanctions.

A full-blown trade war with China would be grueling for Australia, costing it 6 percent of GDP, according to one study. But Canberra is undeterred. With nearly 2 million people dead worldwide, understanding how the virus made the leap into human populations could help stave off the next pandemic.

Some of the trade sanctions are in black and white, like duties on Australian barley published in a government report. But there have been murkier actions like unexplained delays at ports. Jeffrey Wilson of Perth USAsia Centre, an Australian think tank, attributes these to quiet instructions from a Chinese Communist Party official to a Chinese importing agency.

It was no surprise when China took affront at the call for a pandemic inquiry, with one senior diplomat saying Australia’s move “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” But there is no “hurt feelings” clause in World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and Australia is turning to international law to fight back.

It recently launched a WTO challenge to China’s 80 percent tariff on its barley exports, and it reportedly has a strong case. Many will watch to see if the United States, Europe or others join Australia as third parties.

Tensions between China and Australia are not new, and matters relating to an encroaching China will not surprise a U.S. audience. For instance, in 2013 Chinese hackers reportedly stole the blueprints of Australia’s new spy headquarters. Australia had to gut the building and restart the half-billion-dollar project. 

In 2017, an Australian senator was heard defending China’s South China Sea policy in ways that directly contradicted his party’s stance. That senator turned out to have received hefty campaign donations from a wealthy Chinese businessman and a subsidiary of a Chinese state-linked company.

Meanwhile, there are ongoing concerns of China silencing free speech on university campuses. With China representing one-third of all foreign enrollments at Australian universities and a major source of research funding, the stakes are high. 

Australia has responded by tightening up domestic laws and removing security vulnerabilities to foreign influence, including passing laws to prohibit foreign interference in elections, a ban on Chinese telecoms from Australia’s 5G network, and an investigation into the links between China and the country’s higher education sector. 

These moves mirror similar actions by the U.S. government: restrictions on the use of Chinese-connected software applications, restricting U.S. investment to finance Chinese Communist Party military companiesand legislation to de-list companies from U.S. exchanges if they cannot establish independence from a foreign government.

But the China-Australia trade clash reveals a worrying trend: Beijing wielding its huge market as a truncheon against something as straightforward as foreign criticism. And if there was any confusion over China’s sensitivities, its embassy in Canberra released a list of 14 grievances, which extend beyond Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the pandemic. Beijing’s resentments include government funding for any research or report that is unfriendly or antagonistic towards China, accusing China of cyberattacks, involvement in South China Sea issues, restrictions on foreign interference in elections and restricting China’s investment.

“I’ve never seen anything like it before,” said former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Australia has no incentive to stoke further tensions, but Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s Liberal–National Coalition is unlikely to back down. 

The United States is facing similar threats. In July, FBI Director Christopher Wray spelled out the threats posed by the Chinese government and Chinese Communist Party: “Our data isn’t the only thing at stake here—so are our health, our livelihoods, and our security.

The economic effects of trade are one thing we know a lot about. We become far more prosperous in the aggregate, albeit with adjustment costs – sometimes severe for specific local communities – along the way. Opening up trade with China has brought huge consumer benefits and gains for many American firms. The question moving forward is whether the political and social ramifications of China’s new belligerence could someday overwhelm the undeniable economic benefits of integration.

In situations where accessing China’s huge market means giving up tangible national sovereignty and free speech, that’s a bad trade.

To read the full opinion article from The Hill, please click here

Christine McDaniel is a senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/geographical-indications/ Tue, 05 Jan 2021 17:10:39 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=25789 This technical note accompanies “What are geographical indications?” and “Will ‘Melton Mowbray’ stay protected in the EU?” Geographical indications — place names or names associated with locations that are used...

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Australian GIs: it has 109 protected in the EUThis technical note accompanies “What are geographical indications?
and “Will ‘Melton Mowbray’ stay protected in the EU?

Geographical indications — place names or names associated with locations that are used to identify products — are a priority in the European Union’s trade policy. But there are so many criteria, categories and databases that finding out what is protected can be pretty confusing.

Often the first databases we reach via the EU website are the ones containing protected names in different categories: wines, spirits, and other products such as food and beer. Even those three do not contain names the EU protects as a result of its trade agreements with other countries.

