• Global trade growth is forecast to grow at 2.8% per year through 2032—less than the 3.1% annual increase forecast for global GDP over the same period.
• Intra-regional trade in North America is forecast to grow by $466 billion, due to a combination of the US Mexico Canada Agreement and new US industrial policies.
• Southeast Asia and India stand to benefit from slowing trade between China and the West. ASEAN global trade will grow by $1.2 trillion and India’s will expand by over $390 billion.
• To stay competitive, companies should strengthen their geopolitical decision-making to help withstand supply chain disruptions, enhance their ability to respond to price volatility and inflation, adopt “fractal innovation,” and turbo-charge their risk and cybersecurity capabilities.

As the global economy adjusts to persistent economic and geopolitical pressures and disruptions, the familiar routes that defined the world trade map are being redrawn and trade blocs are playing a greater role. In addition, overall global trade is growing at a slower rate than the world economy, a fundamental shift away from the trend of trade-led globalism that has been prevalent since the end of the Cold War. World trade in goods is forecast to grow at 2.8% per year, on average, through 2032, compared with an estimated 3.1% growth rate for global GDP in the same period, according to a new BCG analysis. 

Stronghold North America

The United States, Canada, and Mexico will benefit from the US Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA), as US trade with its neighbors is forecast to grow by $466 billion in the coming decade. Faced with a combination of economic pressure and national security concerns, the Biden administration has adopted a new focus on industrial policies with a more protectionist bent, such as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), CHIPS Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The result is a more influential regional manufacturing footprint with direct investment into strategic industries.

China Trade Dynamics

Persistent trade tensions and growing trade barriers are continuing to impact trade between China and the West. The projected fall-off in US-China trade is one of the most significant developments in the updated global trade map, with 2032 trade value forecast to fall $197 billion from its 2022 level. This is more than three times the $63 billion contraction forecast one year ago in a similar BCG analysis. The change is due to China’s slowing GDP growth in 2022, combined with other factors. China’s trade with the EU will continue to grow, but more slowly than the global average.

ASEAN Trade Growth

Southeast Asian nations are among the biggest winners in the new world trade order. Cumulative ASEAN trade is forecast to grow $1.2 trillion in the next ten years due to the region’s emergence as a key destination for companies seeking to decrease their dependence on China for manufacturing by adopting a “China + 1” diversification strategy. ASEAN is an attractive China alternative because of its young and dynamic population, economic diversity, and generally neutral stance among geopolitical blocs.

India Ignition

Like the ASEAN nations, India is benefiting from a low-cost structure and capable workforce to rise as a major domestic market and “China + 1” destination for global manufacturing. India’s large market and particular strength in industries such as chemicals, consumer electronics, and pharmaceuticals are attractive for companies seeking to diversify their global footprint. Expanding trade connectivity, as evidenced by new and under-negotiation trade agreements, are helping to increase India’s projected external trade in the next ten years by $393 billion, including $180 billion with the US and EU and $124 billion with China.

Russia Trade Divergence

The break in Russia’s trade with the EU and the US caused by the war in Ukraine and the resulting sanctions and reduced European dependence on Russian energy will influence Russia’s trading profile at least so long as the stalemate in Ukraine continues. These conditions have not led to the elimination of Russian trade, but rather its redirection elsewhere. For example, much of the trade with the EU has shifted to Russia’s fellow BRICs countries: Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. While Russia’s trade with the EU in 2032 will fall by $222 billion, compared with 2022, its trade with China and India will grow by $134 billion and $26 billion, respectively.

Multiple Challenges Are Inhibiting Trade Growth

The cooler trade climate is part of a reordering of the world trade map that is taking shape in the wake of the recent twin shocks of the pandemic and the Ukraine war, accompanied by a rise in trade protectionism and a falloff in globalization sentiment. A variety of factors are contributing to reshoring of manufacturing around the world, with a predictable dampening effect on global trade. These include:

• Industrial policy. A leading element is the rise of national policies designed to support domestic industry and job creation. Policies such as the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), with its “Buy American” incentives, reflect governments prioritizing national interests over multilateral, rules-based organizations, such as the World Trade Organization. Similar policies can be seen in the European Union and other parts of the world.
• Labor economics. Companies in some regions are taking advantage of capable, low-cost labor as well as the availability of new technologies that have enabled them to reshore or near-shore manufacturing operations. For example, the cost gap between US and Chinese labor has narrowed as labor costs in China have risen on a relative basis, while locations such as Mexico, Southeast Asia, India, and Latin America have become competitive with China on labor costs.
• Supply chain stability. Faced with risks of disruption and overreliance on extended and brittle supply chains, companies are seeking to diversify their global manufacturing and sourcing networks by moving to markets with lower geopolitical risk, reliable infrastructure and, in some cases, proximity to end-markets.
• Environmental factors. Global and domestic pressure on industry to decarbonize operations has led companies to focus on geographies with clean energy supplies, reduce carbon footprints, and increase overall sustainability. Policies such as the EU’s Green Deal are incentivizing European companies to use more low-carbon energy sources by locating manufacturing closer to home.

