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As the IMF turns 80, its core macroeconomic mission still deserves to be pursued and prioritized. The ongoing corrosion of globalization—reinforcing and being reinforced by geopolitical fragmentation—increases the vulnerability of all but the largest economies to foreign economic shocks, arbitrary swings in current account balances, interruptions in access to dollar liquidity, and accumulation of unsustainable debt. The increasing politicization of international finance and commerce by China, the European Union, and the United States has, however, put at risk the IMF’s ability to assist member countries and limit exploitative behavior by the governments of the three largest economies. For the sake of global economic stability, the IMF must get out in front of these dangers.

But stability will not be achieved by broadening the institution’s remit in an effort to pander to the changing whims of the largest shareholders, though that response might be understandable as a short-term political approach. Instead, the IMF must emphasize its unique role as a multilateral conditional lender and a truth teller regarding international debt and monetary issues. This role justifies greater operational independence, along the lines of central banks.

First, the broader and more discretionary the core IMF agenda, the greater the vulnerability of member countries to the geopolitical machinations of large-economy governments and the market flows they influence—which is precisely the threat that is currently on the rise.

Second, broad consistency in both substance and process in dealings with member countries is critical to the legitimacy of the IMF’s decision making, especially when members are most vulnerable. Technocratic evenhandedness is essential to successful buy-in by all members over the long run, even at the expense of some local support in short run. Inconsistencies of the sort imposed by the US on successive programs with Argentina or by the EU’s “troika” role in the euro area crisis are likely to grow over time.

Third, although there are other international forums to address inequality, climate, and other global issues, only the IMF can be a quasi-lender of last resort and speaker of truth to economic power on debt and monetary issues. The IMF cannot put up substantial funds for longer-term development and global public goods—or mobilize private financing on an ongoing basis—as others can. It should be ready to trade its seat in these discussions for greater institutional (not just de facto) independence in its core mission.

We are likely at the early stage of a cycle of cross-border distrust among the big three economies feeding demands for self-reliance and then demanding that smaller economies choose sides. The IMF may have only a brief window to build its institutional strength before it is pressured recurrently to choose sides between major shareholders.

More central than ever

The IMF’s core macroeconomic mission is to address member nations’ vulnerabilities that arise through cross-border commerce and financial flows and manage the international monetary system that underlies those flows. In their recent assessment, Floating Exchange Rates at Fifty, Douglas Irwin and Maurice Obstfeld point out that many of the problems the IMF and the Bretton Woods agreements were designed to address are inherent to international finance. These problems remain, even though the postwar fixed exchange rate system was abandoned in favor of today’s non-system:

• Exchange rate flexibility allows for monetary independence, yielding low inflation, but still does not prevent sudden stops and financial crises.
• Foreign economic shocks are still transmitted, often with substantial effects on smaller and lower-income countries.
• Capital flows often drive large rapid fluctuations in current account deficits.
• Interruptions in the availability of dollar liquidity to member economies have major repercussions, sometimes causing financial crises.
• Self-insurance efforts by large-surplus economies—whether through currency manipulation or replacement of imports with subsidies and tariffs—reduce global growth and impose adjustments during recessions on others.

As a result, there is no getting away from crisis lending with conditionality when member economies lose access to financial markets or suffer capital flight. The IMF’s ability to provide credible conditional adjustment financing, cushion groups of economies from common economic shocks, and restore access to market liquidity while restructuring international debt obligations is therefore more, not less, central than ever.

Only the IMF can provide this support on a multilateral, nearly universal basis. Any other institution or bilateral intergovernmental arrangement offering emergency financing will give that lender prejudicial influence over the borrowing country.

Benefits of surveillance

Surveillance of spillovers from the misguidedly excessive self-insurance policies of the largest economies, if consistently pursued, has a good shot at benefiting the global economy. Small achievable changes in the policies of those economies can aid many significantly, boost IMF credibility, and reduce risk. Similarly, by seeking to coordinate on cross-border debt and monetary issues, the IMF can generate benefit by influencing small changes in (or offsetting) behavior by lenders and reserve currency issuers. The more independent the IMF, the greater its legitimacy in its interaction with members.