They only contain names that are protected via a complete registration process, not the ones listed in bilateral agreements. And for registration, there are also four different ways that the EU protects these names:

  • protected designation of origin (PDO)
  • protected geographical indication (PGI)
  • geographical indication of spirit drinks and aromatised wines (GI) — just to confuse everyone else who uses “GI” to mean all geographical indications
  • traditional speciality guaranteed (TSG)

Thankfully, there is one database to bind them all: GI View.

It contains all names protected in the EU, whether registered (including names still going through registration) or listed in bilateral agreements — from all over the world.

Here are some fun facts from applying various search filters on GI View, at the time of writing (January 5, 2021).

Where the names come from (some names may come from more than one country):

  • Total names in the database = 5,091
  • From EU countries = 3,344
  • From rest of the world = 1,747

Whether via registration or under special deals (including free trade agreements):

  • Registration = 3,498
  • Under agreements = 1,593

Where the registered names come from:

  • Registration, from non-EU countries = 154
  • Registration, from the UK (left the EU in 2020) = 86 (registered or submitted for registration while the UK was an EU member)
  • Registration, from non-EU, non-UK = 68

All of this has implications for how the UK protects non-EU countries’ names.

Note: For searching by country, EU members are listed first, then the rest of the world — alphabetically according to 2-character country code where Switzerland is “CH” and the UK is “GB”.)

As well as listing the search results, the database can also map where the names come from. This can be a lot of fun. First, this is the map for the whole dataset. There are three single items. They are: “Íslenskt lambakjöt / Icelandic lamb”, “Poivre de Penja” from Cameroon, and “Увс чацаргана / Uvs Seabuckthorn” from Mongolia — all three with registration applied for:

Mapped: where all the protected names come from
Mapped: where all the protected names come from

What about those 691 names in North America? Click on the dot and we get:

American GIs: 682 from the US protected in the EU, 11 from Venezuela, 7 each from Canada and Mexico, 1 or 2 from several others
American GIs: 682 from the US protected in the EU, 11 from Venezuela, 7 each from Canada and Mexico, 1 or 2 from several others

And for East Aisa?

East Asian GIs: 64 from South Korea protected in the EU, 56 from Japan, 10 from China
East Asian GIs: 64 from South Korea protected in the EU, 56 from Japan, 10 from China

What about Europe? Now it gets pretty congested. Some of the dots still cover several countries:

European GIs protected in the EU: pretty high concentration
European GIs protected in the EU: pretty high concentration

What if we click on the count of a single country like Australia, with 109 names protected in the EU?

Australian GIs: it has 109
Australian GIs: it has 109 protected in the EU

To see each geographical indication, we have to get down to this level, and click on each item. (Or we could just select the “list” display instead of “map”.)

To view the original blog post, please click here

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/global-trade/ Wed, 09 Dec 2020 16:31:35 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=27774 Last month, fifteen nations signed a free trade agreement of economic and political significance. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was eight years in the making and includes the 10...

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Last month, fifteen nations signed a free trade agreement of economic and political significance. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was eight years in the making and includes the 10 nations of the ASEAN, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and China. The formation of RCEP highlights the multilateral approach to trade rules in Asia and creates a bright contrast to the United States’ current largely unilateral and bilateral approach to trade relationships.

Why have some heralded RCEP as a landmark agreement? For starters, any trade agreement more than eight years in the making that brings together leaders from 15 members over 28 rounds of formal negotiation could be considered monumental. The countries involved in the agreement accounted for nearly 30% of global GDP in 2019, topping NAFTA as the world’s largest trade bloc . RCEP would also become the world’s largest export supplier and second-largest import destination. The United States was a party to a broad Pacific Trade deal called the Trans-Pacific Partnership but withdrew, and the remaining 11 members stayed together to form the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). RCEP effectively consolidates the “Asian market” in ways that previous agreements, including the CPTPP (the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s successor), have not.