As Cooperation Cools, Regional Trade Blocs Rise

A characteristic of the new world trade order will be the growing prominence of trade blocs—especially North America, the EU, ASEAN countries, and potentially the BRICs—as production moves closer to end markets. Blocs are attractive for countries seeking to limit geopolitical friction by trading with entities seen as “friendly” partners, especially where trade agreements exist, such as the EU, USMCA, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement.

Under the Biden administration, the US has adopted new industrial policies, with legislation that encourages direct investment in strategic industries such as semiconductors, domestic manufacturing, renewable energy production, and electric vehicle infrastructure and battery technology.

Combined with the USMCA, the net effect of these industrial policies is to pull investment back to the US—especially for industries deemed critical to national security, like computer chips. Trade between the US and Mexico stands to grow by an impressive $300 billion over the coming decade. The Inflation Reduction Act, for example, goes beyond familiar “Buy American” incentives to encompass a “Buy North American” approach, such as extending the $7,500 credit for electric vehicles with powertrains or battery technology made in the US, Canada, or Mexico.

Among the biggest impacts of increasing emphasis on resilience through diversification of global markets and supply chains will be a continued fall-off in trade between China and the United States, as companies seek trading partners and manufacturing locations to rebalance their global risk exposure.

As the world’s leading exporter of manufactured goods, China itself is resilient. Trade that stops flowing between China and the West will simply move elsewhere. Notable beneficiaries of reduced US concentration in China will be the ASEAN countries and India as bodog sportsbook review many companies move manufacturing to these economies, both to reduce global supply chain risks and to access new markets. As a result, trade between ASEAN and China will grow a remarkable $616 billion in the coming decade—and trade between ASEAN and both the US and Japan will increase by more than $200 billion. India is forecast to achieve 6.3% average annual trade growth, partly because of this rebalancing of China trade.

“No-Regrets” Moves to Improve Preparedness and Competitiveness

As trade frictions grow and trust in multilateralism weakens, the global market is becoming more fragmented. The more cooperative trade environment that enabled companies to build global supply chains in recent decades is quickly being replaced by a more uncertain world characterized by a mix of smaller regional and local supply chains. In the short term, companies should take several steps to adapt.

• Strengthen geopolitical decision-making capability to enable supply chains to withstand disruptions. Companies can improve resilience by investing in digital tools, such as artificial intelligence, to enable agile decision-making and adaptability. Companies can also take steps such as building buffer inventories of essential commodities, prequalifying alternative suppliers, and planning contingencies for at-risk supply inputs.
• Enhance ability to respond to price volatility and inflation. Strategies can include building resilient pricing, such as by sensing demand shifts earlier and developing dynamic pricing capabilities, strengthening customer relationships and contracting flexibility, and exploring new monetization models, including “as-a-service” models and outcome-based pricing.
• Become more flexible and adaptable by adopting “fractal innovation.” To help meet the challenges of a fragmenting global trading landscape, companies can address differentiated needs of local customers by adopting a “customer-in” approach and embracing a new way of designing products—something we call fractal innovation.
• Turbo-charge risk and cybersecurity capabilities. Companies should identify security gaps, prioritize security projects and tools, and consider approaches such as a cyber tool health index, zero-based budgeting, and cyber risk quantification to develop a custom cybersecurity roadmap.

Forces that have had a dampening effect on global trade in recent years will continue to be a factor in the world economy and corporate decision-making. Companies that rely on global supply chains must recognize that the challenges afflicting global trade are here to stay, and should continue to diversify their networks and build resilience.

To read the full article as it appears on BCG X, click here.

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Since the beginning of the pandemic, lockdowns and other containment measures as well as their effects on certain sectors of the US economy, have been the focus of much analysis. Millions of jobs were lost as businesses that focused on, for example, the retail trade and tourism, shuttered.

One less examined aspect of the pandemic has been the effect of declining external aggregate demand on American industries and sectors that depend on exports. Not only were these businesses hurt by containment measures and other effects of the virus in the United States itself, they have faced reduced demand for their goods and services from the rest of the world.

Many low- and middle-income countries have experienced more severe economic crises due to the pandemic than high-income countries, and thus have imported less from countries like the United States. This has led to the temporary loss of millions of export-related jobs in the United States.