The IMF must also call China, the EU, and the US to account through surveillance of their increasingly political and bullying control of access to their markets and its spillovers to the rest of the world. When China or the US conditions access to its payment systems or fossil fuel exports on national security goals, uncertainty reverberates through the rest of the world. Emerging markets’ growth prospects rise and fall as the big three economies arbitrarily determine who gets to produce their imports and who does not.

Let the other international economic and financial institutions—the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Group of 20 major economies, and so on—take their seats at every arguably relevant table and maximize their funding. The IMF is the only multilateral institution that deals directly with cross-border spillovers and macroeconomic volatility. The IMF is the only multilateral institution that can engage in macroeconomic conditionality with any hope of legitimacy and of changing borrower bodog online casino policies. The IMF is the only international entity that can force negotiation, albeit not necessarily rapid restructuring, by private sector investors. And the IMF is the only international organization that can chide the big three economies in precise terms with respect to their policies and not just ask for more contributions to public goods.

In surveillance, as in lending and other policy decisions, the EU, the US, and China have a common interest in making sure that each is criticized according to the same criteria, with the same frequency, and through the same public channels. The IMF should lock in on independent frankness rather than a mutual nonaggression pact over US fiscal deficits, Chinese exchange rates, and the EU’s ill-timed austerity, which served the world so poorly in the 2000s and 2010s.

Confronting new challenges

To better achieve its mandated goals and shore up its legitimacy, the IMF should aim for greater operational independence, akin to that of most central banks, while maintaining external evaluation of its competence by its members and having them set its overall goals. This is already taking place to some degree with respect to executive board approval of specific program decisions, for example. Continued progress will likely require narrowing down the IMF’s mandate to its core functions in exchange for more autonomy in specific policy decisions. Yielding some turf is what the Fund must do in terms of governance deals without compromising its evenhanded treatment of members.

Given the growing distrust among the US, the EU, and China, there should be a way forward to a mutual agreement to give the IMF that operational insulation. Securing such an agreement, with clear limits on what the IMF can address, would assure each of the big three economies that the other two will not be able to exercise control in situations that really matter to them. All macroeconomic institutions depend upon such a mutual recognition that it is better to yield control to be confident that there will be no abuse of power in turn. The absence of adequate insulation of IMF operations will likely splinter the global financial safety net, with divergent politicized conditionality; allocate access to funding unevenly, if not unfairly; and diminish stability of the international monetary system.

By focusing on its core mission, the IMF can adapt to the new global economic challenges arising from the fragmentation of geopolitics and the corrosion of globalization. Particularly worrisome is the largest economies’ increasing tendency to link access to their markets to various political loyalty tests or side payments. All manner of access is affected—exports to those countries, employment and technical knowledge in high-tech and other industries deemed “critical,” financial services and liquidity, foreign direct investment into and from those countries, and cross-border aid and lending. Intentional or not, this is the kind of national-security-driven fragmentation that the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions 80 years ago was aimed to prevent.

There are of course other imminent global challenges: climate change first and foremost, but also pandemics, food security, technology competition, trade wars, real wars, and the mass migrations all these induce. For member countries other than the big three, these challenges are likely to be experienced as recurring, increasingly frequent macroeconomic shocks. To the extent that these are simultaneous shocks across many member countries, the IMF should provide special facilities or lending to those members on common terms and insist that the big three economies change their behavior or offset the shocks.

Exercising best practice

For the majority of its members, then, it is essential that the IMF’s advice on macroeconomic policies to manage shocks and the vulnerabilities they expose follow best practice, and is consistent for all members, whatever the source of the shock. This is in the long-term best interest of the big three economies as well. But their governments are increasingly tempted either to insert their geopolitical preferences into IMF decisions or to shield their protectionist self-dealing from surveillance, despite the large impact on others.