The reception of RCEP has not been entirely positive. Some argue that RCEP is a “shallow” agreement in terms of tariff cuts and lacks substance on 21st-century trade issues like consumer protection and labor standards. This view stems from the comparison of RCEP with CPTPP, which was touted as the “gold standard” in trade agreements. RCEPs tariff cuts are indeed relatively modest. RCEP will eliminate tariffs on 90% of goods, but existing trade agreements among member countries already cover roughly 80% of these goods. The agreement also has relatively patchy coverage on important issues like service trade and agricultural trade (although there is more coverage on agricultural goods than initially expected). Overall, the agreement is projected to increase GDP in member countries by 0.2% by 2030 (PDF), which is a little more than the projected income gains due to CPTPP. Still, not a substantial amount.

While RCEP may not be a revolutionary trade agreement, it should not be regarded as a purely symbolic agreement either. The projected economic benefits of RCEP are more significant than those of CPTPP (PDF), and there are several components of RCEP that will influence the organization of supply chains in the short term. If RCEP is similar to other ASEAN agreements, the current provisions will likely improve over time. In the long term, the agreement has the potential to influence international competition and future trade rules.

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While many RCEP members had existing trade agreements, the ways that RCEP “staples together” those agreements have significant economic implications. Specifically, RCEP creates standard rules of origin. Rules of origin are a standard part of any trade agreement. They are designed to ensure that traded goods that get benefits are mostly, or at least partly made in a member country, rather than being trans-shipped from a country that does not get trade agreement benefits. By harmonizing rules of origin from existing trade agreements among members, RCEP reduces regulatory barriers and allows for greater trade in intermediate inputs. The result is that the RCEP makes it much easier for Asian firms to send goods around 15 of Asia’s economies, allowing for more regionally integrated supply chains.

RCEPs rules of origin are also relatively liberal. For many tariff lines, only 40% of the product’s value needs to be added within the region, which is a relatively low barrier considering how many countries a producer can use to accumulate regional value. RCEP rules of origin create additional flexibility for a number of products by allowing firms to choose (PDF) if they want to use a value-added rule or a change in tariff classification rule. Harmonizing and liberalizing rules of origin reduces the fixed costs of engaging in trade, which induces market entry and should help small to medium sized firms with market access.

So, while RCEP’s tariff cuts may not be as ambitious as other trade agreements, its less restrictive rules of origin mean preferential tariffs may have higher utilization. Additionally, RCEPs rules of origin may make it more difficult for non-members to enforce highly targeted trade measures, like anti-dumping tariffs. Anti-dumping tariffs are charged by an importing country on goods that it believes are being sold below cost. The harmonized and liberalized rules of origin may make trade re-routing an appealing response to anti-dumping measures, and China is a common target of anti-dumping investigations. Under RCEP, it may be easier for Chinese firms to shift production to other member countries and avoid detection. Flexible rules of origin also help guard ASEAN countries against the sudden imposition of trade restrictions, which has hit ASEAN particularly during the pandemic.

Bringing in New Members

RCEP formalizes new trade relationships as well. For example, before RCEP, there were no existing trade agreements between Japan and South Korea or between Japan and China. These are critical economic relationships between three of the region’s largest economies. In 2018, China was the largest trading partner of both Japan and South Korea, and they are China’s third and fourth-largest partner, respectively. Even a shallow trade agreement between these countries should further solidify their relationships. These countries are also projected to gain the most from joining RCEP. By 2030, incomes in Japan and South Korea are projected to be 1% higher (PDF) than they would have been without RCEP, which is more than a rounding error.

Surprises

RCEP mainly focuses on trade in goods, but the agreement also takes some surprising steps in other areas. For example, RCEP requirements on investment are stronger than expected. Invested firms are not required to export a specific percentage of goods or transfer technology to host nations as a condition for investment. These provisions go beyond ASEAN commitments in existing agreements. Additionally, while coverage for services in RCEP is spotty, some were surprised at the commitments members made to open up 65% of service sectors.

An Eye Toward the Future?

Still, the fact remains that RCEP failed to incorporate strong rules covering state-owned firms, labor rights, and environmental protection, and it only has modest coverage on services. Given the vast range in economic development among member countries, it’s not surprising that RCEP is lacking in some of these areas. The agreement was never expected to be as rigorous as the CPTPP. However, there are signs that RCEP may evolve in the future. For example, while members could not reach an agreement on how to replace investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS), they did include a work program (PDF) that must be concluded with a solution within two years of ratification. Any change would require the consent of all RCEP members.

