WASHINGTON, DC – Africa is on the cusp of an economic transformation. By 2050, consumer and business spending on the continent is expected to reach roughly $16.1 trillion. The coming boom offers tremendous opportunities for global businesses – especially US companies looking for new markets. But unless African policymakers remove existing barriers to regional trade and investment, the continent’s economy will struggle to reach its true potential.

Two major trade agreements – the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – will make it easier for African countries to trade with one another, and with the United States. Together, the agreements promise to remove longstanding impediments to industrialization.

AGOA, passed by the US Congress in 2000, gives countries in Sub-Saharan Africa preferential trade access, allowing them to export tariff-free products to the US. Although it will expire in 2025, US President Joe Biden’s Sub-Saharan Africa strategy, unveiled in August, highlights its positive impact and promises to work with Congress on ways to proceed after AGOA lapses.

AfCFTA, on the other hand, is an intra-African trade agreement with no expiration date. Established in 2018, its goal is to deepen trade ties between African countries by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers.

Although these agreements’ scope, focus, beneficiaries, and structure differ significantly from each other, they are essential to strengthening African regional integration. Rather than viewing them as separate or competing agreements, policymakers and investors should recognize how they can complement each other in creating, sustaining, and transforming value chains across the continent.

Value creation is critical to Africa’s economic transformation. In 2014, manufactured goods accounted for about 41.9% of the trade between African countries, compared to 14.8% of their exports to the rest of the world. Greater regional integration will provide Africa with a larger supply market, which will accelerate manufacturing specialization and make African producers more competitive globally. More robust manufacturing industries will provide jobs for low-skilled workers – particularly those not currently integrated into the formal economy. This, in turn, will increase average household incomes, boost domestic demand, spur innovation and diversification, and help protect local economies against external shocks.

AGOA has already created some opportunities for cross-border value chains. Yet despite some success stories like Madagascar’s apparel industry, which relies on an extensive regional supply chain, such opportunities remain limited. While integration has improved since AGOA’s implementation, particularly since 2015, it remains somewhat superficial: less than 17% of Africa’s commercial value is currently generated through intra-African trade.

The real game changer is the AfCFTA. By removing tariffs for a wide range of products across the continent, it will lower production costs and shift foreign direct investment toward manufactured goods, while also reducing transit costs and shortening supply chains – major benefits in a globalized economy.

The International Monetary Fund projects that, under the AfCFTA, Africa’s expanded goods and labor markets will become more efficient, driving a significant increase in African countries’ competitiveness. By creating a true continental market that increases intra-African trade and impels African countries to participate in “production sharing” at a higher rate, the AfCFTA will likely provide a further incentive to US-based multinationals, which will be able to access a larger market and establish a major global hub. AGOA has already spurred many companies to invest in Africa, and the successful implementation of the AfCFTA will strengthen this trend.

The challenge for policymakers is to accelerate this process and ensure that the two programs complement each other. One way to do this is to deepen and broaden communication channels between Africa and the US, making it easier for investors interested in doing business in Africa to be better prepared for the expected growth in demand for regionally-sourced products. Supporting individual countries in implementing the AfCFTA would also help streamline the process.

A key problem that remains to be addressed is AGOA’s eligibility criteria, which are set on a country-by-country basis. These criteria can be detrimental to regional integration, as one country’s removal could affect another country’s supply inputs, thereby creating a ripple effect. For example, when Madagascar was removed from the AGOA-eligible list in 2010 following a coup d’état, the five African countries from which it had been sourcing apparel inputs were also punished. Considering the broader effect of country-specific sanctions will help prevent unintended investor risk.

Effective regional integration is essential for Africa. Without it, the continent will continue to be overlooked and outpaced globally in manufacturing, information technologies, and agriculture. When considering the future configuration of both AGOA and the AfCFTA, policymakers should regard them as complementary mechanisms for ensuring Africa’s long-term economic development.

Landry Signé is a professor and managing director at Thunderbird School of Global Management and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

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Nigeria—the largest economy in Africa—signed the AfCFTA on July 7, 2019, becoming the 34th member of the trading bloc. Under the AfCFTA, Nigeria stands to gain from increased access to cheaper goods and services from other African countries, as its intra-African trade is currently low: Indeed, as of 2018, Nigeria’s imports from the African region relative to total imports was at 3.2 percent while the share of Nigeria’s exports to the African region relative to total exports was 13.2 percent. Moreover, in 2020, Nigeria’s main trading partner was actually China.

Proponents of the FTA expect the AfCFTA to reduce poverty, increase firm competitiveness, and boost intra-African trade and investment. In fact, based on a recent survey of 1,804 Nigerian manufacturing enterprises, 6 out of 10 businesses expect the AfCFTA to lead to a reduction in material and labor costs, increase production capacity, expand market and consumer size, and reduce prices. Overall, Nigeria’s small and medium-sized businesses are optimistic about the opportunities created by AfCFTA, although with mixed feelings grounded in concerns about rising foreign competition and dumping of substandard goods.

As the trade agreement kicked off in the middle of a global pandemic coupled with a global recession, it is still unclear how the reduction in tariffs on goods and services will impact Nigeria’s households and businesses. However, a 2020 piece by Nassim Oulmane, Mustapha Sadni Jallab, and Patrice Rélouendé Zidouemba argues that the AfCFTA’s boost to intra-African trade might actually mitigate the rapid decline in GDP caused by COVID-19 and subsequent social-distancing policies and border closures.

ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF THE AFCFTA FOR NIGERIA

A tariff reduction enacted by one country has implications for its partners, suppliers, and competitors as it spills over to the rest of the world through trade networks and to other industries through supply chains. (For instance, a reduction in tariffs on cotton products impacts the prices of textiles.) These cascading effects across sectors and countries can be captured using a tractable numerical framework that can simulate the effects of shocks to countries and sectors and its implication on global trade patterns. To identify these effects and the transmission mechanisms resulting from the change in relative prices from trade liberalization on producers and consumers of intermediate and final goods at home and abroad, we employ a multisector, multicountry, quantitative model with linkages across sectors.  A regional tariff reduction is modeled as a higher productivity, as it leads to a reduction in relative prices and has implications for the exchange of goods across countries and regions. In this framework, households and firms then purchase more imported articles at cheaper prices, raising trade volumes and increasing household welfare. For the same reason, changes in relative prices of exports and imports induce higher demand for non-Nigerian-made products, depending on the variation in prices across sectors and countries. Therefore, even though there is a presumption of a positive impact, that may not be the case.