The IMF can thus best serve its membership—including the big three—as a bulwark of technocratic multilateralism against politicized bullying in financial and other market access. A significant step in this direction would be greater IMF executive board ability to pass decisions by qualified majority voting—meaning restriction of the largest shareholder’s ability to exercise a veto—except on long-term or quasi-constitutional issues. This exchange of narrowness for the sake of operational independence would be helpful because the IMF would not be putting more US taxpayer funds at perceived risk or using them to serve mission creep.

Another step forward would be to adopt stricter and more consistent rules limiting IMF lending to economies at war, for example, with respect to Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and Ukraine today. There is, of course, a need for support and eventual reconstruction assistance, but if the IMF is seen as taking sides while conflict is ongoing, it may split the world economy even further. For the first time since the 1980s, military conflicts directly involving the major powers’ allies on opposite sides are occurring and are likely to continue. The IMF should forestall falling into this trap.

Beyond China, the US, and overrepresented EU economies, the IMF’s members, particularly low- and middle-income countries, should view these challenges as an opportunity to have more say on matters that affect them deeply. Enhanced operational independence would go hand in hand with continued IMF accountability to its board for evaluation of its policy execution and for goal setting. The Bretton Woods institutions must be more reliable in the coming years if the big three economies continue to retreat from rules-based globalization in favor of with-us-or-against-us exclusionary economics. For all the immediate pressure on the IMF, well intentioned or otherwise, to respond to its largest shareholders on any given issue, insulation from increasing geopolitical division would be more than prudent. Greater operational independence is the prerequisite for addressing any and all of the other global economic challenges as geopolitics corrodes globalization.

Adam Posen is president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Posen

To read the full article as published by the International Monetary Fund, click here.

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Worse, governments face bodog casino a conundrum. They are mindful that foreign subsidies can erode the market access won in previously negotiated multilateral and regional trade agreements. Yet, evidently, governments want to retain subsidies to tackle pressing national and global concerns, such as the COVID-19 pandemic response, decarbonisation, and the clean energy transition. What one government regards as a good subsidy and a legitimate exercise of national sovereignty can be viewed more negatively by trading partners.

Recriminations have been exacerbated by a lack of comparable and reliable information on subsidy schemes and awards. In this Hinrich Foundation sponsored report, authors Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz of the University of St. Gallen assembled an inventory of 18,137 corporate subsidies awarded by China, the EU, and the US since November 2008 to assess the scale of national and cross-border commerce affected by these trading powers’ subventions.

Given that trillions of US dollars of trade are involved, and the growing discord between governments over subsidy matters, the time is ripe for deliberation about the nexus between subsidies, market access, and the potential for enhanced international cooperation. The paper concludes by describing six specific goals of this needed policy dialogue on the trade-related aspects of corporate subsidies.

To read the full report from the Hinrich Foundation, please click here.

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Resilience360 is constantly looking for ways to provide its customers with actionable insights to help drive better business decisions and navigate impactful issues. To this effect, a customer survey was initiated to identify major trends and understand what actions companies are undertaking to minimize business disruption amid significant operational and regulatory turbulence.

The survey received 267 responses on questions that sought the views of supply chain professionals from across multiple industries and regions on the global challenges presented to them by the US-China trade war. The views presented here come from diverse industries, such as life sciences & healthcare, technology, automotive & mobility, engineering & manufacturing, consumer, retail, energy, chemicals, aerospace, and transportation & logistics.

To see the report click here

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Using information provided by automakers with assembly operations in North America, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has made an initial assessment of the short term, quantitative impact of the USMCA’s new automotive ROO. In order to obtain the maximum transition time to comply with the USMCA’s rules, each North American vehicle producer must provide to USTR a credible compliance plan, outlining how the company will qualify its North American light vehicle fleet under the agreement’s rules over the transition period. Nearly every automaker in North America has voluntarily provided USTR with information that could be used to develop such a plan, on a business confidential basis.

[To read the full report, click here.]

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• Congress reauthorized the Export-Import Bank in 2015, but since then the bank has faced limitations on its operations and is not fully staffed. Reauthorization will lapse in September 2019.
• Due to the operational and staffing constraints, U.S. export credit volumes are well below 2015 levels and are a small fraction of those issued by international official export credit agencies.
• Looking forward, policymakers need not only to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank, but also to remove the constraints on its ability to improve the international economic competitiveness of American exports.

