Techno-nationalism seeks to attain competitive advantage for its own stakeholders, on a global scale, in order to leverage this advantage for geopolitical gain. At stake is supremacy in the industries of the future: data analytics, robotics, AI and machine learning, surveillance technology and 5G networks, to name a few. 

And at the core of all these future technologies are semiconductors, which provide the vital materials and circuitry necessary to produce microchips — which, in turn, are required to operate everything from a smart phone to an advanced satellite weapons system. In short, microchips are the central nervous systems and brains inside all new age technology.

In 2018, global sales of semiconductors and related technology topped $468 billion. China’s semiconductor market represents, by far, the world’s largest importer. Semiconductor-related technologies are China’s largest import products, exceeding even its imports of oil. As will be revealed in this study, China depends almost entirely on American and other foreign companies to supply its needs for integrated circuits, either as imports, or as foreign producers within China’s domestic market.

The intensifying nature of the US-China tech war, combined with the scale and depth of China’s market—and the massive economic gains it provides to American and foreign semiconductor companies—creates a collision of vested interests that has sparked a flurry of protectionist policies in Washington and elsewhere.

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In an attempt to reduce its dependence on American and other foreign semiconductor technologies, as well as advance China’s own innovation, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has rolled out ambitious strategies to promote and fund the development of China’s technology in critical sectors. This funding is earmarked for attracting key investment and technology transfer into China as well as acquiring critical technology overseas, through state- backed acquisition initiatives.

One such initiative is the Made in China 2025 government plan, with some estimates putting the Chinese Communist Party’s funding commitment at $300 billion over a ten- year period. The Chinese Communist Party’s semiconductor financing efforts go well beyond Made in China 2025, however. For example, China’s official government numbers claim that, as of 2019, some $29 billion of funding has been provided for the China National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund.

Simultaneously, the government has been pumping large sums of money into other technology funds, such as Tsinghua Holdings, the technology investment arm of one of China’s top state-led universities, which the Chinese Communist Party has charged with funding and advancing China innovation in the semiconductor industry.

U.S. Counter-Measures

In response to Beijing’s semiconductor initiatives, the U.S. passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), in 2018. This was born bodog online casino largely from a broader narrative shift that links the level of development of a nation’s commercial technology directly with national security —which increasing numbers of policy makers in the U.S. military and security establishment argue is more important than trade deficits or tariff rates.

Under the ECRA, The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is currently reviewing the addition of new“emerging” and “foundational” technologies, for inclusion on U.S. Department of Commerce’s Controlled Commodity List (CCL), which would require export licenses for the sale and transfer of such technologies.

At issue is the relevance of “dual use,” which is defined as a commercial technology or product which can be used for military purposes–which would apply to virtually all of the industries of the future.These new measures will spill over into other markets, as the U.S. will likely propose that the ECRA’s newly added tech controls also be adopted by its allies under the multilateral framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which includes 41 other member countries.

Meanwhile, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018, enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has led to a substantial increase in foreign investment reviews by the Committee on Foreign investment in the United States (CFIUS). As such, the number of high-profile acquisitions of US technology companies by Chinese entities have ground to a halt.

The Proliferation of Non- Tariff Measures (NTMs)

The US-China technology rivalry is driving an escalation of non-tariff measures (NTMs), which could have more profound effects on global supply chains than tariffs. The most noteworthy NTMs include:

• Sanctions
• Export controls
• Licensing requirements
• Restricted entity lists
• Blocked acquisitions and investments

By definition, an export control is simply a regulation that is put in place to protect national security, promote foreign or domestic policy, and, in some instances, control the export of items in short supply. An export control is not, by itself, a prohibition to sell or buy something.

Export controls, however, mean that an export license may have to be issued by the appropriate government licensing agency to allow an exporter to sell, transfer or transport a product to a foreign market, depending on where the final buyer is located, who the buyer is, and how the controlled item will be used. In almost all cases, when the facts surrounding a controlled item are reviewed, US government agencies issue export licenses in the vast majority of instances.

But NTMs such as export controls add a layer of uncertainty to GVCs and threaten to turn a long-time supplier into an unreliable supplier. Export controls also mean that a company’s global value chains will be examined under the proverbial regulatory compliance microscope, adding compliance costs, delays and risks.

Such was the case when the US threatened to block the sale of American technology to Chinese telecoms company ZTE (which was later rolled back). Subsequently, Huawei, HikVision, SenseTime and other key Chinese tech firms have been placed on the US Restricted Entities List. 