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Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry trade model version, authors’ simulations.

Notes: A country’s real wage effect is the percentage change in real GDP from 2014 level associated with free trade across the African region only. Tariffs for other non-AfCFTA countries/region are set at 2014 effective rates. Declines in GDP are shown in red, whereas increases bodog poker review in GDP are in orange and blue. The model provides results for 27 African countries, 13 OECD countries, 14 other emerging economies, and the “rest” of Africa, Asia, Europe, South America, North America, and Australia (60 countries in total including the rest of the world). Simulation results assume a full employment, perfect foresight, and absence of trade imbalances and household’s dynamic intertemporal choices.

QUANTIFYING REAL WAGE, PRICE, TRADE, AND WELFARE EFFECTS

In our analysis, we calibrate a model of trade to countries’ macroeconomic performance as at 2014 and then simulate the potential impacts on macroeconomic indicators associated with trade liberalization across the African region. We estimate the impacts on all countries under a scenario where there is free trade only with continental countries. Figure 1 presents the estimated percentage change in real wage associated with moving from tariff rates in 2014 to those under the AfCFTA for African countries, while tariff rates on other regions/countries remain at 2014 effective tariff rates. Our results have implications on real wage and welfare effects for Nigeria, 52 countries, six other regions of the world, and the rest of the world. Overall, we find that Nigeria will experience a 1.43 percent gain in value added compared to 2014 levels. Notably, the effects for Nigeria, although positive, are modest relative to the gains in real wage for other African countries. Our findings show that the AfCFTA will deliver larger gains to African countries with prior larger shares of imports from the region. Moreover, impacts of trade liberalization on real wage across African countries will be uneven: For example, Botswana, Angola, and Ghana will experience percentage changes in real wage of 16.6 percent, 12.5 percent, and 6.5 percent (dark blue in map), respectively, due to the AfCFTA.

Nigeria gains 1.55 percent in welfare. Decomposing welfare effects into effects due to change in volume of trade (1.14 percent) and effects due to change in terms of trade (0.41 percent) highlights the sources of Nigeria’s positive gain by sector. As shown in Figure 2, agriculture and fishing and other manufacturing industries account for 73 percent of the gains from volume of trade. A decline in terms of trade translates to a larger decline in export prices relative to import prices. “Other manufacturing goods” accounts for most gains in terms of trade while the agriculture and mining industries combined dilute gains by 32.6 percent.

Figure 2. Effect of AfCFTA on Nigeria’s volume of trade and terms of trade by sector

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry trade model version, authors’ simulations.

Notes: Volume of trade is sectoral trade relative to Nigeria’s total trade. Terms of trade is calculated as difference in sectoral price of export and import as a share of total price differences in all sectors. Welfare effects is the sum of the volume of trade (VoT) and terms of trade (ToT) effects. A negative ToT means the sector dilutes the positive gains. Sectoral contribution for ToT and VoT adds up to 100 percent.

PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL AND MANUFACTURING COMMODITIES WILL GO DOWN, BUT SOME OTHERS WILL GO UP

Based on our simulations, the AfCFTA will lead to reductions in prices of agricultural and manufacturing commodities. In fact, the decline in sectoral prices ranges from 0.8 percent in electrical and machinery to 8 percent in metal (Figure 3). Moreover, through sectoral linkages and changes in relative prices of imported goods, we find the AfCFTA will lead to an increase in prices of non-tradable services such as information services; transportation and warehousing; and finance and insurance services.

Figure 3. Price effects of AfCFTA on Nigeria’s economic sectors

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry trade model version, authors’ simulations.

Even with better infrastructure under the AfCFTA and the under-construction train networks between Kaduna and Lagos (the commercial center of Nigeria, which hosts the maritime ports for articles traded to/from the southern and western parts of Africa), intra- and international transportation costs remain high in the short run. A recent article in Nigerian newspaper The Punch finds that the price of shipping a container from the Apapa port in Lagos to the mainland (distance of just 20 kilometers) is almost the same as shipping one container from Nigeria to China. These types of costs will rise as the AfCFTA is implemented because of increases in the demand for inter-country haulage and shipping. In other words, intra-regional transportation cost variation impacts production costs and prices of traded articles as well as trade flows across countries. Changes in trade patterns then drive the uneven distributional impacts on consumption, real wage, and welfare across regions and countries, depending on changes in tariff rates on traded products.

Before the AfCFTA, 38 percent of Nigeria’s exports were in the mining and petro-chemical industries. Now, our simulations suggest a slight decline in exports for the following sectors: mining; wood and paper; petro-chemicals; metal products; and other manufacturing articles. Successful implementation of the AfCFTA will also induce a 6.3 percent increase in exports of agricultural products and 1.3 percent increase in food and beverage exports as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Export effects of AfCFTA on the Nigerian economy

Source: Static computable, multisector, multicountry,  trade model version, authors’ simulations. U.N. Commodity trade database.

Notes: Before AfCFTA’s export share is based on UNCOMTRADE data, and After AfCFTA is based on simulation results.

As touted by policy experts, the AfCFTA has the potential to lift Nigerians out of poverty and raise manufacturing output. However, to realize this potential, Nigeria must follow targeted industrial policy and structural reforms; upgrade customs infrastructure; address the domestic cost of doing business; reduce bottlenecks, port processes, and transportation costs; promote digital marketing and e-commerce; and create targeted awareness about the AfCFTA policy. A survey of Nigerian businesses conducted by the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa (CSEA) shows that over 60 percent of Nigeria’s businesses are still unaware of the recently signed AfCFTA agreement. Even with potential benefits for firms, there are information costs reflected in different levels of awareness. Firms who don’t know AfCFTA exists are unable to take advantage of the tariff arrangements or even benefit from the policy. Until businesses are aware, the costs of trading under AfCFTA will remain high.

Yewande Olapade is a Quantitative Fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and a Nonresident Fellow at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa.

Chukwuka Onyekwena is the Executive Director at the Centre for the Study of the Economies of Africa.