This fall-off in demand also means that rate of the return of American export-related jobs — jobs both directly and indirectly involved in the production of exports — is dependent upon a broad economic recovery in the rest of the world.

Special Drawing Rights, which are cost-free for the United States, can help boost global demand for American exports by improving the financial position of low- and middle-income countries. Increased demand for American exports would bring back these export-related jobs back more quickly, as well as put the US economy on a path to creating more export-related jobs over the next five years. The US economy is still down about 6.5 million jobs from its pre-pandemic level of employment, and 9.2 million below the pre-pandemic trend.

To read the full report from the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR), please click here. 

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1. Eliminate taxes on imports used by U.S. workers 

In 2019, 62.1 percent of imports were either intermediate goods like motor vehicle parts or capital goods like machinery that are used by U.S. workers to produce goods.^[2] Eliminating taxes on these imports would support American manufacturing jobs, encourage companies to locate in the United States instead of abroad, and boost exports.

For example, in 2019 the United States collected more than $2.1 billion in taxes on imported motor vehicles parts.^[3] Eliminating tariffs on motor vehicle parts would make the United States more attractive to car manufacturers looking for the best location to assemble vehicles.

Figure 1: 2019 Imports by Category

2. Eliminate taxes on imported shoes and clothing worn by U.S. workers

The Biden administration has pointed out that every consumer is also a worker: “The President knows that trade policy should respect the dignity of work and value Americans as workers and wage-earners, not only as consumers.”^[4] 

The inverse is also true: every worker is a consumer, and in 2019 American workers paid an average 14 percent tax on imported shoes and clothing.^[5] 

Shoe and clothing tariffs pit a small number of workers who benefit from tariffs against the vast majority of the American workforce. For every worker in the apparel and footwear manufacturing industry, 1,258 Americans working in other industries pay inflated prices for shoes and clothing as a result of double-digit import taxes.^[6] 

Figure 2: Number of U.S. Jobs

Tariffs pit workers against one another even within the shoe and clothing industry. Jobs in shoe and clothing stores outnumber jobs in shoe and clothing factories by nearly 9-to-1.^[7] That doesn’t even count the millions of Americans who sell clothing and shoes at large department stores and sporting good stores.

Figure 3: U.S. Shoe and Clothing Jobs

The federal government collected $15.8 billion from taxes on imported shoes and clothing in 2019, the equivalent of $135,776 for every production worker in the apparel and footwear industry. On average, apparel and footwear manufacturing workers earned less than $44,000.^[8] Compared to the $15.8 billion cost of tariffs, it would cost taxpayers less to pay every person in the industry three times their current salary.

Figure 4: Average Annual Wage vs. Tariff Cost Per Shoe and Clothing Manufacturing Worker

The shoe and footwear industry includes more than just manufacturing and retail workers. More than 28,000 American fashion designers earned an average of $73,790 in 2019 creating new clothing and footwear. Millions more work in the transportation and logistics industries that help deliver such items to consumers.^[9] Eliminating tariffs on shoes and clothing would directly boost employment in these sectors. Nationwide, additional jobs would be created indirectly as the dollars American workers save as a result of lower-cost shoes and clothing were spent on other goods and services or invested in the U.S. economy.

3. Negotiate job-creating trade agreements 

The United States has been falling behind the rest of the world in negotiating trade agreements, and as a result U.S. exporters face higher tariffs than do most of their foreign competitors. As of 2016, U.S. exporters faced an average foreign tariff of 4.9 percent, ranking in the bottom ten of 136 countries ranked by the World Economic Forum.^[10] 

The United States has failed to implement a single new market-opening trade agreement since 2012. Since our last trade agreement took effect, other countries have signed 70 regional trade agreements, notably including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).^[11] The Trump administration’s U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)  is not included, since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had already eliminated most tariffs between the three countries.

bodog online casino To illustrate why the failure to negotiate new trade agreements has been costly for American workers, consider the automobile industry. Cars exported from the United States to the European Union (EU) face a 10 percent tariff. But because Canada and Mexico have managed to negotiate trade agreements with the EU, cars exported from Canada and Mexico will enter tariff-free once those agreements are fully phased in.^[12] 

Figure 5: EU Automobile Tariffs

This gives Canada and Mexico a big advantage over the United States in attracting investment from carmakers that want to export to the EU. For example, when BMW announced a new factory in Mexico in 2014, the company said, “The large number of international free trade agreements – within the NAFTA area, with the European Union and the MERCOSUR member states, for example – was a decisive factor in the choice of location.” When Audi chose to locate a new factory in Mexico instead of Tennessee in 2012, the company’s chairman said, “Good infrastructure, competitive cost structures and existing free trade agreements played a significant role in the choice of Mexico.”^[13] 

If trade negotiators from Canada and Mexico have been able to negotiate tariff-free access to the EU (or close to it), what’s keeping U.S. negotiators from doing the same thing? Unfortunately, the Biden administration has suggested it will put trade negotiations on the back burner. According to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, “President Biden has been clear that he will not sign any new free trade agreements before the U.S. makes major investments in American workers and our infrastructure. Our economic recovery at home must be our top priority.”^[14] 

This is the wrong approach. Negotiating good trade agreements and making economic recovery the top priority is not an either-or proposition. Pursuit of good trade agreements would create good new jobs for American workers and boost the U.S. economy.