Perhaps more important is the creation of a Secretariat, which indicates that members see RCEP as a platform for discussing future trade and economic issues in Asia, rather than a static trade agreement. An RCEP Secretariat means officials and ministers will regularly engage in the RCEP agenda and suggests that member countries want a robust institutional framework to support Asian trade commitments in the future. RCEP could become a platform for members to engage with important 21st-century trade issues, like rules that pertain to 3D-printed goods, blockchain technology, or artificial intelligence.

What Does RCEP Mean for the United States?

What does the RCEP mean for non-member countries? The United States was party to a broad Pacific Trade deal called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) but withdrew in 2017. The 11 remaining members of the TPP went on to form the CPTPP, which currently excludes the United States and China. When the United States withdrew from the TPP in 2017, it signaled its reluctance to participate in multilateral trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region. RCEP is likely to further reduce U.S. influence in Asia, especially if the agreement functions as a platform for discussing future trade rules. Without a seat at the table, it is unclear if the United States will have a voice in how Asia sets its trade policy. Additionally, RCEP consolidates 5 of the top 15 import markets for the United States, making RCEP a larger supplier of U.S. imports than NAFTA. Although the region is often only thought of as an import supplier, RCEP would also become the second-largest destination market for U.S. exports.

Of course, RCEP comes at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China. However, even in the case of a prolonged U.S.-China trade war, the potential impacts of RCEP are still positive. India withdrew from RCEP negotiations in 2019, citing concerns about the potential economic impacts of an influx of cheap Chinese imports, and India’s absence magnifies China’s influence within RCEP. Although officials are adamant that the RCEP has never been a China-led initiative, the agreement certainly extends China’s influence in the region.

What happens next? While the RCEP has been signed, it will take time for the agreement to be fully ratified. Further, many tariff cuts in the agreement are phased in over 20 years, so the economic effects of the RCEP may take years to fully materialize. Regardless, the RCEP could be a significant step toward a more integrated Asian market.

Toby Sytsma is an associate economist at the RAND Corporation. 

To read the original commentary by the Rand Corporation, please click here.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/steps-for-biden-global-trade-regime/ Mon, 07 Dec 2020 15:58:08 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=25427 As the incoming Biden administration considers the state of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it will find an organisation in disrepair. Trouble was already brewing before Trump’s term of office,...

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As the incoming Biden administration considers the state of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it will find an organisation in disrepair. Trouble was already brewing before Trump’s term of office, with the failure of the Doha Round negotiations, mounting frustrations with the Appellate Body, and setbacks to the plurilateral trade negotiating agenda.

But the WTO’s decline accelerated dramatically over the past four years, with the United States retreating from leadership, the US–China trade war spilling over to Geneva, and the many excessive trade restrictions imposed worldwide through the COVID-19 crisis. With Director-General Roberto Azevedo’s early departure, the WTO leadership transition has since been less than smooth, with no one serving in an acting capacity and the United States blocking consensus on a new director-general.

There are still glimmers of hope. Middle powers have undertaken important work, such as the recent statement on trade and health issued by Canada, the European Union, Japan, Australia and others. President-elect Biden has also emphasised the importance of working with allies and partners and through international organisations to achieve US foreign and economic policy objectives. And it is hoped that a new director-general will be selected soon to advance the organisation’s important work.

With a long list of issues requiring attention, the Biden team needs to sort out its priorities and separate what can be accomplished and how soon. When the new administration considers near-term objectives, it should be mindful of the upcoming 2021 WTO Ministerial Conference. To demonstrate commitment to repairing and revitalising global rules-based trade, there are a series of immediate actions that could be taken early in the new administration’s tenure.

First, by lifting the US reservation on Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala for director-general, the Biden administration stands to gain immediate international goodwill. The move would allow Geneva to shift its focus towards substance in the lead up to the Ministerial Conference. Dr. Okonjo-Iweala is highly qualified, having risen to the top of contention, and the sooner the United States joins in the consensus to select the Nigerian candidate, the sooner attention can be redirected towards the substantive agenda.

An early visit to Geneva by the new US Trade Representative (USTR) would help set the tone for US engagement in revitalising the WTO. Sessions could be held with the newly-appointed director-general, as well as Geneva ambassadors, to survey first-hand the situation and formulate initial thoughts  on priority reform efforts. A visit would be in striking contrast to Trump administration USTR Robert Lighthizer’s WTO engagement. He never once visited Geneva as USTR and frequently skipped mini-ministerial meetings in third countries.