To read the full commentary from The Brookings Institution, please click here.

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The Aug. 20 letter highlighted that a free trade pact with Kenya would be “the appropriate next step in recognizing and strengthening relations, economic opportunities, and a security partnership between the United States and Kenya.”

Kenya began negotiations on a trade deal with the U.S. during the Trump administration. The Biden administration has stalled the negotiations without specifying whether or how Washington would resume the talks.

The letter to Tai made the case that the Biden administration has a “historic opportunity” to work toward a trade agreement with Kenya, which would be the first such pact between the U.S. and a sub-Saharan African country.

The letter further noted that “as the U.S. increasingly partners with Kenya to combat al-Shabab and other terrorist groups, it is more important than ever to recognize Kenya as an important ally in the Horn of Africa.”

Indeed, a trade agreement with Kenya is clearly in America’s interest. Regrettably, however, the Biden administration has shown little appetite for restarting stalled trade negotiations with Nairobi.

During a House Ways and Means Committee hearing in May, Tai did state the necessity of making sure that what we do with Kenya will “reinforce all of the things that Kenya is doing in Africa, not take away from that.”

Two months later, when she announced and highlighted a “U.S.-Africa trade ministerial” that will be held later this year, Tai said the ministerial would be focused on how to “build” on the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

Currently, the cornerstone of America’s economic engagement with Africa is the 21-year-old African Growth and Opportunity Act. A preferential trade program, it offers eligible sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for more than 1,800 goods until 2025.

More can and should be done to build on the African Growth and Opportunity Act and upgrade it to strengthen and broaden commercial ties with Africa.

A renewed U.S. effort to promote economic freedom across Africa should also be a central part of America’s long-term mission to assist African countries. Greater economic freedom, reinforced by trade freedom, is the long-term solution to the continent’s weak health security capacities and many more of its economic and social challenges.

It’s notable that in commemorating the launch of the Organization of African Unity, Rep. Karen Bass, D-Calif., chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa, global health, and global human rights, in June stressed that, moving forward, U.S. policy toward Africa should be more about trade and investment, less about aid.

She further underlined that “we will need to be aligned—like a lot of other countries around the world that view the continent of Africa as a partner—as an investment partner, a business partner, and not view the continent of Africa as a place where we need to deliver charity.”

While the U.S. cannot provide the leaders of foreign nations the political will needed to transform their economies according to free market principles, it can support the cause of economic freedom through consistent policy dialogues with its African partners and by providing technical help for reform-minded countries.

A readily available and practical next step toward that strategic objective would be for the Biden administration to resume negotiations aimed at hammering out a free trade agreement with Kenya as noted by the senators’ letter.

Anthony B. Kim researches international economic issues at The Heritage Foundation, with a focus on economic freedom and free trade.

To read the full commentary from The Heritage Foundation, please click here.

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Therefore, it is no surprise that China applies the same approach when dealing with other developing economies, including in Africa. Focusing on economic relations, China proposes a developmental approach that differs from the West’s and challenges the Washington Consensus, based on free markets and economic liberalisation. This is reflected in China’s 2021 White Paper on International Development Cooperation, which notes that Beijing’s approach to cooperation is about “focusing on development and improving people’s lives” and “providing the means for independent development” of each country.

Following these principles, China’s engagement with African countries does not revolve exclusively around aid, but rather around the economic relationship between the two blocsaround trade, investment, development finance, and other forms of cooperation that aim to promote Africa’s growth. As such, China-Africa relations  have a strong economic focus, based on mutual economic interests which have contributed to promoting the continent’s economic transformation.

 The Belt and Road Initiative: Not a Game-Changer for the African continent

So, what is happening now? In terms of foreign engagement, China’s main tool is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officially launched in 2013. African countries only committed to participating in the Initiative between 2018 and 2019, making it too early to assess its costs and benefits for Africa.

However, much can be said looking at pre-BRI trends in terms of economic and political cooperation. As regards policies and principles, many of the ideas and concepts governing Africa-China relations before the BRI — such as China’s second Africa policy and the ‘three networks and industrialisation’ principle (san wang yi hua 三网一化, based on the construction of roads, railways, aviation networks, and on the development of the industrial sector across the continent) —  already encapsulated many BRI ideas. Therefore, the BRI does not represent a break from  the past, but rather a continuation bodog casino of China-Africa Relations along the lines already established since 2013.

More practically, one could ask whether the BRI has infused new enthusiasm in China-Africa economic relations: however, this does not seem to be the case. Trade, investment, and lending commitments between China and Africa have undergone a considerable acceleration since 2000, but they have ultimately plateaued and stabilised since 2014. Comparing pre-BRI China-Africa engagement and early BRI trends reveals that the BRI has not disrupted China-Africa relations, but rather has strengthened previous political engagement and economic trends. Therefore, while infrastructure construction remains critical in Africa, the BRI has brought any dramatic changes in the pre-existing trends.

The African Continental Free Trade Agreement: a Potential Game-Changer for Africa’s Industrialisation

For Africa, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) is more exciting than the BRI. It is a pan-African initiative led by the African Unionaimed at creating a free-trade area among all African nations with the higher aim of supporting the continent’s economic transformation by promoting industrialisation. Why? Because while African countries mainly export raw materials and primary commodities to the rest of the world, they exchange a lot of manufactured products among themselves. Therefore, by creating a large free trade area, the AfCFTA can potentially contribute to Africa’s industrialisation and ultimately to the continent’s economic transformation, representing a tangible opportunity for Africa to change its position in the global economy.

The African Union and its members are working hard to advance the initiative, developing policies and agreements (the soft infrastructure) necessary to make the AfCFTA work. But what is still missing is the hard infrastructure, the roads, bridges and ports necessary for trade. These are crucial to making sure  the AfCFTA does not remain on paper alone and that the benefits actually accrue to African citizens.

The African Development Bank suggests  the continent’s hard infrastructure needs about USD130–170 billion a year, with an annual financing gap in the range of $68–$108 billion. Where can such money be found? While China’s financing pipeline may be getting colder, the country remains among the leading parties willing to provide support to close Africa’s infrastructure finance gap. The Chinese government has, in fact, shown a willingness to take part  in the future of the AfCFTA, with foreign minister Wang Yi explicitly supporting the initiative, not only in terms of infrastructure development but also through financial assistance and capacity building.