Introduction

The Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) is the official export credit agency (ECA) of the United States. To that end, the Ex-Im Bank provides loans, guarantees, and other modes of financial assistance to help facilitate the export of American goods and services.

American Action Forum (AAF) writers have commented extensively on the Ex-Im Bank in the past. For an in-depth review of the Ex-Im Bank, please review AAF’s major research performed in 2014. In light of the September 2019 deadline to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank, an update to that analysis further illuminates the key role the bank plays.

Financial Analysis

Authorizations: Limitations and Types

In 2015 Congress re-authorized the Ex-Im Bank until September 2019, but in doing so it placed significant limitations on the ability of the bank to act. The program is limited to $1 billion per contract or other arrangement and capped at $10 billion per year.

To put this limitation in a broader context, in 2017 the United States exported $1.4 trillion in goods and services. The United States is the world’s third-largest exporter, topped only by China and the entirety of the European Union. It seems internally inconsistent to reauthorize the Ex-Im Bank, but then provide less than $5 billion to support U.S. exports – the de facto equivalent of not reauthorizing the bank at all.

This limit is not the only constraint. The Ex-Im Bank is unable to approve any transactions greater than $10 million in value since it lacks a quorum of three voting board members, a position it has remained in since 2015. In contrast, other ECAs, most notably the United Kingdom’s UKEF, do not operate with minimum or maximum contract or loan values. The Ex-Im Bank currently has four vacant board positions and has only one voting member, Jeffrey Gerrish, who acts as both chairman and president, as well as two ex officio non-voting members, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.

President Trump has nominated individuals to serve on the Ex-Im Bank’s Board of Directors, yet they await confirmation in the Senate. Given the lack of a quorum, as of Summer 2018, there is $43 billion in transactions awaiting approval that Ex-Im estimates could support 250,000 U.S. jobs.

The Ex-Im Bank offers three financial products: direct loans, loan and working capital guarantees, and export credit insurance. All obligations carry the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.

In 2013 fixed-rate direct loans made up one-fourth of authorizations by dollar amount in FY 2013. These fixed-rate loans are offered directly to foreign buyers of American exports and typically cover up to 85 percent of the contract value. By comparison, in 2017 direct loans constituted a statistically negligible proportion of Ex-Im Bank authorizations by product. Direct loans are one of the most powerful tools available to the Ex-Im Bank, providing foreign credit-worthy international buyers with inexpensive term financing that may not otherwise have been available.

Despite its name, the Ex-Im Bank now functions almost entirely as an insurer. This necessarily decreases its ability to support American manufacturers in those targeted circumstances when private markets are unable to support the financing projects.

Export-Import Bank Authorizations by Program (Millions USD)

As can be seen above, since 2014 there has been some shift in the mandated programs that the Ex-Im Bank has pursued, most notably dropping an explicit Minority & Women Owned platform. Perhaps the most striking changes, however, can be seen in the increased proportion of authorizations supporting small businesses.

Number and Value (Millions USD) of Authorizations, Small Business and Total

One of the major criticisms of the Ex-Im Bank is that in the past financing has largely supported a few industry titans. As can be seen above, although the total value of authorizations has vastly decreased, authorizations to small businesses now for the first time make up over 50 percent of the total. That said, in raw figures the actual financial support lent to small businesses is less than half the support provided in 2013, when small business made up only 19 percent of the total value of authorizations.

Exposure

Little has changed, however, in the Ex-Im Bank’s exposure portfolio.

International Competitiveness

Although viewing the changes of the last year by relation to the Ex-Im Bank itself are illuminating, there is more value in comparing the Ex-Im Bank to the performance of other international ECAs. More than 60 countries outside the United States have ECAs.

AAF has written at length on the role of the Ex-Im Bank as a necessary evil. The argument is simple: Although ECAs can be misused to provide excess subsidies toward mercantilist ends, until the rest of the world shutters their ECAS, the United States should continue the Ex-Im Bank in order to support the competitiveness of U.S. exporters.