A critical step in fixing the broken dispute settlement mechanism would be for the new administration to table proposals for Appellate Body reform, recognising that success would need to be accompanied by negotiation of new rules in other areas. Since blocking the appointment of new Appellate Body members, the United States has not shared its views on the approach to a concrete reform agenda, instead pressing discussions around the underlying divergent views among delegations.

Meanwhile, other member countries, as well as the former chairman of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, have put forward ideas aiming to address US concerns. The Biden team should draw from this rich input and the detailed suggestions of other trade experts that have also been floated. Negotiation will be difficult but the paralysis needs to end if a functioning WTO has any chance of surviving.

While the Trump administration identified challenges to the current WTO system posed by non-market economies, particularly China, it fell far short of delivering meaningful results. The Biden team has underscored the importance of working with partners and within international institutions to address these problems. As a first step, the incoming administration should finalise the trilateral work with the European Union and Japan on industrial subsidies, recruit wider international support, and submit a proposal to the WTO for negotiation.

While progress is being made in plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce, a wider agreement is still far from reach. The lack of multilateral rules in this critical sector reinforces the narrative that the WTO is falling into irrelevance. The incoming administration has the opportunity to light a fire under negotiations. It can work with others to step up high-level engagement from capitals. More importantly, it can spur momentum by launching digital trade negotiations among like-minded countries in the Asia Pacific region.

Many in the region have already concluded or are in the process of negotiating digital trade agreements among themselves, building on the Trans-Pacific Partnership platform. If robust regional progress is made, others are likely to become more serious about the WTO talks, not wanting to be left behind.

These suggested actions would help pave the way for the Biden administration to make an early and constructive impact on WTO reform and contribute to the success of the 2021 WTO Ministerial Conference. But this list is not exhaustive; reform to developing country status and trade aspects of other global issues, including in climate change and health, are also overdue.

The United States should not be relied on to pick up the mantle alone. For the WTO reform agenda to succeed, others will also need to step up to the plate and move out of their comfort zones.

To read the original blog post, please click here.

Wendy Cutler is Vice President and Managing Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute Washington DC Office.

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bodog poker review|Most Popular_Agreement. Over the years, /blogs/fifty-years-of-foreign-affairs/ Mon, 07 Dec 2020 10:57:04 +0000 /?post_type=blogs&p=25508 Anaemia: Lacking enough healthy red blood cells to carry adequate oxygen to the body, making the patient tired and weak. Anaemia can be temporary or long term and can range...

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Anaemia: Lacking enough healthy red blood cells to carry adequate oxygen to the body, making the patient tired and weak. Anaemia can be temporary or long term and can range from mild to severe.

For a bureaucracy, money is oxygen and people are blood cells.

And anaemia has been a recurring affliction for Australia’s Foreign Affairs Department since it was born in November 1970, casting off its old moniker, External Affairs.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has grown into a great department of state, yet warnings about the impact of anaemia on its work and effectiveness are a persistent motif over 50 years.

The template for the dire diagnosis was set by the 1986 review of Australia’s overseas representation, authored by the department’s secretary, Stuart Harris.

As a medium-sized country with limited economic and military power, Australia must rely heavily on persuasion to achieve its vital overseas objectives, Harris wrote, yet the ‘capacity to do this is thin and becoming thinner’. Australia accepted the need ‘to spend substantially to maintain an orthodox defence capacity’ yet wouldn’t do the same for diplomacy. The pressure on most areas of overseas representation led to Australia’s ‘falling short of our capacity to achieve some of our international objectives’.

When the Lowy Institute reported on Australia’s ‘diplomatic deficit’ in 2009, it found that DFAT’s overseas missions were ‘overstretched and hollowed out’. Years of underfunding had diminished the department’s ‘policy capacity and rendered many overseas missions critically overstretched’. The ever-rising consular workload had displaced ‘our diplomats’ capacity to contribute to wider national objectives’. By international standards, Australia operated a disproportionately small diplomatic network. And ‘language skills of DFAT staff have been in decline over the last two decades’.