4. Follow a trade policy designed to benefit more than just unionized workers

According to the Biden administration, “President Biden’s trade agenda will support all workers.”^[15] 

That is much better than pursuing a trade agenda that focuses on the 5.5 percent of the private-sector workforce who belong to labor unions without regard to the other 94.5 percent.^[16] 

Figure 6: Union Membership (Millions)

The goal of trade agreements should be to benefit workers by reducing barriers to international trade and investment, as opposed to imposing new multinational labor regulations or minimum wage provisions.

However, if labor provisions are to be included in future trade agreements, the Biden administration should consider guaranteeing every worker’s right to work without joining a labor union. Manufacturing workers in particular could benefit from this labor policy. In recent years, manufacturing employment in states with right-to-work laws has increased more than twice as much as in states that do not have such laws.^[17] 

Figure 7: Manufacturing Employment Change, 2010-2019

The White House has said that our trade and international economic policies must serve all Americans.^[18] If the Biden administration is serious about that, a good start would be for it to listen to Americans, who believe trade is more of an opportunity than a threat by a 4.4-to-1 margin.^[19] 

Figure 8: What Foreign Trade Means to the United States

According to U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, “i think that for a very long time our trade policies were based on an assumption that the more we traded with each other and the more liberalized our trade, the more peace and prosperity there would be.”^[20] For the most part, that’s exactly what happened.

The problem facing American workers is too little trade liberalization, not too much. Workers continue to be harmed by U.S. taxes on imported inputs that they need to do their jobs, by import taxes that increase the cost of their shoes and clothing, and by the government’s failure to implement new market-opening trade agreements. A truly worker-centered trade policy should correct these shortcomings.

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Rights advocates are increasingly urging U.S. trade negotiators to include new binding and sanctionable provisions that would protect human rights, women’s rights, and gender equality. Their efforts are understandable. Trade agreements have significant advantages as a process for advancing global rights. Even though Congress and the Executive incorporate global environmental standards and labor rights in U.S. trade agreements, they have refused to incorporate gender rights and broader human rights. The rationale behind the United States’ disparate treatment of rights in trade has received almost no scholarly attention. That is a mistake.

Using labor rights as a case study, this Article discerns the rationale for incorporating rights in U.S. trade policy. Properly understood, U.S. policymakers incorporate some rights in U.S. trade agreements because they view those rights as critical to protecting national industries and citizens Bodog Poker from unfair trade conditions. Efforts to incorporate rights as the ends rather than the means to trade policy accordingly fail to resonate with policymakers. Those efforts also fail to appreciate the significant policy drawbacks of coupling trade law and international rights law, such as conflicts between international law and U.S. federal and state laws, and challenges to domestic processes in the United States and abroad. Nevertheless, there are alternative ways that the United States may protect global rights while preserving the sanctity of both regimes.

To view the original paper on the Social Science Research Network, please click here

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The TAAF program targets those firms impacted specifically by import competition and not by other forms of trade or market disruption. Other federal programs provide assistance for other forms of economic disruption. A 2019 GAO analysis identifies multiple potential causes of disruption, including trade agreements, defense or energy policy changes, emerging technologies, and shifting business models. The report provides an inventory of economic adjustment assistance programs that respond to economic disruptions, including TAAF. While TAAF is solely focused on assisting businesses, other programs target a mix of individuals, businesses, communities, and other beneficiaries (e.g., coal communities, health tax credits).

TAAF is not intended to address all potential disruptions that confront firms involved in international trade. Such disruptions can include an economic downturn that leads to suppressed demand by foreign customers; increased costs or lowered demand due to tariffs and trade disputes; or supply chains affected by protectionism or other policy shifts. In the 116th Congress, some Members have introduced bills to expand the scope of TAAF to address additional trade related elements of economic disruption. For example, one bill introduced (H.R. 6124) would extend TAAF to cover firms whose exports declined because of foreign retaliatory measures adopted in repose to tariffs imposed under the Trump Administration. Other proposals focus on the TAA for Workers program to assist workers whose jobs are eliminated through automation (see S. 3034) or those adversely affected by disruptions in global supply chains from the Coronavirus Disease (COVID–19) (see H.R. 6205).