And then there are military, space and defense related articles as defined under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in the US, which control the manufacture, sale and distributions of such items. Here, a simple transaction with a restricted party is forbidden. Many companies are asking how broad might the ITAR controlled list become?

Impact on Trade Flows and Global Value Chains

The world’s semiconductor companies are now caught in the middle of the US-China tech war. Export restrictions on Huawei and other Chinese entities have inflicted collateral damage on American semiconductor companies such as Broadcom, Qualcomm, Intel, Nvidia, and others, while the ripple effects bodog poker review of these actions are being felt throughout extended global value chains.

The US-China tech war presents an historic inflection point, therefore, for technology companies, with far- reaching consequences for trade flows. This rivalry signals the beginning of a momentous shift in global value chains. Multinational companies in the semiconductor industry and beyond will need to react and adjust to this changing landscape. The ensuing sections of this report delve into these issues and aim to answer the key questions, outlined below.

To view the full report, click here.

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As parties to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Canada and Mexico have agreed to adopt important intellectual property protections for biologic medicines. Most significantly, both countries have agreed to increase the term of regulatory data protection (RDP) for new biologic medicines to ten years, thereby approaching the 12 years provided by the United States. Currently, Canada provides an eight-year term, while Mexico offers no protection.

Despite past evidence to the contrary, some have suggested that this provision of the USMCA will increase drug spending. For example, a memo prepared for Canada’s Health Minister suggested that the USMCA will result in additional medicine costs of CA$169m by 2029.

This research note presents evidence that extending the term of regulatory data protection is unlikely to drive up health spending beyond existing trends. Evidence from Japan and Canada, which both lengthened their respective terms of data protection unilaterally in 2007 and 2006 respectively, shows that the increased protection did not raise drug spending as a percentage of overall health care spending or lead to higher growth rates of drug spending.

The research note proceeds as follows. The first section gives an overview of methodology and data, followed by an overview of the role and rationale for regulatory data protection in the research and development of biologic medicines. The paper then presents evidence on health and medicines spending from Japan and Canada in the years immediately preceding and following the lengthening of their terms of protection for regulatory data.

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[To read the original research, click here]

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The emergence of global value chains – whereby goods that used to be produced within one country are now fragmented and distributed across global networks of production – has offered developing countries new opportunities to integrate into the global economy. This has also had fundamental impacts for workers in developing countries. The chapter shows that higher earnings and employment within sectors and firms is associated with GVC integration, which also supports other spillovers that operate through labor markets. But it has also had distributional implications of where jobs go and the types of jobs they are. Jobs bodog poker review growth has occurred directly in the export sector, as well as indirectly through linkages of exporting firms to domestic, input-supplying firms. Employment creation and wage gains have been biased towards more skilled workers in developing countries, which contrasts with the predictions of trade theory. The skill-biased nature of GVC trade is associated with increased complexity of global supply chains as well as increased use of skill-intensive inputs, notably services. New emerging trends, including automation and digitization, may further determine how employment in developing countries will be affected by GVC trade in the future. The findings point to education as well as trade and labor policies as important factors for strengthening the GVC-labor relationship.

[To view the original research, click here]

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The policy brief by Brookings Institution suggests that the WTO should be central to resolving U.S.-China trade tensions. It also outlines a multi-pronged strategy, including bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral actions, as well as working with allies, for stabilizing the relationship with China. For instance, accession to the CPTPP could be used to encourage China’s compliance with its WTO commitments.

A key conclusion is that the U.S. should focus on addressing the real issues at hand in a free market manner. It should also strengthen the multilateral global trading system and rule of law that it has championed in the post-World War II era. bodog poker review

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To view the original piece, please click here.

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Drawing on a global database of media articles, we quantitatively assess perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in different countries and regions. We find that the BRI is generally positively received. All regions as a whole, except South Asia, have a positive perception of the BRI, but there are marked differences at the country level, with some countries in all regions having very negative views. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in perceptions of the BRI between countries that officially participate in the BRI and those that do not.

We also use our dataset of media articles to identify the topics that are most frequently associated bodog sportsbook review with the BRI. The most common topics are trade and investment. Finally, we use regression analysis to identify how the frequency with which these topics are discussed in the news affects the perceptions of the BRI in different countries. We find that the more frequently trade is mentioned in the media, the more negative a country’s perception of the BRI tends to be. On the other hand, while investment under the BRI seems also to attract attention in the media, it is not statistically relevant for countries’ perceptions of the BRI.