Medium & Long-term Official Export Credit Volumes (Billions USD)

*Excludes Russian ECA, EXIAR

As can be seen above, although global trends over the last four years indicate a decrease in reliance on ECA export credit, the trend appears to be reversing, most notably in China and the BRICs more generally. Setting aside these increases, however, by sheer volume other countries dwarf U.S. credit support, with China funneling $40 billion to support Chinese industries.

Conclusions

Firms face risks and challenges when engaging in exports, and the Ex-Im Bank has been an important tool in helping U.S. corporations compete overseas. Beyond being important for the U.S. economy on the international stage, the Ex-Im Bank’s work benefits more than just the corporations directly involved in export sales. Implicit in Ex-Im Bank financing is an economic transaction that involves and benefits the seller, but also its workers, suppliers, and equity investors.

A truly free market would rely on private export financing. Regrettably, most developed countries support their export industries. The Ex-Im Bank is therefore a necessity – and if it is a necessity, then it is in U.S. interests to make it as effective as possible.

The Ex-Im Bank is certainly in need of reform. AAF has called for these in the past, and the case remains the same. Congress Bodog Poker should seek the elimination of unneeded taxpayer backing and financing authority, the elimination of preferential and quota approaches to industries and firms, an increase in transparency, and improvements in how the bank selects projects to finance.

More pressing, however, is the need to staff and fund the Ex-Im Bank appropriately. It has been hobbled without a quorum on its board, and recent reform efforts have vastly decreased its ability to operate. The current mandate expires in September 2019, and, if 2015 is any indication, re-authorization will once again be a contentious political issue.

[To read the original column, click here.]

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The long-run decline in the income share of labour in GDP is one of the most debated macroeconomic trends in recent years. The trend is widely shared across industries and countries (Dao et al. 2017). At the same time, ‘factorless income’ is on the rise. This is the residual that remains after subtracting measured payments to labour and imputed cost of capital from GDP (Karabarbounis and Neiman 2018). Some interpret this trend as an increase in economic profits (Barkai 2017). Others stress that it reflects the increased importance of intangible capital that is currently unmeasured in national accounts statistics (Corrado et al. 2005, Haskel and Westlake 2017).

The need for a global value chain perspective

So far, the discussion on factor incomes is around shares in GDP of single countries. In a recent paper (Chen et al. 2018) we argue for the need for a multi-country approach. In today’s world, goods are typically produced and distributed in intricate networks with multiple stages of production, referred to as global value chain (GVC) production. So-called factory-free goods producers like Apple provide an iconic example. They sell and organise the production of manufacturing goods without being engaged in the actual fabrication process (Bernard and Fort 2015, Fontagné and Harrison 2017). They provide software and designs, market knowledge, intellectual property, systems integration and cost management, as well as a strong brand name. Yet, we have no way to infer the income that accrues to these ‘intangibles’ in national accounts statistics as their use cannot be uniquely attributed to a geographically location. In contrast, tangible assets (such as machinery) and labour have a physical presence and their use is recorded in the national account statistics of the countries where they are located. There is thus a need to complement factor income studies at the country level by study of factor incomes in global value chains that cross borders.

How to measure intangible income in global value chains

To fix ideas, consider a firm in country 1 selling shoes. This requires two activities, fabrication and marketing. Both activities require firm-specific knowledge B (e.g. market intelligence on consumers’ preferences for particular types of shoes). The fabrication stage is offshored to country 2. In this case the (vertically integrated) production function is Y=F(K1, L1, K2, L2, B). To infer payments to intangible assets B in this GVC we sum payments to all labour L and tangible capital K used in country 1 and country 2, and subtract this from the sales value of the shoes.This is a multi-country extension of the method to calculate ‘factorless income’ in national GDP as outlined in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018).