Trade adjustment assistance can play a role in helping companies adapt to a changing environment. Enabling firms to adopt greater digitization or automation, target new markets, or develop business continuity plans to increase resilience may lead the firm to need a different workforce with different skills. Upskilling the workforce of a single TAAF company or helping that firm recruit and possibly relocate new trained workers could be part of a business recovery plan under TAAF. However, broader government or private sector programs are likely needed to address broader educational and training needs of entire industries or sectors.

Issues for Congress

As Congress considers trade liberalization agreements and ongoing trade negotiations, it may wish to further examine the TAAF in light of the current debate of its effectiveness and the impact of international trade on the U.S. economy and recent trends. An implementing bill for a new trade agreement and upcoming expiration of TPA may provide Congress an opportunity to reexamine and potentially revise the TAA programs. In addition to adjusting appropriations levels, Congress could examine changing the current program or EDA’s administration of it.

Potential options for Congress to consider on TAAF may include:

• determining if the program should be limited to assisting firms who face competition from imports or if it should be expanded to assist firms who face increased costs or decreased demand due to changes in domestic or foreign tariffs or other trade-related policies;
• determining if current funding levels are appropriate;  further refining the performance metrics to measure the employment or economic impact of TAAF programs;
• placing a stronger emphasis on assisting SMEs to utilize technology to improve operational efficiency, expand into new markets, including through e-commerce, and take fuller advantage of an increasingly digitally driven economy;
• facilitating partnerships with large multinational companies to support SME integration into GVCs;
• facilitating partnerships with educational institutions or programs to train workers for digital or other skills needed by the TAAF firm or other employers;
• aligning Federal programs by linking qualified workers of a TAAF firm with the TAA for Workers program under the Department of Labor; or
• consolidating or streamlining TAAF with other federal programs that assist troubled SMEs such as those operated by the Small Business Administration (SBA).

While TAAF has traditionally focused on firms who can demonstrate they have been harmed by import competition, Congress could also explore the feasibility and possible steps that could or should be taken before firms are harmed. Congress might consider requiring EDA to conduct outreach and education on pending trade liberalization agreements. The analysis of each proposed trade agreement by the USITC may help identify industries or regions as potentially vulnerable or likely to experience a negative impact as a result of proposed trade liberalizing measures. For example, the USITC economic impact assessment report for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), before the United States withdrew from the negotiations, contended that U.S. demand for business services would outstrip supply, presenting opportunities for growth, while employment could decline in certain manufacturing and transport sectors. Congress could, for example, consider requiring EDA to prepare a capacity building plan to assist those industries or regions that the USITC identifies as potentially vulnerable or likely to experience a negative impact from implementation of a proposed trade agreement.

To download the full report, please click here. 

Rachel F. Fefer is an Analyst in International Trade and Finance at the Congressional Research Service. 

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COVID-19 will bring many changes, but whether the change is for the better or worse is indeterminate. What we do next will depend on how well we analyze the causes of the current health and economic disaster; whether we correctly understand the roles played by different policies, values and countries; and how honest we are in setting out alternatives and pursuing those that can create a viable, fair and humane system for the future. As we start to rebuild we need a coherent understanding of why the U.S. economy—the largest in the world, with enormous wealth—left its working people so vulnerable to such harsh health and economic fallout. One important aspect of this analysis, and the purpose of this report, is to understand the role of trade and international economic integration in order to ensure that trade and investment rules are aligned with urgent and longerterm needs, rather than standing in the way.

The report begins with an examination of U.S. trade policy before the pandemic and reveals an approach tilted heavily toward the interests of the financial sector and large and concentrated U.S. corporations, with negative impacts on many workers and households. U.S. trade policy created perverse incentives for U.S. corporations to move jobs, production and investment overseas, where they enjoyed huge profits and often avoided taxes. As these firms destroyed jobs and pushed down wages and regulations in the U.S., the government failed to change course and did little to help those who lost from its unbalanced policies.

 These failures were a campaign focus of then-candidate Donald Trump in 2016, but once in office he doubled down on the procorporate approach. While throwing on some tariffs and blaming other countries, the core of his trade policy aims to increase profitability and privileges for firms and investors. Despite bodog sportsbook review bombastic rhetoric, the data in the next two sections of this report show that he did nothing to improve the quality, security and wages of U.S. jobs. We review his main trade actions and agreements, including his deal to replace NAFTA and his trade war with China, and examine their impact on U.S. workers and hard-hit regions. The report then discusses Trump’s overall approach to China and what it means for jobs, wages and security in the U.S. and beyond. We propose constructive ways to develop a U.S.- China relationship that benefits both of the world’s two largest economies and thus the world economy as a whole and avoids the risk of dangerous confrontations or even a war that nobody could win.