The AfCFTA, China, and the Rest of the World

In sum, while the BRI itself may not be a game-changer for Africa, China’s support to African infrastructure remains vital for the realisation of the African-led AfCFTA. China is signalling to African countries that it is willing to support their economic growth through infrastructure development, which could very much strengthen the China-Africa partnership at the continental level.

Recently, the G7 has made similar promises, launching the Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership to tackle the infrastructure needs of the developing world. While details are still scarce, it seems to reveal Western countries’ renewed interests in Africa’s infrastructure after years of uncontested Chinese leadership in this area.  Should the G7 initiative represent a similar — or even better — offer for Africa than what China is currently providing, it would be very much welcome.

The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank providing leading research and viable policy options to government officials, business executives and the public at large wishing to better understand international issues. 

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“We’re not really going to have what is [a] sustainable recovery” as long as vaccine scarcity continues, Okonjo-Iweala said at an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s GeoEconomics Center. “The supply scarcity is driving behavior,” she said, not only fueling countries to competitively bid on vaccines, but also to “bid away vaccines from COVAX,” the global coalition tasked with improving COVID-19 vaccine access. “That’s why COVAX has been struggling to deliver what it should.” 

Okonjo-Iweala outlined ways the WTO can alleviate the scarcity problem across the supply chain for COVID-19 vaccines: by encouraging the removal of trade restrictions while working with manufacturers to unlock bottlenecks and spread their production expertise. “Without the transfer of technology and know-how, you also cannot manufacture or increase output,” she said. Members of the WTO are negotiating a proposal to waive intellectual property rights for COVID-19 vaccines, and Okonjo-Iweala hopes “they will come to a conclusion that is pragmatic, allowing developing countries to have access but also [protecting] research, development, and innovation.” 

Meanwhile, the WTO, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Health Organization proposed a $50 billion plan to end the pandemic, foster a sustainable recovery, and generate an estimated $9 trillion in global economic returns by 2025. Okonjo-Iweala said the plan includes $10 billion allocated to boosting preparedness for and prevention of future pandemics. 

Here are some of the highlights of Okonjo-Iweala’s vision for the WTO, from her plans to revive trust among its members to her philosophy on bringing the trade body into the digital era. 

A trust-building exercise ahead 

• Among the WTO’s challenges, “there is a trust deficit between members: between developed countries and developing countries, between China, the US, the EU… You name it, in any configuration,” said Okonjo-Iweala. “[Trust] is something that we really need to build up.”  

• She suggested that one way to build trust is to revive the WTO’s original purpose set out in the organization’s founding document, the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement. The “WTO is supposed to help enhance living standards for people, create employment, and support sustainable development. This is all about people,” Okonjo-Iweala said. If the organization aims to “make things better for people, then it wouldn’t take twenty years to negotiate an agreement” that benefits people. 

• The comment alluded to the WTO’s twenty-year negotiations on prohibiting fishing industry subsidies that contribute to global overfishing. Trade ministers will meet to discuss the issue on July 15, and Okonjo-Iweala noted that this meeting may “kick us along the path towards agreement” by the end of 2021. The leader of the negotiations, Permanent Representative of Colombia to the WTO Santiago Wills, has produced a draft agreement “that so far, nobody has thrown out,” Okonjo-Iweala noted. 
• If WTO members can strike deals such as a fisheries subsidies agreement and “work in these multilateral ways together,” Okonjo-Iweala said, that can begin “to build the trust that you can work together and you can deliver together.” 

A mission to get with the times 

• The WTO will also have to “update its rules and move with the times” to build trust among its members, said Okonjo-Iweala. “The world is going digital,” she noted, but she also acknowledged that “the WTO does not yet have an agreement” on digital trade and e-commerce regulations.  

• With her vision focusing on inclusive growth, Okonjo-Iweala said that a WTO approach to digital is key. She noted that during the pandemic, small- and medium-sized enterprises with digital bodog online casino access avoided shutting down entirely. Women specifically own many of these enterprises, “and when they do have access to the Internet, they can directly connect with their customers, and this is very helpful.” Thus, she concluded, “in order to have a fair, transparent, and level playing field for digital trade, and to solve many of the issues about cross-border data flows, you need some agreement.” 

• Okonjo-Iweala admitted that, while trade lifted people out of poverty, “people have been left behind.” She partially attributed that to protectionism and to technological changes in economic sectors. Weeks after the Biden administration released a plan for a new US industrial policy in an Atlantic Council speech, Okonjo-Iweala noted that industrial policy can be helpful in building infrastructure (like internet access) but cautioned that “industrial policies that lead to protectionism [are] something we need to watch,” and could be “against WTO rules” depending on their approaches. 

• Okonjo-Iweala said that eighty-three WTO members are participating in plurilateral negotiations to modernize trade rules for a digital world. “We’re very hopeful that… [by] the next [ministerial], we would be able to come up with an agreement with a set of rules that can help us underpin digital trade.” 

• But in equipping the WTO to deal with modern challenges, she acknowledged that helping to solve trade’s health and environmental issues, alongside digital issues, will be urgent, too. “I believe we can do it. We can’t do them all at once, but we can sequence what we want to do.” 

Support for Africa’s largest trade endeavor 

• Okonjo-Iweala is both the first woman and the first African to lead the WTO. The Nigeria native hailed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which came into effect in January, as “one of the best things I think the continent has done. … The WTO has been a foundation for putting these rules together and, I hope, will be a companion as we try to implement [it].” 

• She noted that the WTO is ready to partner with the AfCTFA on issues like digital trade and improving Internet access. “We have a lot of work that we can do together to breach the digital divide,” she said. 

• Among the ways the WTO can support the AfCTFA, Okonjo-Iweala mentioned that the trade organization can help reduce barriers to the movement of goods and services across borders and encourage investment to create value-added exports and keep jobs on the continent. 

Time for reform? 

• When asked about differences in opinion among WTO members over issues like the benefits of free trade and the role of the dispute-settlement system, Okonjo-Iweala pushed back by saying that members “believe that trade and trade liberalization is the right way to go,” but that they differ on the way “they put this into practice.”  