To view the original piece, click here.

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Just to be clear on the agenda here, the alleged theft takes three forms. The first is what passes for actual theft. It is when a Chinese company, possibly with help from the Chinese government, literally takes technology from a US company. This can happen, for example, if they infiltrate its internal computer system.

While this is undeniably a bad practice, it is not unique to Chinese companies. In fact, many US companies also engage in such practices. Uber famously agreed to pay Waymo $245 million for stealing some of its software for self-driving cars. It would be hard to know if China’s companies are more guilty in this area than anyone else, but we can agree it is a bad practice that should be stopped.

The second area is forced technology transfers. This is when China requires that US companies, like Boeing or GE, take on a Chinese partner when they set up operations in China. This allows the Chinese companies to gain expertise in the technology used by US companies and then become potential competitors.

The third type of alleged theft is when Chinese companies don’t honor the patents or copyrights of US corporations. For example, this would be the use of software developed by Microsoft without paying it a licensing fee. It could also mean making generic versions of drugs developed by Pfizer or Merck without paying them royalties. And, it means making unauthorized copies of music and movies copyrighted by Disney and Time-Warner.

Our elites are hoping Trump can clamp down on these practices by Chinese companies and better protect the intellectual property of US corporations. But why should this be a concern for the non-elites, as in everyone below the top 5 percent or so of the income distribution?

Let’s start with the issue of forced technology transfer. Boeing is upset, because under the current rules, if they set up shop in China, they are going to have to partner with a company that is likely to be a competitor a few years down the road.

Suppose tough-talking Trump forces China to accept rules that prohibit these mandated partnerships. Under his new deal, if Boeing wants to set up shop in China it just starts building a new facility, no partner needed.

Standard economics would tell us that this will make Boeing and other US companies more likely to set up operations in China. This is obviously good from the standpoint of Boeing’s profits, but why exactly should US workers be happy about a change that will facilitate the outsourcing of US jobs?

There is a similar question about making China pay more money to US corporations for software, pharmaceuticals, and movies and music. In a standard trade model, we would expect that increased payments for intellectual property would mean a rise in the demand for dollars. That means the dollar would Bodog Poker rise in value against the Chinese yuan.

With a higher valued dollar, US exports would be more expensive to people living in China, meaning we export less. Chinese imports are also cheaper for people living in the United States, meaning we would import more. The net effect is a larger trade deficit on everything other than intellectual products, which is bad news for those of us who don’t own lots of stock in Pfizer and Merck or work in designing software or developing drugs.

In the wake of the 2018 elections, there were a number of articles that pointed out that the left-behind regions of the country seemed to be the strongest supporters for Trump and the Republican Party. The argument was that the people in these areas are not part of the dynamic sectors of the US economy and they are lashing out by supporting the racist, xenophobic agenda being pushed by Trump. There were also some pieces that offered suggestions on how the rest of us could help the left-behinds.

Helping the regions that are not sharing in the economy’s growth is a long and complex story, but part of the solution would be to design trade policy to make their situation better, not worse, which is what our media is encouraging Trump to do. It is truly incredible that most of the advocates of this trade policy do not even seem to understand the class nature of their agenda, equating the interests of a tiny group at the top with the interests of the whole country.

It sure looks like Trump is not the only one who doesn’t know what he is doing when it comes to trade.

To view the original article on the Truthout website, click here.

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USMCA was agreed to by the U.S., Mexico, and Canada on October 1, 2018 and signed by representatives at the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina on November 30. The deal must now be ratified by legislative bodies in each country including the U.S. Congress. The schedule for ratification in each country is uncertain at this time.1

Canada and Mexico are the United States’ second and third largest trading partners, after China. The North American economy is highly integrated and goods flow back and forth across the continent as part of complex supply chains before reaching market. The U.S. and Canada trade large amounts of vehicles, agricultural products, mineral fuels, and services. U.S. trade with Mexico is dominated by agricultural products and machinery, with Mexico importing U.S. corn, soybeans, dairy, meat, electrical machinery, and fuel while supplying the U.S. with fresh fruit, vegetables, beer, vehicles, and medical instruments.

To read the report published by the Washington Council on International Trade, click here.

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Copyright © 2018 Washington Council on International Trade

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