The report then focuses on the future and how trade policy should be changed to recover the ground lost over recent decades and rebuild on a sound basis after the pandemic-induced recession. As we face a long and difficult recovery it is critical that every U.S. public policy must contribute to a revival of the economy, with a focus on empowering and lifting working households out of the recession and providing the public goods and services needed for health and social wellbeing. The U.S. should also be a leader in establishing the minimum rules needed to stabilize the global economy in a way that allows each country to participate in trade as a component of its own recovery, recognizing that a hostile, us-against-them attitude toward the world jeopardizes our own welfare while increasing the likelihood of serious conflicts. The report sketches out a new trade policy built to achieve equitable outcomes within the U.S. and across countries, prioritizing the interests of labor over investors and recognizing that labor exploitation anywhere undermines fairness everywhere. Curbing corporate power and shifting power to working people is a necessary part of a strategy to create quality jobs and broadly rising living standards across the world, making everyone better off. The proposed new trade policy also takes into account that we are facing a climate crisis in addition to the health crisis and includes steps toward a cooperative international system that builds health, stability and resilience across the world—now and sustainably into the future.

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World trade growth stalled during the first half of 2019, with year-on-year growth in the volume of merchandise trade dropping to 0.6% from 2.4% in the second half of 2018 as trade tensions continued to escalate. In response to the slower-than-expected pace of expansion, on 1 October 2019, the WTO Secretariat downgraded its forecasts for world trade growth in 2019 and 2020 to 1.2% and 2.7%, respectively (down from the estimates from last April of 2.6% and 3.0%, respectively) . Economic growth also slowed in major economies in the first half of the year, partly due to persistent trade tensions and partly as a result of cyclical and structural factors. World real GDP at market exchange rates is projected to increase by 2.3% in both 2019 and 2020. If these estimates are realized, trade volumes will only grow half as fast as world GDP in 2019.

The slowdown coincided with increasingly negative forward-looking indicators for world trade and output, including export orders derived from purchasing managers’ indices, and economic policy uncertainty based on the frequency of keywords in press accounts. Risks to the forecast are predominantly on the downside and include a further ratcheting-up of trade-restrictive measures and a sharper slowing of GDP growth in one or more major economies.

More specifically, this Report shows that WTO Members implemented 102 new trade-restrictive measures during the review period, including tariff increases, quantitative restrictions, stricter customs procedures, and imposition of import taxes and export duties. The main sectors targeted by the new import restrictions were mineral and fuels oils (HS 27) 17.7%, machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) 13%, electrical machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) 11.7%, and precious metals (HS 71) 6%.

The trade coverage for the new import-restrictive measures implemented by WTO Members was estimated at USD 746.9 billion. This is the highest recorded since October 2012 and represents an increase of 27% compared to the figure in the previous annual overview (USD 588.3 billion) . The trade coverage of import-restrictive measures recorded in the last two annual overviews has soared.

WTO Secretariat estimates of the stockpile of import restrictions implemented since 2009, and still in force, suggest that 7.5% of world imports are affected by import restrictions. At the end of 2018, USD 1.5 trillion out of a total USD 19.5 trillion of world imports were estimated to be affected by import restrictions put in place by WTO Members over the last decade. The trade coverage of import-restrictive measures implemented since 2009 and still in force by mid-October 2019 is estimated at USD 1.7 trillion, suggesting that the stockpile of import restrictions has continued to grow.

WTO Members also implemented 120 new measures aimed at facilitating trade, during the review period, including reducing or eliminating tariffs, export duties and import taxes. The trade coverage of the import-facilitating measures implemented during the review period was estimated at USD 544.7 billion (excluding ITA-related measures) . This is the second highest trade coverage reported for this type of measures since October 2012. The main sectors targeted by the new import-facilitating measures were machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) 13.4%, electrical machines and equipment (HS 85) 12.1%, copper and articles thereof (HS 74) 7.6%, and motor vehicles (HS 87) 7.4%.

In addition, liberalization associated with the 2015 expansion of the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA) continues to feature as an important contributor to trade facilitation. The trade coverage of the import-facilitating measures implemented during the review period associated with the ITA Expansion Agreement amounted to USD 705 billion, according to preliminary WTO Secretariat estimates.