• And while the differences in opinion may pose challenges for the WTO, they don’t erode the organization’s utility, said Okonjo-Iweala, arguing that instead of labeling the WTO as dysfunctional, members should come together to make it work better. “Is the best answer to walk away and say this doesn’t work? This organization, the WTO, has worked for the US, has worked for China, has worked for the UK and the EU, and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and enriched economies. It is still the same organization,” she said. 

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.  

To read the full commentary from the Atlantic Council, please click here. 

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Sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to “level up” its digital game unless governments develop and update their national digitization strategies, ensure regional interoperability of these strategies, and work with foreign partners to add digital provisions to their trade agreements. As global digitization and trade become increasingly connected and interoperable, the lack of national digital strategies and dearth of digital provisions in trade frameworks threaten to slow sub-Saharan Africa’s digital transformation. African governments have fallen short on three key issues—intellectual property (IP) protection, data protection, and cybersecurity—which will impede regional competitiveness and have critical implications for security and trade in the region.

Connectivity Like Never Before . . .

Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing a digital transformation. From students learning to code and drones delivering medical supplies to the increased usage of mobile payment platforms, daily life is being redefined by digital technologies. According to the International Monetary Fund, internet penetration in sub-Saharan Africa has grown tenfold since the early 2000s, compared with a mere threefold increase in the rest of the world. The number of tech hubs on the continent has grown by 50 percent over the past several years, now numbering more than 600. And the region was home to nearly half of the world’s mobile money accounts in 2018 and will see the fastest growth in mobile money technology through 2025, according to the Brookings Institution. Three of the most digitally advanced countries in the region—Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa—boast impressive internet penetration and are expected to be the top three markets for smartphone connections in 2025, according to the GSM Association (GSMA).

• Kenya. Home to a dynamic, growing digital ecosystem, Kenya is a regional leader in information and communications technology (ICT) innovation. The percentage of mobile internet penetration nearly doubled between 2014 and 2019, according to GSMA. In fact, mobile phone subscriptions surpassed the total population by 12 percent in 2019. Kenya has also led the continent in financial inclusion; telecoms giant Safaricom is the main force behind Kenya’s M-Pesa money transfer technology, which grew the percentage of Kenyan adults with access to at least basic financial services from 26 to 83 percent in approximately 15 years.
   
• Nigeria. The region’s most populous country is an ICT powerhouse. The sector contributes almost 14 percent to the country’s GDP, and the government has invested in highspeed internet via five underwater cables with international links, reducing bandwidth prices and enhancing network capacity. GSMA estimates that Nigeria will be home to the highest number of smartphone connections in 2025 with 154 million connections—more than the combined number of connections estimated for South Africa and Kenya. Nigerians are also the top cryptocurrency traders on the continent, although often maligned as avenues for corruption. Nigeria generated more than $400 million worth of cryptocurrency trade in 2020, ranking third place after the United States and Russia.
   
• South Africa. Boasting a vibrant digital entrepreneurship ecosystem, South Africa is home to a variety of tech startups tackling challenges in the health, transport, and education sectors. The country accounts for 49 percent (a plurality) of the region’s cellular internet of things (IoT) connections and is the only sub-Saharan African state to have launched commercial 5G services. South Africa has seen great advancements in fiber optic networks, leading bandwidth prices to drop significantly. Most of this advancement has occurred in urban areas, however, leading to a significant digital divide.

. . . But Still Not Ready for Prime-Time

This boom in digitization is unlikely to fulfill its potential until major blind spots are confronted head-on. These limitations stem from countries’ lack of or outdated national digital strategies and frameworks as well as lean or absent digital clauses in the multiple trade agreements to which African countries are signatories. These shortcomings could seriously hinder sustainable, secure digital growth and trade, and serve as a significant stumbling block to private sector competitiveness. If regional governments want their digital ecosystems to reach cruising altitude, they must develop robust digital governance frameworks and strengthen digital provisions regulating trade and investment with external partners.

National Digital Strategies

A national digital strategy is a policy framework that strengthens governance on a host of digital issues such as IP protection, data security, ICT infrastructure, and human capacity development. Not only do national digital strategies generate digital norms for e-government services and private companies operating in the country, but they also help create open and predictable regulatory environments that attract trade and investment in national digital economies. Digital strategies go hand-in-hand with digital legislation—including on key issues like data protection and cybercrime—without which it is impossible for governments to facilitate secure, sustainable digital growth. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD), as of 2021, only 28 African countries have comprehensive personal data protection legislation in place, while just 11 countries have adopted substantive laws on cybercrime. The lack of digital strategies and relevant legislation results in severe security gaps that leave countries vulnerable to the misuse and abuse of digital platforms and data.

Trade Agreements

African governments are signatories to a variety of multilateral trade agreements that outline norms and regulations around issues such as technical barriers to trade (TBTs), tariffs, and other trade restrictions. As digital technologies and platforms play a greater role in everyday life—from purchasing groceries and filling a gas tank to accessing health clinics—it is critical for these agreements to ensure protection of individual, private, and government data and property rights. Many of these trade agreements, however, skimp on details when it comes to digital issues like IP protection, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. CSIS reviewed six key trade agreements on the continent—the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, UK-Ghana Interim Trade Partnership Agreement, UK-Kenya Economic Partnership Agreement, European Union-East African Community (EU-EAC) Economic Partnership Agreement, the Cotonou Agreement, and the U.S.-Kenya Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Negotiation Principles—and found that only half include vague or general provisions around IP protection, while none include clauses on data protection or cybersecurity.

The Consequences of Inaction

Unless regional governments step up—developing and updating their national digital strategies and incorporating digital-specific clauses into their trade bodog casino agreements—they will miss an opportunity to fully benefit from the unfolding digital transformation. Moreover, countries are likely to become more vulnerable to cyberattacks and may face a decrease in trade and investment from external partners.

• Deficient digital transformation. Without IP protection, data protection, and cybersecurity standards in their regulatory environments and trade agreements, sub-Saharan African countries risk stunting their digital growth. A failure to implement these provisions could translate to reduced innovation and difficulty scaling digital solutions. For example, a Nigerian startup providing 3D printing technology to local hospitals will likely hit a wall as it struggles to navigate Nigeria’s inadequate digital legal and trade frameworks. This creates a cyclical effect: as tech startups fail to scale, regional governments will be less inclined to invest in their ICT sectors, which is bad news for lowering data prices, developing human capacity, and increasing competitiveness.
   
