Anti-dumping Archives - WITA

Annual Report on the EU’s Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities and the Use of Trade Defence Instruments by Third Countries targeting the EU in 2020

Jake O'Keeffe — Mon, 30 Aug 2021 15:13:13 +0000

This 39th Report gives information on the EU’s anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard activities, as well as the trade defence activity of third countries against the EU in 2020, in line with the Commission’s reporting obligations.

The European Union is committed to open rules-based trade, supported by the tools to defend European industry against unfair trade practices. The Commission ensures that where industries are harmed because of unfair practices, such as dumped and subsidised imports, they can rely on the EU’s trade defence instruments to provide an effective response.

Ensuring fair trade conditions for European producers also means dealing with trade defence actions taken by third countries against the EU, which reached their highest level in 2020.

While 2020 presented new and unique challenges in global trade, the Commission adapted and responded to these challenges and those posed by existing and new unfair trade practices and continued its enforcement of the EU’s trade defence instruments.

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To read the full report from the European Commission, please click here.

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Executive Incentives, Import Restrictions, and Competition

Ashley Singh — Thu, 27 May 2021 21:18:06 +0000

To better understand the political economy of trade policy, I examine executive compensation around the time of changes to import restrictions through antidumping and countervailing duty orders. Trade policy restrictions limit international competition, so I explore the resulting compensation of firm managers. When imports are restricted, firms linked to restrictive orders give their CEOs compensation in cash and equity incentives that is 17 percent higher than when the restrictions are not in place. Furthermore, CEOs’ compensation is $1 million higher than expected, suggesting the additional compensation is not explained by superior firm performance or other characteristics. Overall, the findings suggest that executives benefit amid import restrictions, thereby contributing to research on executive incentives, trade, and public choice.

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To read the original report, please click here.

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United States : Certain Methodologies And Their Application To Anti-dumping Proceedings Involving China : Re-litigating Through The backdoor?

Ashley Singh — Thu, 27 May 2021 21:13:30 +0000

This paper presents a legal-economic analysis of the World Trade Organization’s Article 22.6 arbitration report on the dispute over certain United States’ antidumping methodologies. The Arbitrator sought to quantify the damages suffered by China from US non-compliance with an earlier ruling. The case covered 25 antidumping duty determinations for which at least one of three methodologies (weighted average-to-transaction; single rate presumption; and zeroing) was incorrectly applied. Damage calculations rely heavily on how the counterfactual is defined—what would have been the duty had it not been for the inconsistent measures? The Arbitrator deemed a zero-duty counterfactual to be appropriate, but the justifications were in our view weak and illustrate the danger of an Arbitrator essentially performing re-litigation of violations that may or may not have occurred in the administrative investigations. We conclude that the Arbitrators may have gone above and beyond their mandate in this determination.

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To view the original report from European University Institute, please click here.

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