The monthly average of initiations of trade remedy actions by WTO Members remained stable compared to 2018. However, the second half of the review period saw this figure accelerate, in particular as a result of new anti-dumping investigations. Initiations of anti-dumping investigations continue to be the most frequent trade remedy action, accounting for around four fifths of all initiations during the review period. In the area of safeguards, the review period saw a significant increase in activity. Trade remedy measures continue to be a very important trade policy tool for WTO Members, and account for about 68% of all trade measures captured in this Report. The main sectors targeted by trade remedy initiations during the review period were on furniture (HS 94) 24.7%, iron and steel (HS 72) 14%, articles of iron and steel (HS 73) 12.1%, and machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) 4.9%. The trade coverage of these initiations was estimated at USD 46.2 billion, and that of terminations at USD 24.8 billion. Both figures are significantly higher than the trade coverage recorded for these measures in the previous annual overview.

With respect to general economic support measures, the Secretariat received information from only eight WTO Members in response to the Director-General’s request for information. As a result, the Secretariat has been unable to justify the inclusion of a separate annex on these measures in the Report. From the limited information received from the WTO Members, and from the research undertaken by the Secretariat, bodog casino the current review period confirms that Members continue to implement such measures as part of their overall trade policy. Discussions at the informal TPRB meeting in July 2019 reinforced the need for further guidance as to how the Secretariat should cover these measures in the Trade Monitoring Reports. The selective commitment to transparency which has characterized general economic support measures in the context of the trade monitoring exercise should be of concern to all Members.

A range of other subjects are also covered by this Report. WTO Members have continued notifying their sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures, with most new notifications submitted by developing Members. The SPS and TBT notification obligations are meant to promote enhanced predictability and transparency regarding measures taken to address legitimate policy objectives. As in previous Reports, the majority of regular SPS notifications related to food safety, whereas the bulk of emergency SPS measures related to animal health. Most TBT measures indicated the protection of human health or safety as their main objective. In both the SPS and TBT Committees, WTO Members have dedicated considerable time in discussing specific trade concerns (STCs), suggesting an increasing use of the Committees by WTO Members as forums in which trade concerns may be resolved non-litigiously. Since 1995, 43% of all STCs raised at the SPS Committee have been reported as resolved or partially resolved.

The Report provides evidence of the continuous increase of trade issues and concerns raised in a wider range of WTO bodies during the review period. About 230 trade concerns were raised in some 28 formal meetings of WTO bodies other than the SPS and TBT Committees, showing an increase of 8% per meeting compared to the previous annual report. A significant number of trade concerns were raised in successive meetings of the same Committee/Council, and often in multiple WTO bodies, confirming that many concerns involve what appear to be technically complex and persistent problems. WTO Members are increasingly using multiple platforms within the WTO committee structure to address various aspects of their trade concerns and for exploring solutions to trade frictions non-litigiously. At the same time, the reasons behind the repetition and non-resolution of the same trade concerns and issues in various WTO bodies may warrant further study.

In the area of agriculture, WTO Members continued to make use of the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) as a forum to discuss agricultural policies and issues related to the implementation of commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) . WTO Members continued asking questions on individual notifications and under Article 18.6 of the AoA, with the majority (70%) of those directed to domestic support notifications. The average number of questions raised under Article 18.6 per meeting has been increasing since 2011, reaching an average of 51 questions per meeting in 2019. Among the new issues raised during the review period, more than half related to Members’ domestic support policies, and around 30% related to measures that restrict, or had the potential to restrict, trade of agricultural products.

The level of the WTO dispute settlement system activity remained high during the review period, despite the impasse over the appointment of new Appellate Body members. The Report shows that, over the last 12 months, 29 panels were composed and commenced work, and appeals were filed in 8 disputes, resulting in 55 panel, arbitration and appeal proceedings ongoing during each month on average.

The Report also illustrates that, with a few exceptions, the compliance with notification requirements of the various WTO Agreements remains very uneven. Although there have been significant efforts by some delegations to bring their notifications further up to date, the general sense is that progress remains slow. The lack of compliance with notification obligations across WTO bodies is problematic, as it undermines individual agreements and, more generally, the operation of the multilateral trading system. There are several reasons for this low compliance, and an important one relates to the lack of capacity of many WTO Members to fulfil their notification obligations, despite the continued efforts by the WTO Secretariat and the Committees.

Work on the implementation of the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement advanced. Many Members concluded their domestic ratification processes, raising the total number of acceptances to about 89% of the entire WTO membership.

Many new measures affecting trade in services were introduced by WTO Members and Observers during the review period. While most of these were trade-facilitating, a significant number appeared to be trade-restrictive, in particular measures affecting communication and network-enabled services, as well as policies pertaining to the review of foreign investment in certain areas considered strategic or linked to national security.

The Report also draws attention to developments in Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), including the strengthening link between intellectual property (IP) and trade, and the development and diversification of national policies to streamline IP into the economy. WTO Members continued to develop and diversify their own national strategies to streamline IP into the economy and to modernize and fine-tune their IP legislation and administration. 