• Exposed to cyberattacks. Without adequate cybersecurity measures in place, regional governments are at an increased risk of cyberattacks. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), African governments face a rapidly evolving mix of digital threats—critical infrastructure sabotage, organized crime, and combat innovation—from a mix of actors, including nation-states and lone-wolf actors. Ninety-six percent of cybersecurity incidents on the continent go unreported or unresolved, and that will remain true as long as governments are slow to formulate and pass foundational cybersecurity strategies and trade rules.
   
• Anemic trade and investment. U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa is already dismally low (in the past two years, U.S. trade with the region has represented less than 1 percent of all U.S. trade in goods), and this trend is on track to worsen if African governments fail to implement necessary reforms. If regional governments do not have IP protection in place, for example, foreign firms will not trust their patents, trademarks, and copyrights to be enforced. International companies will be more likely to choose to trade with and invest in countries that have up-to-date digital regulatory environments as well as digital-first trade standards.

Taking It to the Next Level

African governments can still get digitization right. By developing, updating, and committing to national digital strategies and legislation, working with the African Union to ensure regulatory harmonization, and prioritizing digital clauses in upcoming trade deals such as the AfCFTA Phase II negotiations, the region can harness its digital momentum to mitigate economic inequality, expand education access, increase trade and investment, and spur innovation. Trade-friendly regulatory environments will also see considerable growth in workforce development opportunities.

Update or Develop National ICT Strategies. As digital tools, services, and infrastructure become increasingly ubiquitous, it is critical for regional governments to shape sustainable digitization through a national plan, set of policies, or blueprint. And while numerous countries may have digital blueprints in place, it is the quality of and commitment to these strategies that counts. Regional governments should look to Kenya as a model, which has some of the most advanced digital legal frameworks on the continent, including its ICT Masterplan (2014) and Digital Economy Blueprint (2019). The Kenyan government is a regular convener of digital symposiums and, according to the International Trade Administration, has “invested heavily” in its ICT sector. In addition to national strategies, countries should pass laws related to IP protection, data privacy, and cybersecurity. Regional governments should take notes from Uganda which passed the Data Protection and Privacy Act in 2019, becoming the first African country to recognize data privacy as a human right. In addition, regional governments could prioritize training of legislators and judges who are often responsible for applying regional and international standards and regulations.

Engage the African Union. The African Union is a powerful convener on a host of issues, including digitization, with the capacity to strengthen coordination, align policies and sector regulation, and scale investment and dedication of resources for sustainable digitization. Building off its Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030)—which seeks to harmonize regulatory environments and guarantee investment and financing in the digital economy—the African Union should expand engagement with member states to not just update and develop national ICT strategies but to ensure alignment between those strategies. Regional interoperability is key to scaling digital applications across the continent. If something works in Kenya but cannot be used in Uganda and Tanzania, growth will be stunted. In addition, recognizing that the development of national policies take an enormous amount of time, money, effort, and political will and commitment, the African Union should ramp up regional conventions on digital issues. Examples of past conventions include the African Union’s Malabo Conventions (officially the Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection), which continues to be ratified by member states.

Build Out Digital Clauses in Phase II AfCFTA Protocols and U.S.-Kenya FTA Negotiations. Hopes are high for the ongoing AfCFTA Phase II negotiations, which include IP protection, data protection, and cybersecurity. These provisions will have enormous consequences for security and regulatory harmonization with the possibility to facilitate increased trade and investment. If the AfCFTA signs off on effective digital clauses, it will make the African continent an attractive trade and investment destination. There is also precedent to be set with the digital clauses in the U.S.-Kenya Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, which may be restarted under the Biden administration.

Prioritize Digitization as Key Pillar of U.S. Strategy in Africa. The Biden administration should signal its commitment to economic engagement in the region, engaging African governments to develop and implement comprehensive digital frameworks and policies. The United States should work with African partners to embrace high standard digital trade rules, including through the U.S.-Kenya FTA negotiations, and improve enabling environments. This might include convening high-level African ministers responsible for ICT and digital growth to discuss policy issues and paths toward alignment. It might also include a presidential statement reiterating support for digital-focused trade agreements, including the AfCFTA.

Judd Devermont is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, he served as the national intelligence officer for Africa from 2015 to 2018. In this position, he led the U.S. intelligence community’s analytic efforts on sub-Saharan African issues and served as the DNI’s personal representative at interagency policy meetings.

Marielle Harris is a research associate with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Prior to joining CSIS, she lived and worked in Tanzania for two and a half years, first as a project officer on a U.S. State Department-funded program to prevent violent extremism and then as a consultant supporting program design and development for local and international organizations. Marielle has an M.A. in diplomacy and conflict studies from the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, and a B.A. from Goucher College.

To read the full commentary from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), please click here. 

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Two key speakers promoted that slogan at a recent roundtable event hosted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in honor of Africa Day, commemorating the launch of the Organization of African Unity.

Rep. Karen Bass, California Democrat and chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Africa, global health and global human rights, stressed that, moving forward, U.S. policy toward Africa should be more about trade and investment, less about aid.

“We will need to be aligned—like a lot of other countries around the world that view the continent of Africa as a partner—as an investment partner, a business partner, and not view the continent of Africa as a place where we need to deliver charity,” she said.

These words earned a warm endorsement from the next speaker, World Trade Organization Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.

“As the DG of WTO,” Ms. Okonjo-Iweala said, “I fully want to support what Rep. Karen Bass said: Trade, not aid, for Africa.”

Ms. Okonjo-Iweala praised Africa’s “entrepreneurial dynamism and connectivity.” She also highlighted the continent’s efforts to grow trade and regional integration, particularly through the African Continental Free Trade Area.

That agreement, now ratified by 36 African countries, went into effect on Jan. 1.

Indeed, it’s time for Washington to pursue a greater economic partnership with Africa.

Currently, the cornerstone of America’s economic engagement with Africa is the 21-year-old African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). A preferential trade program, AGOA offers eligible sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for more than 1,800 goods until 2025.