The main measurement challenge is the fact that GVCs are not directly observable in the data and need to be inferred from information on the linkages between the various stages of production. We will build upon the approach introduced by Los et al. (2015). They showed how one can derive the value-added contributions of country-industries in a given GVC using global input-output tables. Information from World Input-Output Database (2016 release, see Timmer et al. 2016) is combined with information on wages and tangible capital stocks in each country-industry. Crucially, we use an ex ante rate of return to impute the income to tangible capital such that a residual remains.

Increasing share of intangible income in GVCs

We study factor income distribution in the global production of manufacturing goods. We find a large decline in the income share of labour, in particular in the period 2000-07 (see Figure 1). The share of tangible capital remains more or less constant such that the income share of intangibles (measured as a residual) increased rapidly (by 4 percentage points). These trends did not continue after the global financial crisis (2008-2014), but also did not reverse, suggestive of a one-off shift in the factor income distribution in the early 2000s (see Figure 1). In our paper, we discuss robustness of these results to issues like missing information on land and inventories, as well as choice for (ex-ante) rate of return to tangible assets. We argue that the level of intangible income might be overestimated, but the trend over time is likely to be underestimated, if anything. We conclude, along the lines of Corrado et al. (2005), that the current system of national accounts is likely to still miss out on a large range of intangible assets.

Bodog Poker Increasing intangible income share in global value chains

Notes: Income share of labour, tangible and intangible capital in worldwide output of final manufacturing products (in percentages).  Based on Table 1 in Chen et al. (2018). 

We repeated the analysis for detailed manufacturing product groups and found sizeable variation in intangible income shares. This invited further investigation into possible drivers. In previous work we documented that the process of international fragmentation was fast in the production of electronics (including computers), electrical machinery and metal products in the 2000s. But production of textiles and furniture was already quite fragmented before 2000 (Timmer et al., 2016). We correlate our estimates of changes in intangible income shares with the changes in international fragmentation across 19 manufacturing product groups for the period 2000-08. Figure 2 shows that there is a clear positive correlation (0.52).

Figure 2 Correlation between change in intangible income shares in GVCs and international production fragmentation

Notes: Fragmentation index from Timmer et al. (2016) based on all imports made in the GVC (2008 as ratio of 2000 level). Observations for nineteen manufacturing product groups, highlighting textiles (tex), electrical machinery (elec) electronics and computers (comp) and fabricated metal products (fab met).

Implications

Taken together, our results Bodog Poker suggest that the 2000s should be seen as an exceptional period in the global economy: multinational firms benefitted from reduced labour costs through offshoring, while capitalising on existing firm-specific intangibles, such as brand names, at little marginal cost. More generally, we conclude that a global value chain perspective is helpful for better understanding the role of intangibles in today’s economy.

References

Barkai, S (2017), “Declining Labor and Capital Shares”, job market paper, University of Chicago.

Bernard, A B and T C Fort (2015), “Factoryless Goods Producing Firms”, American Economic Review 105(5): 518-23.

Chen, W, B Los and M P Timmer (2018), “Factor Incomes in Global Value Chains: The Role of Intangibles”, NBER Working paper 25242, forthcoming in C Corrado, J Miranda, J Haskel, and D Sichel (eds), Measuring and Accounting for Innovation in the 21st Century, NBER

Corrado, C, C Hulten and D Sichel (2005), “Measuring capital and technology: An expanded framework”, in C Corrado, J Haltiwanger and D Sichel (eds), Measuring Capital in the New Economy, NBER, pp. 114 – 46.

Corrado, C, J Haskel, C Jona-Lasinio and M Iommi (2013), “Innovation and intangible investment in Europe, Japan, and the United States,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 29(2): 261-286.

Dao, M C, M Das, Z Koczan and W Lian (2017), “Why is labor receiving a smaller share of global income? Theory and empirical evidence”, IMF Working paper WP/17/169.

Fontagné, L and A Harrison (eds) (2017), The Factory-Free Economy. Outsourcing, Servitization, and the Future of Industry, Oxford University Press

Guvenen, F, R J Mataloni, Jr, D G Rassier and K J Ruhl (2017). “Offshore Profit Shifting and Domestic Productivity Measurement,” NBER Working Paper 23324.