Following MC11, work continued throughout 2019 to advance negotiations, particularly on fisheries subsidies, building on the decision taken by Members in Buenos Aires. Groups of Members also continued to pursue their discussions on other issues, including electronic commerce, investment facilitation, women’s economic empowerment, domestic regulation in services, and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) .

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We asked these questions ourselves at the Inter-American Development Bank, as part of a study on how trade liberalization has impacted Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in recent decades.

To answer these questions, the IDB added a module on foreign trade to the 2018 Latinobarómetro opinion poll, which found that on average, 73% of Latin Americans expressed support for their country increasing trade with other countries.

Levels of support varies from country to country, ranging from 59% in Argentina and Peru to over 85% in Venezuela, Honduras, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. Despite this range, most respondents in each country favor increased trade.

However, the results also reveal that support for trade is fragile, as less than half of Latin Americans continued to express support when informed it may have negative consequences for employment. These reactions remind us of Princeton professor Alan Blinder’s comment that support for trade is “a mile wide and an inch deep.” This also seems to be true of Latin America.

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The poll also reveals a series of patterns that may prove particularly interesting to trade policymakers in LAC:

• The majority (58%) believe that trade boosts employment, while only 11% believe that trade leads to less employment. One exception to this finding is Chile, but in countries like Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, over 70% of respondents share this view.
• Some 37% of respondents believe that increased trade leads to higher wages.
• Nearly four out of every 10 people think that trade is associated with a greater variety of products.
• Some 78% of Latin American men said they were in favor of trade, as compared to 71% of women.
• People with greater access to the media tend to be more in favor of trade (75%) than those with less access.

The above figures suggest that when it comes to trade, people care first and foremost about employment, a finding that policymakers seeking to pursue trade reforms or promote trade liberalization can make use of in their political and media strategies.

Both LAC and the world are protrade

By way of comparison, the poll’s findings on levels of support for trade among Latin Americans were on par with global attitudes to trade. According to the 2017 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, on average, 86% of respondents in 38 countries think trade and business ties with other nations are good for their country. According to Pew, levels of support for trade in Latin America are lower but still considerable at 80%.

A review of the Pew data on support for trade over time reveals that between 2002 and 2017, despite a slight downturn in support in Brazil, there is no evidence of a significant anti-globalization reaction in how either Latin American countries or the rest of the world feel about trade.

Major findings on support for trade

After analyzing the results of Latinobarómetro and comparing them with the Pew survey, we share three major findings on trade support that we think bodog casino are particularly relevant for LAC countries:

1. While trade advocates can take heart in the population’s widespread support for trade, that support is tenuous at best. Policymakers must remain vigilant and seek out creative ways to hold onto this support.
2. When it comes to trade, people care first and foremost about employment. Policymakers seeking to safeguard trade reform or further liberalize their economies may need to counterbalance these initiatives with positive information about employment.
3. While mile-wide support for trade is reassuring, its inch-deep nature makes reform more susceptible to protectionist reversals in response to some politicians’ tactics concerning how trade affects employment.

To find out more, download the chapter “On Board with Trade, for Now: People’s Attitudes and Support”, which we are releasing as a special sneak preview for readers of this blog. This is one of the chapters of the IDB’s flagship Development in the Americas report, which focuses on trade this year and will be launched in November.

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The USMCA would revise and strengthen labor provisions of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and require Mexico to enact certain changes to its domestic labor laws. Scrutiny over Mexico’s labor practices during the negotiations put increased pressure on Mexico to advance ongoing reform efforts. After several years of domestic debate and constitutional reforms in 2017, on May 1, 2019, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador signed into law a labor reform bill aimed at enhancing Mexican worker rights by ensuring that workers can vote for union representatives by secret ballot, establishing the right to join unions of choice, and creating an independent labor court to resolve disputes between union workers and employers and register contracts, among other measures. Similar issues are addressed in an annex of the USMCA.

Historically, U.S. labor advocates have expressed concern over free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries, due to those countries’ relatively lower wages and labor standards, and have sought stronger labor provisions in U.S. FTAs. In the view of some observers, U.S. FTAs can help improve standards, build capacity to support worker rights in developing countries, and enhance economic development and growth. At the same time, trade liberalization can adversely impact domestic labor markets in certain industries and regions of the country. In the long run, FTAs help reallocate resources to more efficient industries, support higher-paying U.S. jobs, and, according to most economists, have a net positive effect on the U.S. economy. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that, if implemented, the collective bargaining commitments made by Mexico in USMCA would increase Mexican union wages and help reduce wage disparity.

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