More can and should be done to build on AGOA and upgrade it to strengthen and broaden commercial ties with Africa.

A renewed U.S. effort to promote economic freedom across Africa should also be a central part of America’s long-term mission to assist African countries. Greater economic freedom is the long-term solution to the continent’s weak health security capacities and many more of its economic and social challenges.

Economic freedom is all about empowering people to pursue their dreams by unleashing greater opportunities to earn a living. Preserving and advancing economic freedom ensures real, lasting progress on many fronts.

Over the past 27 years, The Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of Economic Freedom has demonstrated undeniable links between economic freedom, individual liberty, and prosperity in nations around the world.

The facts are indisputable: Free markets and free people have worked hand in hand to increase prosperity and improve the quality of life in terms of health outcomes, environmental protection and much, much more. Perhaps not surprisingly, countries with freer markets also tend to be more resilient in times of crisis and more capable of handling challenging external shocks.

As the 2021 Index emphasizes, Africa can do much more to advance economic freedom and liberate its many entrepreneurs.

While the U.S. cannot provide the leaders of foreign nations the political will needed to transform their economies according to free-market principles, it can support the cause of economic freedom through consistent policy dialogues with its African partners and by providing technical help for reform-minded countries.

The proven right way forward lies in advancing free-market policies that facilitate trade, not aid, which should be the foundation of America’s lasting strategy for practical engagement with Africa.

A good next step toward that strategic objective would be for the Biden administration to resume negotiations aimed at hammering out a free trade agreement with Kenya. As a trading partner, Kenya presents vast opportunities. So far, regrettably, the administration will say only that it is reviewing its position.

Kick-starting negotiations on a U.S.-Kenya free trade agreement would be a powerful signal of American commitment to solidify our pragmatic engagement with Africa. And that could be a major stepping stone toward entering greater partnerships with many more countries on the continent.  

Anthony B. Kim is research manager and editor of bodog sportsbook review the Index of Economic Freedom. Previously, Kim had served as Deputy Chief of Staff to Dr. Edwin J. Feulner, founder of the Heritage Foundation.

Terry Miller champions free markets as director of two of The Heritage Foundation’s key research centers, Data Analysis and Trade and Economics, and as the think tank’s Mark A. Kolokotrones fellow in economic freedom.

To read the full commentary from the Heritage Foundation, please click here.

Image from the Heritage Foundation

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Now that it is in effect, the AfCFTA will be one of the largest free trade areas in the world, covering a market of more than 1.2 billion people and up to USD$3 trillion in combined GDP. It also has the potential to increase intra-African trade by more than 50 percent, which would add an estimated USD$76 billion in income to the rest of the world.

African nations have already made determined efforts to increase trade among themselves through eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) officially recognized by the African Union, and via many additional regional trade agreements.

In this context, intra-regional agricultural trade has played an important role in boosting Africa’s economic growth. It has also improved incomes and livelihoods and strengthened the resilience of the continent’s smallholder farmers, rural and urban populations, and national economies against shock or prolonged crisis, including the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the pandemic, women in Africa have been disproportionately affected by countermeasures such as border closures, curfews and other movement restrictions, as well as by increased gender-based discrimination and violence. AfCFTA can help lift up the continent’s women by generating an expected increase in wages for skilled and unskilled women of up to four percent by 2035 through new employment opportunities across the agriculture value chain.

As Africa’s agricultural trade intensifies, its food systems will benefit from more robust supply chains and more stable food prices, which is good for both producers and consumers. For now, however, formal intra-African trade remains at under 20 percent of total African exports and is dominated by a small number of products and countries. Moreover, Africa imports approximately USD$72 billion in food and agricultural products per year, a figure that is growing by 3.6 percent annually.

Every year, 10 to 12 million young Africans enter the job market, each vying for one of only about 3.1 million jobs created annually on the continent. Although the agriculture and informal sectors are already the highest employers in Africa, these sectors are nonetheless likely to create additional employment as the demand for food across the continent rises.

The Panel’s recommendations include improving information and data on cross-border trade, particularly on informal cross-border trade, in the areas of scale, product quality, and flow patterns. Better data would support efforts to simplify regulations, provide training on food hygiene, enhance access to finance, and address entrepreneurship skills.

Addressing tariff and non-tariff barriers is also key to boosting agriculture trade in Africa, for instance by streamlining or eliminating cumbersome customs procedures, roadblocks, subsidies, and technical barriers such as sanitary and phytosanitary rules.

Also helpful would be new digital solutions, such as introducing radio frequency identification or microchipping for tracking livestock, and using digital storage and exchange of safety certificates for easy and quick transmission of goods across African borders.

In addition, the development of rail and rural roads in Africa would expedite the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies (fertilizers, seeds, irrigation, and mechanization), facilitate greater crop diversification, speed the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture, and improve delivery of services such as finance and extension.

Another critical improvement would be to enhance Africa’s value chain competitiveness and strengthen its crisis preparedness and resilience. Emphasis should be placed on those food products that both generate high value and also contribute to improved nutrition. This step calls for investments in the design and development of technologies that improve both the quantity and quality of food produced in Africa. Furthermore, the provision of training facilities needs to be enhanced in order to expand opportunities for skill development and innovation capacity along the value chain.

As intra-African agriculture trade evolves and as mechanization and digitalization expand across food systems, new entrepreneurship opportunities—beyond the farm—will emerge in the continent’s agri-food sector, creating the potential for high-quality, sustainable jobs across Africa.

Prof. Sheryl Hendriks is a Malabo Montpellier Panel member and Department Head and Director of the Institute for Food Nutrition and Well-being at the University of Pretoria in South Africa.

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The region does enter the agreement with great momentum around trade: Exports have grown by nearly a factor of four since 1995. Notably, while South Africa and Nigeria remain sub-Saharan Africa’s largest exporters, the export landscape beyond these two countries has changed dramatically in recent years (Figure 1).

Figure 1. 10 largest sub-Saharan African exporters (after Nigeria and South Africa) in millions of current US dollars

Source: Authors using data from World Bank. 2020. “World Development Indicators.”