Haskel, J and S Westlake (2017), Capitalism without capital: the rise of the intangible economy, Princeton University Press.

Karabarbounis, L and B Neiman (2018), “Accounting for Factorless Income”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 33.

Los, B, M P Timmer and G J de Vries (2015), “How global are global value chains? A new approach to measure international fragmentation”, Journal of Regional Science 55: 66-92.

Timmer, M P, A A Erumban, B Los, R Stehrer and G J de Vries (2014), “Slicing up global value chains”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 28: 99–118.

Timmer, M P, B Los, R Stehrer and G J de Vries (2016). “An Anatomy of the Global Trade Slowdown based on the WIOD 2016 Release”, GGDC research memorandum number 162, University of Groningen.

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Just to be clear on the agenda here, the alleged theft takes three forms. The first is what passes for actual theft. It is when a Chinese company, possibly with help from the Chinese government, literally takes technology from a US company. This can happen, for example, if they infiltrate its internal computer system.

While this is undeniably a bad practice, it is not unique to Chinese companies. In fact, many US companies also engage in such practices. Uber famously agreed to pay Waymo $245 million for stealing some of its software for self-driving cars. It would be hard to know if China’s companies are more guilty in this area than anyone else, but we can agree it is a bad practice that should be stopped.

The second area is forced technology transfers. This is when China requires that US companies, like Boeing or GE, take on a Chinese partner when they set up operations in China. This allows the Chinese companies to gain expertise in the technology used by US companies and then become potential competitors.

The third type of alleged theft is when Chinese companies don’t honor the patents or copyrights of US corporations. For example, this would be the use of software developed by Microsoft without paying it a licensing fee. It could also mean making generic versions of drugs developed by Pfizer or Merck without paying them royalties. And, it means making unauthorized copies of music and movies copyrighted by Disney and Time-Warner.

Our elites are hoping Trump can clamp down on these practices by Chinese companies and better protect the intellectual property of US corporations. But why should this be a concern for the non-elites, as in everyone below the top 5 percent or so of the income distribution?

Let’s start with the issue of forced technology transfer. Boeing is upset, because under the current rules, if they set up shop in China, they are going to have to partner with a company that is likely to be a competitor a few years down the road.

Suppose tough-talking Trump forces China to accept rules that prohibit these mandated partnerships. Under his new deal, if Boeing wants to set up shop in China it just starts building a new facility, no partner needed.

Standard economics would tell us that this will make Boeing and other US companies more likely to set up operations in China. This is obviously good from the standpoint of Boeing’s profits, but why exactly should US workers be happy about a change that will facilitate the outsourcing of US jobs?

There is a similar question about making China pay more money to US corporations for software, pharmaceuticals, and movies and music. In a standard trade model, we would expect that increased payments for intellectual property would mean a rise in the demand for dollars. That means the dollar would rise in value against the Chinese yuan.

With a higher valued dollar, US exports would be more expensive to people living in China, meaning we export less. Chinese imports are also cheaper for people living in the United States, meaning we would import more. The net effect is a larger trade deficit on everything other than intellectual products, which is bad news for those of us who don’t own lots of stock in Pfizer and Merck or work in designing software or developing drugs.

In the wake of the 2018 elections, there were a number of articles that pointed out that the left-behind regions of the country seemed to be the strongest supporters for Trump and the Republican Party. The argument was that the people in these areas are not part of the dynamic sectors of the US economy and they are lashing out by supporting the racist, xenophobic agenda being pushed by Trump. There were also some pieces that offered suggestions on how the rest of us could help the left-behinds.

Helping the regions that are not sharing in the economy’s growth is a long and complex story, but part of the solution would be to design trade policy to make their situation better, not worse, which is what our media is encouraging Trump to do. It is truly incredible that most of the advocates of this trade policy do not even seem to understand the class nature of their Bodog Poker agenda, equating the interests of a tiny group at the top with the interests of the whole country.

It sure looks like Trump is not the only one who doesn’t know what he is doing when it comes to trade.

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