Returning to the ‘diplomatic disrepair’ case in 2011, Lowy found that Australia’s traditional diplomatic footprint was outdated and inadequate: ‘Both political parties are to blame. Unless these deficiencies are remedied, our economic, political and security interests could be seriously jeopardised.’

The Lowy disrepair report revealed that DFAT’s overseas network had shrunk by 37% over two decades ago, despite ‘massive growth in the Australian public service (60% in 15 years)’. The government should reduce staff numbers in Canberra to get more of our diplomats overseas, the report said, and prevent further erosion of DFAT’s policy and diplomatic capacity by reviewing the way consular services are delivered and funded.

Parliament’s joint foreign affairs committee concluded in 2012 that DFAT had suffered ‘chronic underfunding’ for the previous three decades. The diplomatic network was ‘seriously deficient’ because of cuts imposed by successive governments: ‘Australia has the smallest diplomatic network of the G20 countries and sits at 25th in comparison to the 34 nations of the OECD. Australia clearly is punching below its weight.’

When the Public Service Commission did a capability review in 2013, it described DFAT as a ‘strong and agile’ organisation with ‘great potential to deliver more to the government and to the Australian community’. So the great department wasn’t quite delivering. ‘In the view of its own staff and others’, the review reported, ‘DFAT is more effective at advocacy and delivery than at strategic thinking.’

The capability review set out the anaemia problem by listing the department’s challenges, expressing them as the obverse of its strengths. The commission’s strengths-versus-challenges list is a description of a department needing to get more oxygen to its blood cells:

  • loyalty of staff to department versus ‘institutional insularity’
  • flexibility of workforce versus ‘churn and poor workforce planning’
  • talented generalists versus ‘strains on specialisation’
  • excellence of overseas networks versus a department that’s ‘less effective in Canberra’
  • excellent delivery in a crisis and a ‘can-do’ approach versus suspicion of prioritisation and strategic planning
  • high responsiveness to ministers versus ‘less clearly articulated departmental views’
  • effective advocacy of existing policy versus ‘less good at policy development’.

The federal budget maps the trend. In 1949, the combined budget for diplomacy, trade and aid was almost 9% of the federal budget, reducing to 3.2% by 1969, 1.9% by 1989, 1.5% by 2009, and then down to the current 1.3%. The figures are from Melissa Conley Tyler’s report for Australian Foreign Affairs on systematic underfunding. As she comments:

Since 2013, Australia’s total diplomatic, trade and aid budgets have fallen from 1.5% of the federal budget to 1.3%. In pure dollar terms, this is a fall from A$8.3 billion to A$6.7 billion. At the same time, the budgets for defence, intelligence and security have ballooned. In the almost two decades since the September 11 terror attacks, the Department of Defence budget has increased by 291%, while the allocation for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has grown by 528% and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service by 578%.

Busy doing urgent business, DFAT rightly worries that it’s letting important business slide. Busy is understandable when there’s a diverse range of responsibilities: bilateral and multilateral, high and low policy, plus all the functions of a service department.

This conglomerate bureaucracy does high policy (diplomacy, strategy and security interests); low policy (trade and economic interests); a $4 billion aid program that proves the old high–low policy distinction is pretty meaningless; issues 1.7 million passports annually, with 1,400 active consular cases on any one day; and at its embassies and missions, manages security, estates, information and communication, including hosting 30 Commonwealth departments, agencies or entities that have staff in Oz overseas posts. The conglomerate has four agencies that do trade and investmentinternational agricultural researchspying and tourism.

The Public Service Commission review said DFAT knew it had a ‘serious problem’ sharing its knowledge with other departments and was too detached from the rest of the public service. DFAT ‘should play more of a central agency-type role’ in shaping international political, economic or strategic policies:

DFAT is not seen by other government agencies, or by some of its own people, as performing as well in Canberra as it does overseas. It is perceived as being distant from policy processes outside traditional national security and trade areas, even on issues like the global economy or energy where it has something to bring to the table.

To extend the anaemia metaphor, the heart of DFAT’s problem is in the rest of Canberra that surrounds its R.G. Casey Building headquarters.

To read the original blog post, please click here.

Graeme Dobell is ASPI’s journalist fellow.

The Strategist — The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog. Copyright © 2020

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