Between 1995 and 2000, Côte d’Ivoire was the continent’s third-largest exporter, averaging more than $4 billion per year. In 2000, Angola surpassed Côte d’Ivoire and has remained in that position ever since. During this same period, the Republic of the Congo and Botswana, boasted some of the region’s fastest-growing exports, joining Angola and Côte d’Ivoire at the top. Ghana’s exports remained strong throughout this period, making it the region’s fourth-largest exporter overall each year between 2012-2018.

The narrative changes slightly when considering exports per capita. Exports per capita also grew substantially from 1995 to 2018, expanding by a factor of 2.5. By and large, the leaders in exports per capita are small nations with no more than a few million inhabitants, including Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Botswana, and Gabon. Since 1995, Seychelles has nearly uninterruptedly led the continent—including Nigeria and South Africa—in exports per capita, exporting nearly $20,000 per capita in 2018. South Africa and Namibia were the only two countries to finish in the top 10 of both exports and exports per capita in 2018.

Figure 2. 10 largest exporters per capita (current US dollars) in sub-Saharan Africa, 1995-2018

Source: Authors using data from World Bank. 2020. “World Development Indicators.”

As Africa begins the AfCFTA era, it will try to harness the momentum it has displayed in trade the last few decades, though bottlenecks around infrastructure and other nontariff barriers still threaten its overall success. For more on perceptions of the AfCFTA among small business owners, consider reading, “Figure of the week: Perceptions of the AfCFTA among small enterprises in Nigeria.” For more on the challenges of implementing the AfCFTA, consult “Mitigating short-term adjustment costs: Preparing for the AfCFTA.”

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Thus far, it is true that only five countries in Eastern Africa have deposited their ratification of the AfCFTA. However, it is not the number of countries that counts but the fact that a regional block of contiguous countries—representing around three-quarters of regional GDP—is coalescing. From January 1, 2021, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda will all begin a reduction in their tariffs—starting with a linear reduction on 90 percent of tariff lines—leading to the elimination of tariffs on intra-regional imports over a period of five years (10 years in the case of countries classified by the United Nations as “least developed countries”); by the standards of regional trade agreements, this pace of liberalization will be quite rapid.

Figure 1. East African countries that have deposited the ratification of the AfCFTA with the African Union, September 2020

Source: TRALAC, 2020

One of the big boons for the region from the AfCFTA will be unblocking the trade barriers between Kenya and Ethiopia—the two largest economies in eastern Africa. Despite previous efforts to deepen economic relations, the volumes of bilateral trade between the two remain exceedingly low. In fact, total bilateral trade did not even reach $70 million in 2019, accounting for just 0.5 percent of Ethiopia’s total exports and 0.09 percent of Kenya’s, and consisting principally of food and live animals and some manufactured goods (Table 1).

Table 1. Bilateral Ethiopian/Kenyan trade, 2015-2019 (millions USD and %)

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics

The reasons for this neglect so far of these neighboring markets are fairly clear and go beyond the usual considerations of prevailing low per capita incomes. On the one hand, Ethiopia retains a fairly protectionist tariff policy, with high tariff peaks in particular sectors. But East African Community (EAC) members like Kenya (and not Ethiopia) also currently impose a high common external tariff on imports of Ethiopian goods in spite of the fact that both countries are members of regional grouping the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The reason is that Ethiopia has not yet acceded to the COMESA Free Trade Area, and, hence, relatively high tariffs are still imposed on bilateral trade. A similar problem impacts Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan trade with neighboring Bodog Poker Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—all are members of COMESA, yet the DRC has yet to accede to the FTA.

In principle, the implementation of the AfCFTA will pave the way for a rapid dismantling of such impediments to cross-border trade. Alongside the removal of tariff barriers, the AfCFTA will also focus attention on outstanding nontariff barriers (NTBs), an important step toward increased trade in the region as studies consistently show that NTBs constrain intra-regional trade as much as or even more than tariff barriers. East Africa has already made some progress in this area by, for example, installing 25 one-stop border posts, significantly reducing the time taken for goods to pass through customs. Accompanying regional programs to the AfCFTA, like the African Union’s Action Plan for Boosting Intra-Africa Trade (BIAT), should help accelerate the progress.

To be sure, East Africa will continue to face a number of challenges, including one shared by all countries on the continent: the need to rapidly finalize the tariff offers and outstanding negotiations on the rules of origin as well as the schedules on services trade offers. This shared challenge will be particularly tough as the negotiations in areas like services and those in phase II such as competition and intellectual property policies will inevitably be quite complex and highly technical.

A second challenge is peculiar to the East African Community. Of the six members, only three have so far ratified the AfCFTA. Because the regional block of the EAC is a customs union and, consequently, has a common external tariff (CET), without further ratification of the AfCFTA by the other three member states, problems for the integrity of the CET will arise. Rules of origin in principle may limit this problem, but their liberal application will lead to greater bureaucratic overheads and increase the risk of trade diversion (whereby trade is diverted from a more efficient exporter toward a less efficient one because of the differential tariffs being applied). This could thereby reduce the benefits derived from the AfCFTA. Thus, the greater the degree of harmonization of trade policy regimes within East Africa, the better, as this will facilitate deeper regional economic integration and pave the way for the eventual formation of an African-wide customs union, as contemplated under the AfCFTA agreement.

A third related question is how to manage future trade negotiations with third parties. Mindful of the consequences of a possible phasing out of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2025, Kenya has already entered into negotiations with the aim of establishing a free trade agreement with the United States. Eager to establish new trade deals after its departure from the European Union, the United Kingdom is also approaching a number of countries in the region. The Kenya-U.S. free trade agreement has been particularly controversial, but perhaps unduly so: In principle, there is nothing impeding countries in East Africa from negotiating with third parties. However, for the reasons explained above with respect to rules of origin, it is better to avoid totally disparate approaches to third-party negotiations.

In short, to move forward decisively with AfCFTA implementation, East Africa needs to be better integrated both internally and with the wider African economy. However, it would be preferable, wherever possible, that national policy is aligned and that the regional blocks move together. By reenergizing existing commitments, such as those attained through COMESA and the EAC, or those envisaged under the Tripartite Agreement between SADC, COMESA, and the EAC, the AfCFTA will provide the perfect framework to achieve that goal.

Andrew Mold is the Chief, Regional Integration and AfCFTA Cluster, Office for Eastern Africa – United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

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